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ABSTRACT
Smartphone penetration surpassed 80% in the US and nears 70% in Western Europe.
In fact, smartphones became the de facto devices users leverage to manage personal infor-
mation and access external data and other connected devices on a daily basis. To support
such multi-faceted functionality, smartphones are designed with a multi-process architecture,
which enables third-party developers to build smartphone applications which can utilize
smartphone internal and external resources to o↵er creative utility to users. Unfortunately,
such third-party programs can exploit security ine ciencies in smartphone operating sys-
tems to gain unauthorized access to available resources, compromising the confidentiality of
rich, highly sensitive user data.
The smartphone ecosystem, is designed such that users can readily install and replace
applications on their smarpthones. This facilitates users’ e↵orts in customizing the capabil-
ities of their smartphones tailored to their needs. Statistics report an increasing number of
available smartphone applications—in 2017 there were approximately 3.5 million third-party
apps on the o fial application store of the most popular smartphone platform. In addition
we expect users to have approximately 95 such applications installed on their smartphones at
any given point. However, mobile apps are developed by untrusted sources. On Android—
which enjoys 80% of the smarpthone OS marketshare—application developers are identified
based on self-sign certificates. Thus there is no good way of holding a developer account-
able for a malicious behavior. This creates an issue of multi-tenancy on smartphones where
principals from diverse untrusted sources share internal and external smartphone resources.
Smartphone OSs rely on traditional operating system process isolation strategies to confine
untrusted third-party applications. However this approach is insu cient because incidental
seemingly harmless resources can be utilized by untrusted tenants as side-channels to bypass
the process boundaries. Smartphones also introduced a permission model to allow their users
to govern third-party application access to system resources (such as camera, microphone
and location functionality). However, this permission model is both coarse-grained and does
not distinguish whether a permission has been declared by a trusted or an untrusted princi-
pal. This allows malicious applications to perform privilege escalation attacks on the mobile
platform. To make things worse, applications might include third-party libraries, for ad-
vertising or common recognition tasks. Such libraries share the process address space with
their host apps and as such can inherit all the privileges the host app does. Identifying and
mitigating these problems on smartphones is not a trivial process. Manual analysis on its
own of all mobile apps is cumbersome and impractical, code analysis techniques su↵er from
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scalability and coverage issues, ad-hoc approaches are impractical and sucseptible to mis-
takes, while sometimes vulnerabilities are well hidden at the interplays between smartphone
tenants and resources.
In this work I follow an analytical approach to discover major security and privacy issues
on smartphone platforms. I utilize the Android OS as a use case, because of its open-source
nature but also its popularity. In particular I focus on the multi-tenancy characteristic of
smartphones and identify the resources each tenant within a process, across processes and
across devices can access. I design analytical tools to automate the discovery process, attacks
to better understand the adversary models, and introduce design changes to the participating
systems to enable robust fine-grained access control of resources. My approach revealed a
new understanding of the threats introduced from third-party libraries within an application
process; it revealed new capabilities of the mobile application adversary exploiting shared
filesystem and permission resources; and shows how a mobile app adversary can exploit
shared communication mediums to compromise the confidentiality of the data collected by
external devices (e.g. fitness and medical accessories, NFC tags etc.). Moreover, I show how
we can eradicate these problems following an architectural design approach to introduce
backward-compatible, e↵ective and e cient modifications in operating systems to achieve
fine-grained application access to shared resources. My work has let to security changes in
the o cial release of Android by Google.
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Eleven years now, after the first iOS and Android enabled smartphones, the technology
behemoths are now responsible for 90% [1] of total smartphone sales in 2018. These de-
vices have revolutionized the way people communicate and manage personal and business
tasks. Their unprecedented nature, which combines mobility, computational power and a
model of easy to replace applications that can facilitate every facet of our everyday lives,
constitute them an integral tool for people of any age. This very model, designed to leverage
developers’ creativity to provide users with a menagerie of smartphone applications (apps
for short) of any perceived purpose, led to the release of an astounding number of apps in
o cial application markets. Statista reports an almost exponential increase in the number
of available smartphone apps on the o cial application store for Android devices, with a
recent gnaw-dropping recorded number of 3.5 million apps [2]. These apps cover a broad
spectrum of functionality: applications for entertainment purposes, like games for children
and for adults; apps for educational purposes that can be used at schools and at home; apps
that render managing financial investments trivial; apps that help people manage their time
and tasks; o ce apps, data management apps; even apps for medical purposes, facilitating
decision making for doctors, or helping patients manage their treatment or daily activities
to improve quality of life; and recently apps to control and interface with Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, such as connected motion sensors and cameras.
Increasingly, smarpthone apps incorporate third-party libraries for two main reasons: (a)
for advertising; (b) for utility. For example, Grace et.al found that approximately 50%
out of 100,000 collected apps use in-app advertising libraries (ad libraries for short) for
monetization [3]. They further found that a third of them integrate one ad library while
one of the apps they analyzed includes 20 such libraries. In our work, we further found that
33.3% out of 230,000 collected apps that request the camera permission, include at least one
third-party library [4]. These third-party libraries are used for a variety of purposes such as,
location services, character encoding, audio encoding/decoding, text recognition, credit card
scanning and computer vision support among others. This highlighs the fact that including
third-party libraries is a common practice on the smarpthone ecosystem. These libraries,
interface with their host apps through APIs which the hosts utilize to pass information to
the libraries for their tasks.
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In turn, the host applications utilize operating system resources and capabilities for their
own functionalities. Smartphone operating systems o↵er a rich API to application devel-
opers for accessing user data such as a user’s contact list, incoming SMSs or collaborate
with other applicaitons on the system. Smartphone APIs also allow processes to leverage
a smartphone’s advanced sensing and communication capabilities. These capabilities allow
contemporary phones to receive and transmit information from and to accessories, remote
servers and devices: Bluetooth is being utilized to allow smartphone users to manage their
medical conditions, keep track of their fitness progress and communicate with other Blue-
tooth enabled phones; NFC made credit card payments fast and seamless and can automate
repetitive tasks through the tap of the phone on an NFC tag; smartphone audio jacks can
be used again for monetary transactions [5] or for receiving sensitive information from ac-
cessories regarding its user’s body functions; SMS can be more than a message exchange
between users as it can be used for sensitive tasks i.e 2-factor authentication; also the ability
to connect through WiFi with remote domains allow app developers to o↵er mobile adver-
tising for monetization or interface with IoT devices in a home area network or across the
world.
Of particular interest, is the Android OS which dominates the smartphone marketshare [1].
Its open source nature led to the adoption of Google’s proud green robot by the vast major-
ity of hardware vendors, o↵ering Android enabled devices for everyone, regardless of their
financial capabilities. Android smartphones are available from $40 to $800 with a variety of
di↵erent specifications. Flagship Android phones and tablets, now feature quad core proces-
sors, 4GB of RAM, in par with modern laptops and notebooks. The computational power
of those devices, in tandem with their ubiquitous, always-present nature and its current
penetration has dictated the use of Android smartphones for personal, business and medical
purposes.
This vast adoption of Android, created an equally large attack surface for malicious ap-
plications aiming to infringe users’ privacy. Unequivocally, investment in malware makes
more sense when a security vulnerability or breach a↵ects a wide user base and Android is
the ideal candidate for doing just that. As malware targeting Android increases, we have
witnessed a large scale of malicious attempts [6] exploiting the system’s vulnerability to
gain root access, or charging users money, by sending SMSs or calling premium numbers [7].
Furthermore the scientific community delineated another spectrum of the popular system’s
vulnerabilities, using more sophisticated attacks such as permission re-delegation [8] and
capability leaks [9]. Lastly, in a data-driven world, multi-billion dollar industries such as
analytics and advertising, rely on building detail user profiles, which in essence incentivizes
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them as well to follow aggressive data harvesting practices, which are not always in accord
with users expectations.
Android marketshare, penetration, use in sensitive settings and the fact that is being
targeted by the vast majority of smartphone malware, analytics and advertising networks,
highlight the significance of an analytical approach for studying the security of the platform
but also the need for designing backward compatible, e cient and e↵ective defense mecha-
nisms that detect questionable data harvesting behaviors and prevent malicious ones. For
the rest of this thesis I will be using Android as a use case of a modern smartphone operating
system.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Android OS uses various security strategies to control userspace process access to
sensitive resources (Android apps run as userspace processes). Android leverages a Dis-
cretionary Access Control (DAC) scheme to isolate processes and their data. Moreover, it
recently introduced a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) scheme to further strongly isolate
system processes from third-party applications. Both are enforced at process level in the
kernel layer. On top of the kernel, lies the Android middleware which leverages a permission
model to govern process access to system and application resources. For example, when an
app wants to utilize the sensitive system API to record audio, it needs to first get granted
the MICROPHONE permission by the user of the system.
Unfortunately, these mechanisms are inadequate to guarantee the confidentiality of sen-
sitive information. All strategies are applied at the process granularity and as such fail
to identify threats from libraries which share the same privileges with their host pro-
cesses [10, 4]. The DAC scheme which protects filesystem resources is adopted from a
static environment. However, filesystem resources shared across processes in a station-
ary machine sometimes require di↵erent access control management when used on a mobile
platform [11]. The MAC scheme only focuses on isolating system processes from third-party
apps allowing attacks between apps of the latter kind. Moreover, the Android permission
model does not distinguish between system permissions defined by the system (a privileged
principal) and custom permissions defined by untrusted third-party apps (unprivileged prin-
cipals) to protect their shared application components, which allows compromising the
confidentiality of those components [12]. Moreover, this permission model mostly depends
on user input when protecting access to communication channels and as such it needs to
strike a balance between usability and security granularity. In essense, this model is both
too coarse-grained and users are desensitized to permission prompts. This further allows
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third-party apps to gain unfetterd access to shared direct communication resources
such as the Bluetooth, NFC and Audio channels [13, 14] and shared indirect commu-
nication channels such as WiFi devices on the same network [15]. This allows malicious
apps to stealthily attack other devices that can connect to the smartphone.
Previous works have been taking ad-hoc and impractical approaches to mitigate these
issues. Some works simply propose more permissions for controlling access to sensitive
resources at a finer-granularity [16]. However these introduce a permission overbloat problem
and exacerbate the desencitization of users to the permission model. Other works considered
spliting libraries from their host apps so we can utilize process level isolation [17]; these are
both ine cient and impractical as they break the business model of advertising networks, a
role increasingly assumed by smartphone vendors as well. Other works focus only on code
analysis for prevention which is not scalable and slow to utilize at runtime [3, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26] while other researchers propose ad-hoc approaches for quickly patching
found vulnerabilities; these are hard to maintain and usually do not address the root causes
of the security problems.
Instead, I postulate that we need an analytical approach to systematically reason about
the security challenges on smartphones. Such an approach will allow us to better model
the smartphone adversary and thus design unified, e cient, scalabe and robust systems to
eradicate security problems.
1.3 APPROACH
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to securing smartphone systems. However, thinking
about the resources we need to protect and the principals that try to—or have an incentive
to—access those resources, greatly facilitates the process. Specifically, in my work I focus
on how di↵erent kinds of resources are shared between tenants at di↵erent granularities on
a smartphone platform to unearth security and privacy vulnerabilities. I then utilize these
results to drive design desicions in building tools and systems for detection and prevention
of information leakage through such shared resources. My solutions aim to satisfy the fol-
lowing important design properties: e↵ectiveness; e ciency; backward compatibility and;
maintainability.
In particular, in my work I systematically analyzed five classes of shared resources and
found how tenants at di↵erent granularities can exploit them to compromise sensitive user in-
formation. These classes are: (a) shared process privileges; (b) shared filesystem resources;

































Figure 1.1: Smartphone shared resources.
and; (e) shared direct communication channels (d and e are depicted as connectivity re-
sources). Figure 1.1 summarizes the approach at a conceptual level.
First, executable code from di↵erent untrusted sources, might run within the same process
boundaries. Therefore they share privileges at the process level. For example, Android apps
are commonly distributed for free. In turn they o↵er advertising which can result in
monetizing user impressions and clicks among others. To achieve this return of investement
the app developers include ad libraries into their source code which are compiled with the
host application. As a result the advertising code runs within the same process as the host
app. This symbiotic relationship comes with an intrinsic sharing of privileges: a third-party
library can exploit that to access application data and platform resources. Other studies
have focused on the ad libraries’ current behaviors. Such approaches are limited since they
cannot predict future behaviors. In contrast, we model all the di↵erent ways an ad library can
access user data on the Android platform. Since in this case, the OS cannot make a decision
whether advertising data collection constitutes a malicious behavior, I instead designed a
detection system, called Pluto [10], which can be utilized by application markets to quantify
the risk associated with embedding an ad library into an app. Pluto leverages Android OS
domain knowledge combined with natural language processing and frequent pattern mining
techniques to automatically detect sensitive user information that can be inferred by an ad
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library due to its vantage placement in a target app. Pluto performs a risk assessment and
provides a privacy-leakage risk score associated with embedding an advertising library in a
mobile app.
Second, I found that Android su↵ers from information leaks stemming from unprotected
filesystem resources. The protection of such resources on Android, is delegated to the tra-
ditional Linux Discretionary Access Control, where a user or a group of users is granted a
combination of the read, write and execute permissions. However, information seemingly
innocuous on a stationary machine, that is made available to any process, can have grave
privacy implications when used on a smartphone (or any multi-tenant mobile) platform.
Therefore, if some of those resources are transferred from Linux to Android without the
proper access control modifications, then private information leaks are a pragmatic and im-
minent threat. Indeed I found that an adversarial smartphone app can utilize such shared
filesystem resources as side-channels to infer a smartphone user’s identity, medical condition
and financial preferences. Since then a lot of other works followed, utilizing other shared
filesystem resources as side-channels. Google on version 6, introduced restrictions to third-
party application access to such resources.
Third, smartphone applications can share their application components with other ap-
plications on the same platform. The Android OS provides application developers the a
security mechanism to protect such components from unauthorized accesses. Specifically,
third-party app developers can declare their own custom permissions in the system. How-
ever the OS does not distinguish at runtime between a permission declared by the system
and a custom permission declared by an untrusted third-party app. Moreover, it does not
have a way of tracking ownership of custom permissions. In essence custom permissions
are identified by their developer-declared name which can be claimed on a first-come-first-
served basis. This allows malicious third-party apps to manipulate their component-sharing
security mechanism to elevate their privileges and gain unauthorized access to other tenants
components but also system resources such as the calendar, camera, contacts, location, mi-
crophone, phone, sensors, SMS and storage. To mitigate this I introduced a new version of
the Android permission model which separates management of system-defined and custom
permissions, can identify at runtime whether a permission is system or custom and can fur-
ther track ownership of custom permissions. The new permission model is designed to be
backward compatible with third-party apps, is e cient, and formally verified to be correct
with fundamental security properties.
Four, Bluetooth, NFC, Audio, and SMS constitute shared channels of direct communi-
cation between a smartphone and a remote or external source. Here we use external and
remote interchangeably as remote sources are indeed external resources for the mobile OS
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on smartphones. Since these channels carry private information most of the times, Android
OS developers correctly protected access to those channels with permissions. However, not
only permissions are being neglected or granted without scrutiny from users [27] but even if
users bestow the appropriate attention, this work argues that they are very coarse-grained to
protect the resources they guard. Consider for example an app that requires the Bluetooth
permission to supposedly connect to an accessory. Once the permission is granted, that
app gains unfettered access to the Bluetooth channel irrespective of the accessory currently
connected to the phone. Similarly, an app with the NFC permission can access any NFC
device in vicinity. An app with the AUDIO permission cannot only be used to support a
speaker but can read data transmitted to a cable-connected fitness accessory [28]. In my
work, I extended the Android MAC scheme and introduced a flexible DAC scheme to allow
both enterprise administrators (admins for short) and users to construct rules to control at
application-level how these shared direct communication channels can be accessed. Such
control allows a messaging app to read all SMSs except from those that are protected, such
as an SMS from Chase which can be configured to be read only by the Chase Bank app.
It will also allow an app to talk to its Bluetooth headset but restrict it from talking to a
protected Bluetooth blood glucose meter and so on.
Lastly, smartphones are increasingly used to connect to WiFi smart-home devices. These
IoT devices are typically located behind a home area network router and are controlled
through smartphone apps. A lot of these systems tend to rely on the Wi-Fi router to au-
thenticate other devices [15] or su↵er from common vulnerabilities devices such as hardcoded
credentials, weak or no authentication [29]. This treatment exposes them to attacks from
malicious smartphone apps, particularly those running on authorized smartphones, which
the router does not have information to control. Mitigating this threat cannot solely rely
on IoT manufacturers, which may need to change the hardware on the devices to support
encryption, increasing the cost of the device, or software developers who we need to trust
to implement security correctly. We could tackle such attacks at the smartphone OS with
stronger access control such as in the case of direct communication channels. However, this
would entail assuming that not only the owners, but also all guests of the household, or an
adversary that compromised the WiFi passphrase use our proposed smarpthone OS. Since
these devices are shared by the router, a more practical approach would be to built our
defense there. To tackle this problem I built a system which uses an approach inspired by
software-defined networking (SDN) (see [30] for a survey) to o↵er fine-grained protection:
each phone runs a non-system userspace Monitor app to identify the party that attempts to
access the protected IoT device and inform the router through a control plane of its access
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decision; the router enforces the decision on the data plane after verifying whether the phone
should be allowed to talk to the device.
Focusing on analyzing shared resources within a process, across processes and across de-
vices, allows us to discover new adversarial capabilities on smartphones and in environ-
ments where smartphones are introduced (e.g. IoT). This facilitates better modeling of
the smartphone adversary which leads to the design of robust systems for both detection
and prevention of malicious behaviors by untrusted userspace smartphone programs.
1.4 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis makes significant contributions in the analysis of smartphone adversary models
and the design of tools and system enhancements for detecting suspicious behaviors and
preventing malicious behaviors on the smartphone ecosystem.
• Provides a systematic analysis of information reach of advertising libraries embedded in
smartphone apps. Previous work has focused on past and current behaviors of advertising
libraries, overlooking the fact that these behaviors can change opportunistically. This thesis
focuses on the fact that such libraries share process space and privileges with their hosts
and as such can eventually take advantage of those privileges. It systematically models all
shared privileges a library has with its hosts which leverages for the design of an automatic
open-source tool for estimating the risk of sensitive user information exposure by a host app
to its advertising library.
• Discovers new side-channels hidden in shared filesystem resources and demonstrates new
adversarial inference techniques. An analysis of Android shared filesystem resources led to
the discovery of new side-channels which can be exploited by malicious applications with a
suite of new inference techniques to bypass the process isolation boundaries and infer a user’s
identity, medical condition and financial preferences. This work led to Google introducing
further restrictions on Android filesystem resource access by third-party apps.
• Redesigns the Android Runtime Permission Model to tackle attacks on shared system and
application components. This thesis introduces a redesign of the Android permission model
which (a) separates management of system-defined and third-party-defined permissions and
(b) tracks ownership of custom permissions. This solves a perennial problem on Android
where vulnerabilities kept arising because of this non separation of trust between permissions.
The proposed model is backward compatible and formally verified to be correct with respect
to fundamental security properties.
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• Unearths threats on Android’s communication with external resources. This work system-
atically studies Android’s shared channels of communication with external resources such
as Bluetooth and NFC devices, devices that connect through the Audio port, incoming
SMSs and, WiFi smart-home devices. It defines a new threat, called the device mis-bonding
(DMB) problem, to highlight the system’s incapacity to create application-level bonds. It
further demonstrates that Android’s system permissions are too coarse-grained to support
the utility of the apps while guaranteeing the confidentiality and intergrity of the data com-
municated through these channels. Furthermore it measures the prevalence of the problem
in the Android ecosystem.
• Introduces smartphone OS-level enhancements to safeguard the communication with An-
droid external resources, using both MAC and DAC. This is the first mechanism that provides
comprehensive protection of di↵erent kinds of Android external resources over their channels
in a uniform way. The enhancements are built on top of SELinux on Android and achieve
both MAC and DAC in an integrated, highly e cient way, without undermining their se-
curity guarantees. These new techniques help both system administrators and ordinary
Android users to specify their policies and safeguard their accessories and other external
resources.
• Introduces a novel distributed application-level access control system to safeguard vulnera-
ble shared smart-home devices from malicious smartphone apps. It shows how smartphones
can collaborate with enforcing points in smart environments to enable fine-grained access
control for WiFi smart-home devices. The design focuses on OS-level enahancement at
the enforcing point (the router) which makes device-level decisions and utilizes trusted ap-
plications on smartphones for application-level decisions. The trusted applications utilize
novel tra c monitoring techniques while the overall solution is independent from IoT device
manufacturers.
• Impact on real-world smartphone operating systems. Threats revealed in this work were
acknowledged by Google, who overhauls the development of Android (the most popular
smartphone operating system) which is used by millions of users. Google introduced security
enhancements to Android to address these issues.
• New design principles for the security of systems. Proposed three new principles for the
design of secure systems.
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1.5 THESIS ORGANISATION
In Chapter 2, I will present background knowledge on the Android operating system, its
security mehcanisms and its shared resources. In Chapter 3, I will provide a discussion of the
available literature on Android security. In Chapter 4 I will present my analysis on shared
process privileges by libraries and their host apps and discuss how this analysis allowed me to
build an automatic tool for assessign the potential exposure of sensitive user information to
advertising libraries. In Chapter 5 I will introduce new side-channels on Android stemming
from shared filesystem resources. I will also discuss new adversarial inference techniques
which exploit those side-channels to compromise user’s data confidentiality. In Chapter 6 I
will analyze the Android runtime permission model, propose, implement and evaluate a re-
design to tackle privilege escalation attacks. In Chapter 7 I will analyze the security of shared
direct communication channels with external resources and propose security enhancements
on the Android operating system to enable application-level access control to such resources.
In Chapter 8 I will look into new attack surfaces introduced by smartphones sharing devices
in smart-homes and propose a distributed fine-grained access control scheme to protect
smart-home devices from malicious smartphone apps. In Chapter 9 I propose three new
principles to guide the design of secure systems stemming from my analysis on smartphone
operating systems. Lastly, in Chapter 10 I will conclude this treatise and discuss future
directions. Lastly in Section 10 I will conclude this thesis and discuss its findings.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this Chapter I provide some background on the Android OS and its security features.
2.1 ANDROID OS
The advent of Android was announced on November 5th, 2007. This exquisite mobile
platform was a result of a partnership of Google with OHA (Open Handset Alliance), a
consortium of telecommunication, software and hardware companies and its source code is
made publicly available. Android is an open source software stack encompassing a kernel
layer, a middleware layer and basic applications.
Since the announcement of the first Android version, a number of new OS releases followed
as depicted in table 2.1, with every version being playfully given a desert name [31]. Google
ships its Nexus devices with the unmodified Android open source code while other hardware
companies such as Samsung and HTC release their devices with appropriate modifications
to satisfy their specific UI or hardware requirements.
Table 2.1: Android Versions [31]
No Release Number Code Name
1 1.0 Android Alpha







9 4.0-4.0.4 Ice Cream Sandwich








Android is usually depicted as a software stack featuring a Linux Kernel at the lower
level. On top of that lies the Android middleware which integrates libraries written in C,
the Android runtime, and the application framework written in Java. The Android software
stack is displayed in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Android Software Stack [32]
Applications are also written in Java and can make use of a rich API provided by the
Application Framework to access resources on the device such as the SMSs or contacts and
perform actions such as place a phone call, handle an incoming phone call or SMS, access
the GPS or accelerometer data and so on. Nevertheless, use of native code (C, C++) is
not prohibited and apps can use it although they rarely do. An app can also use the JNI
(Java Native Interface) that allows Java code to interact with native code when use of both
is imperative. An application’s major components are Activities, Services, Content
Providers, Intents, Broadcast Receivers.
Activity: An Activity is usually correlated with a UI screen on the phone. An activity can
display UI elements when in the foreground, invoke another activity (screen) or be invoked
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to be shown on the foreground. It must extend the Android Activity class and follow the
Activity Lifecycle as shown in figure 2.2 given by the o cial Android documentation [33].
Figure 2.2: Activity Lifecycle [33]
Service: A Service is an application component that does not need a UI to run. It is
being used to perform tasks in the background and can continue running even if the parent
app is not. They have high priority and they are the last being killed by the OS in the event
that resources need to be freed. Even then they are immediately restarted once enough
resources are made available.
Content Provider: A Content Provider is a convenient structure provided by the appli-
cation framework to applications, to access databases on the device. For example if an app
needs to access the SMSs, it can use the appropriate content provider which allows the app
to query the SMS database.
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Intents: Intents is a powerful inter-component communication tool for applications and
userspace processes. An application (built-in or third-party) can notify other applications
about an event, or even send data to interested applications through this mechanism. Inter-
ested applications can receive such broadcasted intents through Broadcast Receivers.
Broadcast Receiver: An application can register a broadcast receiver to receive specific
intents. For example an app can register to receive the intent sent by a framework app
notifying that the system has booted, or that a bluetooth device has just paired. Another
example is the Activity Manager that can receive intents regarding the intention of an
activity to launch a new activity. We will elaborate on how this works later on.
It is also important to understand that each Android application runs as a separate Linux
process with its own instance of the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) as shown in figure 2.3.
Dalvik is an e cient process virtual machine with just-in-time (JIT) compilation specially
designed for Android due to its constraints in memory and processor speed. Android pro-
grams are usually written in Java and then compiled to bytecode. Then they are converted
from .class files compatible with the Java Virtual Machine, to Dalvik executable files (.dex).
Subsequently these .dex files are compressed in an apk (Android Application Package) and
installed on the Android device. In version 5.0, Android replaced Dalvik with Android
Runtime (ART) which performs a more e cient and power preserving ahead-of-time (AOT)
compilation, which compiles entire applications into machine code at installation time.
Figure 2.3: Application Isolation on Android
2.1.2 Android Boot Sequence and the Zygote Process
When an Android device boots, the bootloader runs first, which eventually starts the
kernel. Once the Kernel is up and running it will mount the root filesystem and launch the
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init process. This process will look into a file called init.rc which dictates which system
services will have to be launched next and set up filesystem and other system parameters.
Init will start the Service Manager which is responsible for managing services’ registration
and requests for registered services. The init process will also start the Zygote. The Zygote is
the parent process of every other process. For example since every application is essentially a
process, that must be forked out from the Zygote and this exactly what the Activity Manager
is doing. Next the Zygote initializes the Dalvik VM and forks the GUI process and the
System Server process in their respective DVMs. The System Server process is responsible
for starting the Android system services such as the Activity Manager, Telephony Manager,
Package Manager (handles installation/uninstallation of applications), Bluetooth and so on.
When the System Server starts a Service, that action goes through the Service Manager
which maintains an index of all started services. Now, if an app wants to access a system
service, it has to go through an RPC (Remote Procedure Call) mechanism called Binder
which in turn will deliver the request to the Service Manager. The Manager then will return
again through the Binder, a handle to the application which will allow it to use the service.
The Binder is implemented in the kernel and the app developers do not interact with it
directly when requesting a Service access.
Having a basic understanding of the Android platform and important terms covered we
will now scrutinize over the Android Security Model.
2.2 ANDROID SECURITY MODEL
Android employs a number of security features. We will focus on the inherent Linux
security, the permission model to protect sensitive API calls and the latest integration of
SELinux on Android which enables Mandatory Access Control on the kernel.
2.2.1 Application Sandbox
As stated before, Android features a Linux kernel. As a result it benefits from its
discretionary access control (DAC) on the filesystem. This is an implementation of
access control lists (ACLs), where for each object the system stores a list of users that
can access it. In Unix and in extend Linux and Android, users can be grouped together to
avoid long sparse lists. This is stored in the file’s node and when a user requests access to
it, the OS will check whether the requesting user is the owner of the resource. If that is not
the case it will then check if the user belongs to a group that can access it. Lastly it checks
whether the resource can be accessed by the rest of the world to decide if it will grant
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access. The actions that can be performed by a user on a Linux file are one of three: Read;
Write or Execute.
On Android each application is considered a di↵erent user and runs in its own Linux
process. This way it owns its own memory stack and can access its own resources taking
advantage of Linux’s user-based protection. The system bestows a unique User IDentifier
called UID to every installed application and runs it in a newly forked process. Linux ensures
that no process can access another process’s resources and restrict communication between
them through its secure IPC (interprocess communication) mechanism. This is known as the
Application Sandbox and its implemented in the kernel. Thus it can protect applications
from each other whether they use Java or native code. Consequently, application sandbox
can be compromised only when the kernel itself is compromised.
However Android provides developers the capability to share resources among their own
applications: Apps are signed with certificates whose private key are in the acquisition of
their respective developers. Applications signed with the same certificate, can request to
share UID and thus consider as a single Linux user and share the same resources. This
request to the system, can be defined by the application developer in the app’s manifest
file, namely AndroidManifext.xml. The presence of that file in the app’s root directory is
non optional. It tells the system about the major components the app is using (Content
Providers, Broadcast Receivers, Services, Activities e.t.c), lists libraries that the app must
be linked against, requests permissions to access protected APIs, names the Java package for
the app which can be used to uniquely identify it and contains other essential information
about running the particular app.
2.2.2 Permission Model
Android o↵ers applications a rich API to access resources on the system through its
application framework shown in figure 2.1. The Android sanbox allows access to some basic
resources. To protect access to resources that are considered sensitive, such as accessing
services that might cost users money, or functions that can lead to private information leaks,
Android employs a security mechanism called Permissions. According to this mechanism,
a permission is mapped with one or more sensitive functions. An application must declare
in its manifest all permissions required for it to run properly, according to the function call
(or resource accesses) it makes.
Android Permissions can have di↵erent protection levels. A permission’s protection
level can have the value normal, dangerous, signature or signatureOrSystem. A normal
permission is consider to be of minimal risk to the application, the system or the user. Such
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permissions can be granted automatically by the system without user interaction during
installation unless their revision is explicitly requested by the user. A dangerous permission
is of higher risk as it can provide access to private information or device features that can
adversely impact the user. These kind of permissions must be presented to and accepted
by the user. A signature permission, is granted automatically by the system only if the
requesting application is signed with the same certificate as the application that declared
the permission. Lastly a signatureOrSystem permission that the system automatically grants
to the requesting application, if that application is either signed with the same certificate as
the declaring application or the requesting application is built as part of the Android system
image (i.e a system application). The first comprehensive study on Android Permissions was
conducted by Felt et al. [27].
Before Android 6.0 (API level 23), all permissions were granted at application installation
time. However, starting with version 6.0, Android adopted the runtime permission model,
where dangerous permissions are granted to an app at runtime by the user the first time
they are used by this app, and the user is given the ability to revoke these permissions to
apps at any time. This ask-on-first-use model was first proposed by Wijesekera et al. [34].
Normal and signature permissions are still granted at installation and cannot be revoked by
the user. Additionally, in version 6.0, Android introduced permission groups which cluster
permissions based on their utility [35]. According to the runtime model, if a dangerous
permission in a permission group is granted to an app, all the dangerous permissions in that
group will also be granted (if explicitly requested by the app) in order to minimize user’s
e↵ort. There are currently nine permission groups on Android: calendar, camera, contacts,
location, microphone, phone, sensors, SMS and storage (Figure 2.4).
The Android OS checks system permissions in 2 ways as shown in Figure 2.5: Either at the
framework level or at the kernel level. Most commonly, an application can request access
to a sensitive API using the appropriate Manager. The Manager provides a convenient
way to apps to query a Service for a resource. The request will go from the Manager,
through the Binder to the Service, which will check whether the calling process has the
permission to access the requested resource. If it does, access is granted, otherwise a Security
Exception is thrown back to the application. Consider for example an application that
wants to connect to a paired Bluetooth device. That app will use the BluetoothAdapter
to find the BluetoothDevice it needs. Then it will obtain a BluetoothSocket handle calling
device.connectRFcommSocket for serial data transfer with the RFCOMM protocol. The
socket handle can be used to call socket.connect to actually establish the connection.
The connect request will go through Binder RPC to the Bluetooth Manager Service which
binds to AdapterService. The Adapter Service is responsible to establish the connection on
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Permission Groups
Figure 2.4: Permission groups on Android version 7.0 (Nougat).
behalf of the app. Before doing so, it checks whether the calling app has the BLUETOOTH
permission.
Alternatively an app can directly request access to a hardware feature. This request can
be checked for permission at the kernel layer. For example when an app is granted the
INTERNET permission during installation, its assigned UID is mapped with the Internet
Group’s ID (GID), which corresponds to the number 3003 and referred to with the constant
AID INET in the kernel. Before an IPv4 or IPv6 socket is created, the kernel first checks
whether the requesting process belongs to the group AID INET. If it doesn’t, it returns an
access error.
Custom Permissions. Third-party apps are allowed to define new permissions on Android.
These permissions, are called custom permissions, and are used to protect an app’s own
components from other apps. In order to define a new custom permission, an app must
provide a permission name and can optionally include a permission group (>= version 6) to
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Figure 2.5: Android Permission Check
which this permission belongs and a description regarding the utility of the permission in its
manifest. Additionally, in order to request a permission, an Android app needs to declare
the use of the permission by referring to it with its name. Furthermore, Android allows
applications to create custom permissions dynamically via the use of the addPermission()
API method. In order for this method to work successfully, apps need to declare permission
trees in their manifest file which state the domain name under which the dynamic permissions
will be created.
Although it is suggested that reverse domain name notation should be used for custom
permission names, there is currently no naming convention enforced by the system for custom
permissions and apps can use any name they desire when creating new custom permissions.
One exception is that Android does not allow two di↵erent permissions to coexist on the
same device if they have the same name; hence, installation of an app which defines a
permission with a name that belongs to an existing permission on the device will be denied
by the system. Conventional use case for custom permissions is for apps to define custom
permissions with the signature protection level so that only the apps that are signed with
the same certificate (e.g., apps that belong to the same developer) can utilize the definer
app’s resources. For example, if an application’s component is protected with a signature
permission, only the apps that are signed with the same certificate as that of the component
owner can access it.
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2.2.3 SELinux on Android
SELinux is a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) security mechanism, designed by United
States National Security Agency, and is integrated in various popular Linux distributions.
Smalley et al. [36] published a detailed solution to port SELinux on Android, called Security
Enhanced Android (SEAndroid).
Security-Enhanced Android is built on top of Android [36]. It is designed to mediate
all interactions of an app with the Linux kernel and other system resources. Furthermore,
SEAndroid confines even system daemons to limit the damage they can cause once they are
compromised. It also provides a centralized policy configuration for system administrators
and device manufacturers to specify their policies.
More specifically, SEAndroid [36] associates with each subject (e.g., process) and object
(e.g., file) a security context, which is represented as a sequence user: role: domain
or type[: level] and indexed by a Security Identifier (SID). The most important
component here is type1. Under a type enforcement (TE) architecture, a security policy
dictates whether a process running within a domain is allowed to access an object labeled with
a certain type. Following is a policy specified for all third-party apps: allow untrusted app
shell data file:file rw file perms. This policy states that all the apps within the
domain of untrusted app are allowed to perform “rw file perms” operations on the objects
with a type of shell data file within a class2 file.
SEAndroid appeared in Android in version 4.3, running in permissive mode. In this
mode, the system allows a process to access a resource even if that violates the policy.
However it records the violations and reports it in the system’s logs. It is common practice to
test SELinux policies in permissive mode, to identify policy inadequacies or unearth policy
bugs that might result to system crashes. In version 4.4 we saw SEAndroid running in
enforcing mode for several root daemon processes such as installd (responsible for installing
apps), the zygote (responsible for forking new processes for newly launched apps), the vold
process (volume daemon: manages device nodes) and the netd (network daemon: provides
access to the Network). All other processes, including system and third-party apps and
services still run in permissive mode.
The policy files are under external/sepolicy in AOSP’s (Android Open Source Project)
source code and are built with the system such that the resulting policy in binary code
is read-only and unable to be modified without shipping a new binary and rebooting the
phone. The most important files are mac permissions.xml, file contexts, .te files for each
1
role is for role-based access and level for multi-level security.
2A class defines a set of operations that can be performed on an object.
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domain that processes can be assigned to and seapp contexts. In mac permissions.xml,
policy engineers can define a label to be assigned to an app, according to the certificate used
to sign it. That label is called seinfo. In file contexts, every Linux file is assigned a security
type. In seapp contexts, domains are defined for seinfo labels. Lastly a domain is defined
by creating a “domain name”.te file. Inside that file the rules dictating what a process that
belongs to that domain can access are defined.
Consider the following example. Let’s say that we want to assign an app called TestApp to
a domain called testdomain app. Then we want to allow that app to open the wallpaper file
/data/data/com.android.settings /files/wallpaper. First we must assign a security
context to the subject, i.e the file. Inside file contexts we add the following line:
/data/data/com.android.settings/files/wallpaper \
u:object r:wallpaper file:s0
This will assign the type wallpaper file to our file in question. Next we must create the
domain that will be allowed to access this file. For that we create under external/sepolicy a
testdomain app.te file. Inside this file we will place all the rules that will dictate what a
process assigned to this domain can access. Thus we include a rule like below:
allow testdomain app wallpaper file:file open;
The class file is defined in the file external/sepolicy/access vectors. In that file the
operation open is defined for subjects that will belong to the class file. Our rule will allow
any subject in the testdomain app domain, to perform the action open on the wallpaper file
object which is a file. We are still missing something though. We haven’t told the system
how to associate our TestApp app with the testdomain app domain. For that we include
the app’s certificate (e.g testApp.x509.pem file) under built/target/product/security. Inside
external/sepolicy/keys.conf we define a tag name (e.g TESTTAG) to refer to our app’s cer-




Next in mac permissions.xml we associate this certificate with an seinfo tag let’s say
testApp seinfo. To do that we include the following lines of code:
<signer signature="@TESTTAG">
<seinfo value="testApp seinfo" />
</signer>
Lastly we associate the seinfo tag assigned to our app with the testdomain app domain in
seapp contexts by adding the following line:
user= app seinfo=testApp seinfo domain=testdomain app
The SEAndroid module currently incorporated into the AOSP (Android Open-Source
Project) 4.3 and 4.4 defines five domains within its policy files: platform app; shared app;
media app; release app and untrusted app. The platform domain is assigned to all apps
signed with the platform key, i.e packages that are considered as part of the core platform
such as System UI, Bluetooth, Settings e.t.c. The shared domain is assigned to the launcher
and contacts related packages while the media platform is assigned to the gallery app and
media related providers. The release domain is assigned typically to device’s vendor apps
and google apps. The last one, untrusted domain, is the domain assigned to all applications
installed by the user.
As noted before, these policy files are ready-only and compiled into the Android kernel
code. They are enforced by security hooks placed at di↵erent system functions at the kernel
layer. For example, the function open we saw before, is instrumented to check the compliance
of each call with the policies: it gets the type of the file to be opened and the domain of
the caller, and then runs avc has perm with the SIDs of both the subject (testdomain app)
and object (wallpaper file) to find out whether this operation is allowed by the policies.
Here avc has perm first searches an Access Vector Cache (AVC) that caches the policies
enforced recently and then the whole policy file. In addition to the components built into
the kernel, SEAndroid also includes a separate middleware MAC (MMAC) that works on
the application-framework/library layer. The current implementation of MMAC is limited
to just assigning a security tag (testApp seinfo) to a newly installed application (TestApp)
(through mac permissions.xml). When Zygote forks a process for an app to be launched,
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it uses that tag in tandem with a policy file (seapp contexts) to decide which SELinux
domain should be assigned to it.
SELinux integration on Android creates new possibilities for defending the system and
the applications it supports and this work we will take advantage of this it and seamlessly
extend it to protect against critical vulnerabilities that we will discuss on later chapters.
2.3 BACKROUND ON TECHNIQUES AND METHODOLOGIES USED
NLP Techniques: The NLP community has developed di↵erent approaches to analyze
unstructured data. For example, NLP is used to parse user reviews online or user voice com-
mands to digital personal assistants. Work focused on extracting grammatical information
to understand what the user is trying to convey. Part-of-speech Tagging (POS Tagging),
is a typical technique to achieve that. It is used to determine for each word in a sentence
whether it is a noun, adjective, verb, adverb, proposition, and other part of speach. A com-
mon problem in NLP arises when one needs to perform word sense disambiguation. That is,
to derive a given a word’s semantic meaning. This can be challenging as a word might have
multiple meanings and complex relationships with other words. To this end, Wordnet [37],
an English semantic dictionary has been proposed, where the community tried to capture
most of senses, of most of the English words. Wordnet also provides relationships between
words, such as whether two words are synonyms, or connected with is-a relationship and so
on. In essence, Wordnet is a graph with words as nodes and relationships as edges. To assist
in better capturing the relationships between words, the community has developed multiple
similarity metrics which are di↵erent ways to parse the Wordnet graph. For example, the
LCH [38] metric, uses the shortest paths between two words to determine how similar the
words are. To accurately determine which of the multiple senses of the word is the most
appropriate, one needs to carefully select the right similarity metric or design a new similar-
ity metric, and design her system in a way that incorporates domain knowledge. These are
challenges we had to overcome in our work to enable extraction of targeted data from local
files. Furthermore, our target files do not contain real words that can be used in an actual
conversation but rather variable names. These are some of the challenges I had to overcome
(see Chapter 4).
Formal Verification via Alloy: Alloy is a declarative specification language that is used
to model the behavior and structural constraints of complex systems [39]. It provides a
modeling tool called Alloy Analyzer that operates based on first-order (i.e., predicate) logic
and can be used to analyze formal models created with the Alloy language. Statements in
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Alloy can be interpreted both from object-oriented (OO) programming paradigm and from
set theory perspectives. Signature is a declaration of a schema, which defines the vocabulary
of the model. It is similar to the concept of a class in OO paradigm and to a set in set theory.
It can consist of several fields, which are equivalent to fields in OO paradigm and to relations
from a set theoretical perspective. Facts are global constraints to the model that are always
supposed to hold. Predicates define parametrized constraints, which can be interpreted as
operations that can be performed in the model. Functions are expressions with declaration
parameters and they return a result based on the parameters. Assertions are assumptions
made on the model and they can be validated via the Alloy analyzer. Additionally, Alloy
allows using multiplicity keywords as quantifiers in quantified constraints: all (universal
quantifier), some (existential quantifier), lone (zero or one), one (exactly one), no (zero).
Also, it is possible to use some (or set interchangeably), lone, and one for field declarations
in signatures to indicate the number of elements a field can take and also for signature
declarations to indicate the number of elements that can belong to the set of the signature.
The Alloy Analyzer tool performs only finite scope checks on the models. The analysis is
sound since it can never return false positives and is complete up to a scope as the tool will
never miss any counterexamples that are equal or smaller than the specified scope. As in
traditional model checking, Alloy models are infinite, that is, the specification dictates how
the components of a system should behave without any restrictions on their quantity. The
analyzer also provides automated analysis by allowing automatic generation of examples
that satisfy a given model as well as counterexamples to claims (i.e., assertions) that are
expected to hold in the model.
2.4 ANDROID’S SHARED RESOURCES
On a par with any multi-process operating system, modern smartphone operating sys-
tems manage process access to resources. This thesis performs a security analysis on such
shared resources across smartphone applications. In particular it focuses on shared process
privileges; shared filesystem resources; shared system and application resources; and shared
connectivity resources.
• Shared Process Privileges. Each app on Android is assigned a unique static UID when
it is installed. This allows the operating system to di↵erentiate between apps during their
lifetime on the device, so it can run them in distinct Linux processes when launched. In
this way Android leverages the traditional Linux process isolation to ensure that one app
cannot access another app’s resources.This is with the exception of apps signed with the
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same developer key. In that case, the apps can indicate in their manifests that they should
be assigned the same UID. Developers also commonly utilize third-party libraries for either
utility (avoid reinventing the wheel for common funcitonality) or advertising (allows for
monetization of free apps). However, when developers include a third-party library, the
library is treated as part of the host app. The operating system will assign one UID for the
app as a whole, even though the library and host app have di↵erent package names. Every
time an app is launched, the OS will assign a process identifier (PID) to the app and associate
that with the app’s UID. Again this PID is shared between the host app and its libraries that
run within the same Linux process. As a result, the host app and the library components
will also share privileges and resources, both in terms of Linux discretionary access control
(DAC) permissions and in terms of Android permissions granted. The former allows the
library to access all the local files the host app is generating. The latter allows it to use the
granted permissions (e.g., ACCESS COARSE LOCATION) to access other resources on the
device (such as GPS), that can expose user information (such as her location).
This multifaceted ecosystem, where there are strong incentives for more data collection
by all stakeholders, needs to be better understood. Of particular interest are advertising
libraries o↵ered by advertising networks which rely on building detailed user profiles to
optimize their services. Studying the current practices of ad libraries is an important place
to start. Indeed our community already found that ad libraries collect some types of data
for themselves even without the cooperation (or with the implicit consent) of the host app
developer. Such behaviors have been observed in the wild since 2012 [3] and as a routine
practice today [40] for certain types of information. Nonetheless, to fully assess the privacy
risk associated with embedding a library into an app, we need to take into account not only
past and current behaviors, but also all allowed events that can lead to breaches of users’
data confidentiality. My work aims to take the first step into the direction of modeling ad
libraries, not based on previous behaviors but based on their allowed actions on the Android
platform. I show how this can be leveraged to design a tool that can assess the targeted
data exposure to ad libraries (Chapter 4).
• Shared Filesystem Resources. Android is built on top of a stripped down version of a Linux
kernel. Linux, historically makes available a large amount of resources considered harmless
to normal users, to help them coordinate their activities. A prominent example is the process
information displayed by the ps command (invoked through Runtime.getRuntime.exec),
which includes each running process’s user ID, Process ID (PID), memory and CPU con-
sumption and other statistics. Most of such resources are provided through two virtual
filesystems, the proc filesystem (procfs) and the sys filesystem (sysfs). The procfs contains
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public statistics about a process’s use of memory, CPU, network resources and other data.
Under the sysfs directories, one can find device/driver information, network environment
data (/sys/class/net/) and more. Android inherits such public resources from Linux and
enhances the system with new ones (e.g. /proc/uid stat). For example, the network
tra c statistics (/proc/uid stat/tcp snd and /proc/uid stat/tcp rcv) are extensively
utilized [41] to keep track of individual apps’ mobile data consumption.
• Shared System and Application Components. Android o↵ers a rich API which allows
third-party applications to request access to system resources. Felt et al [27] found 1259
API calls with permission checks in Android 2.2, while Au KW et al [42] found 17,218
permission protected APIs on a study spanning Android 2.2 until 4.1. As mentioned in
Section 2.2.2 permissions can be of di↵erent protection levels. APIs protected by dangerous
permissions (granted by the user) protect access to nine (9) main sensitive system resources:
calendar, camera, contacts, location, microphone, phone, sensors, SMS and storage. Third-
party apps can request permission from the user to access these. At the same time, Android
allows application developers to share application components (content providers, services,
broadcast receivers, activities) with other apps on the smartphone (see Section 2.1 for a
description of app components). Application developers can declare their own permissions
(custom permissions) to control access to these exported components. For example, by
protecting a content provider with a signature permissions, developers are guaranteed by
the OS that the component can only be accessed by other co-installed applications that are
signed with the same developer key.
• Shared Connectivity Resources. Android and other mobile systems are routinely employed
by their owners for managing their external resources. Particularly, almost every app running
on these systems is supported by a remote service, which interacts with the app through the
Internet or the telephone network (using short text messages). Such services are increasingly
being utilized to store and process private user information, particularly the data related
to online banking, social networking, investment, healthcare, etc. Moreover, the trend of
leveraging smartphones to support the Internet of Things, brings in a whole new set of
external devices, which carry much more sensitive data than conventional accessories (e.g.,
earpieces, game stations). In my work I categorize IoT devices into two classes: Personal
devices are devices which connect to smartphones directly, through a proximity protocol
such as Bluetooth, NFC, WiFi Direct e.t.c. (see Figure 2.6b). Examples include health and
fitness systems (e.g., blood pressure monitors [43], Electrocardiography sensors [44], glucose
meters [45]), and remote vehicle controllers (e.g., Viper SmartStart [46]) among others.
Other devices belong to the Shared class (see Figure 2.6d). Such devices are typically home
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(a) Smartphone apps compete for connectivity
resources to access personal IoT devices.
(c) Smartphones and their apps compete for
connectivity resources to access shared IoT
devices.
Figure 2.6: Shared connectivity resources can be used for accessing external devices.
automation andvsecurity systems [47]. Examples are smart thermostats [48, 49], cameras
for streaming surveillance video to a mobile phone [50]; the baby monitors [51], the smart
refrigerators [52] and others.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 ADVERTISING LIBRARIES
Several e↵orts try to characterize the current mobile advertising libraries. MAdScope [40]
and Ullah et al. [53] both found that ad libraries have not yet exploited the full potential of
targeting. My work is driven by such observations and tries to assess the data exposure risk
associated with embedding a library in an app.
Many studies describe alternative mobile advertising architectures. AdDroid [54] enforces
privilege separation by hard-coding advertising functions as a system service into Android
platform. AdSplit [17] achieves privilege separation via making ad libraries and their host
apps run in separate processes. Leontiadis et al. [55] proposes a client-side library compiled
with the host app to monitor the real-time communication between the host app and the
ad libraries to control the exposed information. MobiAd [56] suggests local profiling instead
of keeping the user profiles at the data brokers to protect users’ privacy. Most of these
alternative architectures envision a separation of ad libraries from their host apps. However,
none of these solutions are deployed in practice as they all disrupt the business model of
multiple players in this ecosystem. I take a di↵erent approach by analyzing and modeling
the capabilities of ad libraries in order to proactively assess apps’ data exposure risk.
There are a number of studies that aim to—or can be used to—detect and/or prevent
current privacy-infringing behaviors in mobile ads. Those works mainly fall into three general
categories: (1) static scanning [3, 18, 19, 20, 21], (2) dynamic monitoring [22, 23, 24, 25],
and (3) hybrid techniques using both [26]. A combination of these techniques could detect
and prevent some of the attack strategies of ad libraries we discussed in this work, if they
are adopted in practice. However, such countermeasures can still fail to protect against all
allowed behaviors. For example, TaintDroid [25] and FlowDroid [20] cannot evaluate the
sensitivity of the data carried. Moreover, static code analysis will miss dynamically loaded
code, and code analysis in general cannot estimate the potential reach of libraries. Further,
by merely encrypting local files we cannot prevent libraries within the same process from
using the key the host app uses to decrypt the files. In addition, there is no mechanism to
address data exposure through app bundle information as we reveal in this work because (1)
this is not considered as a sensitive API from AOSP and (2) even if marked as sensitive it is
unclear how access to it by apps and/or libraries should be mediated, as there are legitimate
uses of it. My focus is not on detecting and tackling current behaviors but assessing the
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data exposure given all allowed behaviors. This is critical when trying to assess the privacy
risk of an asset.
SUPOR [57] and UIPicker [58] seek instances where apps exfiltrate sensitive data. These
works also use NLP and machine learning techniques to find data of interest in user interfaces.
However, their focus is on data like account credentials and financial records, whereas I focus
on general targeted data with validation based on data of interest to advertisers. As with
most of the other work in this area, SUPOR and UIPicker seek existing exfiltration instances
rather than allowed instances, although some of their techniques can facilitate finding allowed
instances.
3.2 INFORMATION LEAKS THROUGH FILESYSTEM RESOURCES
Information leaks have been studied for decades and new discoveries continue to be made
in recent years [59, 60, 61]. Among them, most related to my work is the work on the
information leaks from procfs, which includes using the ESP/EIP data to infer keystrokes [62]
and leveraging memory usages to fingerprint visited websites [63]. However, it is less clear
whether those attacks pose a credible threat to Android, due to the high non-determinism
of its memory allocation [63] and the challenges in keystroke analysis [62]. In comparison,
our work shows that the usage statistics under procfs can be practically exploited to infer an
Android user’s sensitive information. The adversarial inference technique I will introduce in
this work is related to prior work on tra c analysis [64]. However, those approaches assume
the presence of an adversary who sees encrypted packets. Also, their analysis techniques
cannot be directly applied to smartphone. The attack I demonstrate is based upon a di↵erent
adversary model, in which an app uses public resources to infer the content of the data
received by a target app on the same device. For this purpose, we need to build di↵erent
inference techniques based on the unique features of mobile computing, particularly the
rich background information (i.e., social network, BSSID databases and Google Maps) that
comes with the target app and the mobile OS.
Information leaks have been discovered on smartphone by both academia and the hacker
community [8, 9, 65]. Most of known problems are caused by implementation errors, either
in Android or within mobile apps. By comparison, the privacy risks which manifest due
to shared resources in the presence of emerging background information have not been
extensively studied on mobile devices. Up to my knowledge, all prior research on this subject
focuses on the privacy implications of motion sensors or microphones [66, 67, 68, 69, 70].
What has never been done before is a systematic analysis on what can be inferred from the
public resources exposed by both Linux and Android layers.
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New techniques for better protecting user privacy on Android also continue to pop up [25,
71, 9, 72, 73, 74, 8]. Di↵erent from such research, my work focuses on the new privacy risks
emerging from the fast-evolving smartphone apps, which could render innocuous shared
filesystem resources indicative of sensitive user information.
3.3 IPC, SYSTEM RESOURCES AND SHARED APPLICATION COMPONENTS
Previous work has shown ways of exploiting IPC on Android to acquire unauthorized ac-
cess to resources. In [75], the authors discuss the permission re-delegation problem where
an unprivileged app can access system resources through a privileged app via IPC. Addi-
tionally, [76] shows ways of exploiting the Intent mechanism to send or receive Intents in
an unauthorized manner and get access to other app’s private resources. Wei et al studied
the evolution of permissions across Android versions and showed that the set of permissions
on Android tends to grow with every release [77]. Stowaway tool aims to detect if apps
follow the least privilege for permission requests [27]. Additionally, [78] presents a formal
analysis of Android permissions for older Android versions (<6.0) in Alloy; whereas [79, 80]
introduce similar models in Coq. One of the early works on the runtime permissions (¿=
Android version 6.0) shows the necessity of having revocable, ask-on-first-use type permis-
sions on Android, supported by user studies [27]. [81] provides an initial analysis on the
runtime permission model and identifies several problems in this model that might open up
ways for exploits. In [82], the authors analyze the undesirable side e↵ects of switching to
runtime permissions and introduce a tool called RevDroid that aims to identify these prob-
lems in apps. DP-transform provides a tool which helps developers adapt to the runtime
model by automatically introducing the permission requests required by the model into the
application code [83].
Although previous work has studied Android permissions which protect system resources,
there is little work done specifically regarding Android custom permissions which are typi-
cally used by thirs-party developers to protect their shared application components.The blog
post in [84] discusses how the ”first one wins” approach for custom permission definitions
can create problems. Shin et al presents a viable attack on custom permissions by exploiting
the naming convention problem of custom permissions [85], to which Google responded with
bug fixes. In [86], the authors discuss how permissions can stay dormant on the Android
platform, later to be revived by the installation of a permission definer app, and demon-
strate attacks on custom permissions via the exploitation of this undesirable property. In
this word I present a systematic analysis of custom permissions on Android which reveals
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the root causes of those vulnerabilities and propose a new design of the permission model
which eradicated these problems.
3.4 SHARED COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Shared communication channels such as Bluetooth, NFC, Audio and SMS, rely on system
permissions for delegating access to third-party apps. The Android permission system has
been under scrutiny for years [87, 88, 89, 25, 90, 91, 89, 92, 93]. Much has been proposed
to extend this security model, allowing the phone user to selectively grant permissions to
apps [93], deny those with dangerous permission combinations [74], utilize app-defined fine
grained access control [87] or leverage IPC provenances for security protection [8]. However,
all these prior approaches are designed to guard a phone’s local resources. In contrast little
has been done on mobile OSes to protect the external devices that connect to smartphones.
In particular, on Android, an app that acquires the permissions to use a channel (e.g.,
Bluetooth, NFC, etc.) is automatically granted the access to any device attached to this
channel. There is nothing to bind a device to its authorized app.
Related to my study on how Android delegated access to SMSs, is Porscha [89], which
controls the content an app can access on a phone for digital rights management. Porscha
controls access to SMS messages through sending an IBE encrypted message to a Porscha
proxy on the phone, which further dispatches the message to authorized apps according
to a set of policies. While e↵ective, this solution is ad-hoc and specific to SMSs. I follow
an architectural approach which allow me to propose a unified, easily maintainable and
extentible design for controlling access to all shared communication channels with external
resources.
Prior works on the security issues of health devices are also closely related to our work.
Rahman et al. [94] identified several vulnerabilities on Fitbit, a wireless wearable fitness
device, which can be leveraged to inject data into the device and launch a denial of service
attack against it. Li et al. [95] look into the security weaknesses of glucose monitoring and in-
sulin delivery systems and proposed the technologies for protecting those devices’ operations
using rolling-code and body-coupled communication. Also, Marti et al. [96] lay out a few
necessary requirements for building a secure mobile health care system. All such prior work
focuses on the security problems of a specific health device or the communication protocol
it uses, whereas my research aims at understanding the security implications of Android’s
shared communication channels to such external devices in proximity, in the presence of
malicious apps running on the phone.
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3.5 SHARED IoT DEVICES
IoT attacks. Recent works demonstrated attacks on IoT devices [97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102]. Fernandes et.al. found vulnerabilities on SmartThings’ applications [101]. Their work
focuses on a specific IoT hub that can integrate third-party IoT devices, whereas I propose a
design applicable to an infrastructure that exists in almost all households with IoT devices.
[98, 99], revealed vulnerabilities on smart-home devices. However they consider an adversary
on a separate device. [102] considers an intricate mobile adversary which colludes with a
cloud. I illustrate that the mobile adversary can succeed with minimal e↵ort. All reported
attacks further motivate the need for practical smart-home defenses.
Android side-channels and network monitors. [103] used the VPN service on Android
for passive monitoring of mobile apps to collect user tra c information for analysis. However,
it redirects all packets to a server that further routes the packets. This raises privacy concerns
which I show we can avoid by implementing the routing functionality locally.
Access control. There have been various works on home access control which we classify
in three major areas: surveys [104, 105, 106]; access control systems [107, 108, 109, 110,
100, 111]; and user studies for usable policy specifications [112, 113]. More relevant to
my study on shared devices is the second. Nonetheless, most of these systems assume a
clean-slate design where the OSes of participating nodes can be modified. My proposed
solution is backward compatible: it requires just a software upgrade on a home’s router
and downloading an app on the phone. Other work focused on access control enforced on
the mobile phones [114, 115, 116]. In Chapter 7 I also illustrate the design of hybrid MAC
and DAC approach on smartphone operating systems to guarantee applicaiton-level access
control to devices. This works well for personal devices which are typically owned by the
smartphone user. In contrast, smart-home devices are shared across a local area network
where guest users might connect their own smartphones which we cannot trust to carry
our improved OS version. In Chapter 8 I will show how we can build an access control
scheme distributed across a home area network router and trusted smartphones to tackle
this problem e↵ectively.
IDS and Firewalls. Work on intrusion detection systems (IDS), personal and application
firewalls [117, 118, 119, 120], focuses either solely at the host or at a network node, or
only at the network layer. The system I propose (Chapter 8) is distributed, consolidating
application level semantics from hosts, and network level information from the network node.
Furthermore, we do not require experts to set up policies.
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In all previous works, the solutions are either ad-hoc, or impractical. In this thesis I
conduct a systematic analysis of the security of shared resources on smartphones which reveal
new adversarial capabilities of third-party smartphone apps. To mitigate such adversaries, I
design solutions focusing on both detection of information leakage and prevention at an the
operating or a distributed system level. My solutions follow four important design properties:
(a) e↵ectiveness; (b) e ciency; (c) backward compatibility and, (d) maintainability.
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CHAPTER 4: SHARING PROCESS PRIVILEGES
Android enforces access control decisions at the process/application boundaries. However,
smartphone apps commonly utilize third-party libraries from other untrusted sources for
advertising. Thus, these libraries share all the privileges their host process is granted. Since
advertising networks depend on building detailed user profiles we expect them to follow
aggressive data harvesting techniques. In this chapter, I analyze how advertising libraries
can take advantage of the shared process privileges with their host apps. Then I utilize this
analysis to design a tool for automatic detection of potential sensitive information leakage
to advertising libraries [10].
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Advertisers aim to generate conversions for their ad impressions. Advertising networks
assist them in matching ads to users, to e ciently turn impressions into conversions. I call the
information that achieves this targeted data. Android smartphones contain rich information
about users that enable advertising networks to gather targeted data. Moreover, there is
considerable pressure on advertising networks to improve the number and quality of targeted
data they are able to o↵er to advertisers. This raises many privacy concerns. Mobiles often
contain sensitive information about user attributes which users might not comfortably share
with advertising networks but could make valuable targeted data. This, in turn, led to a
substantial line of research on privacy and advertising on mobiles in two general areas: (1)
strategies for detection and prevention [121, 22, 18, 19, 26, 3, 122, 23, 123, 53, 24, 40], and
(2) architectures and protocols that improve privacy protections [56, 54, 17, 55]. The first
of these approaches primarily provides insights into the current practices of advertisers and
advertising networks. The second examines a future in which a changed advertising platform
provides better privacy. However, some of the studies show that the development and use
of targeted data on mobiles is modest at present [53]. This is at least partially because
most applications do not pass along information about users to the advertising network—
through its ad library embedded in the app—unless the advertising network requires them
to do so [40]. This leave open an important question: what if advertising networks took full
advantage of the information-sharing characteristics of the current architecture?
In particular, when one wants to assess the privacy risk associated with an asset, she needs
to take into account not only past and current hazardous behaviors but all allowed actions
that can result in potential privacy loss [124]. In the case of opportunistic advertising
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libraries, a privacy loss is possible if such libraries have the ability to access private user
information without the user’s consent. Current app privacy risk assessment techniques [125,
126], try to detect when sensitive data leaks from an app. To achieve that, they employ static
or dynamic analysis of apps and/or libraries. However, applying this sort of assessment is
constrained by the apparent practices of the advertising libraries. For example, every time
an ad library is updated, or a new ad library appears, such analysis must be performed
again. To make things worse, some ad libraries load code dynamically, [3] which allow them
to indirectly update their logic without dependency on the frequency of their host app’s
updates. In this way, any analysis dependent on current library behaviors is unreliable as
the analysis can not predict the behavior of updated code or dynamically downloaded/loaded
code. Thus, to assess such risks, we need to have a systematic way to analyze the potential
data exposure to ad libraries independent of current or apparent practices. A privacy risk
assessment should consider what an adversary is allowed by the system to do instead of only
what she is currently doing. My work takes the first step in this direction by analyzing
the shared intra-process resources available to libraries and modelling their data collection
capabilities on an Android platform.
I model opportunistic ad networks based on their abilities to access targeted data on an
Android platform through at least four major attack channels: protected APIs by inheriting
the permissions granted to their host apps; reading files generated at runtime by their host
apps and stored in the host apps’ protected storage; observing user input into their host apps;
and finally unprotected APIs, such as the PackageManager.getInstalledApplications()
that allow the ad library to access platform-wide information. We further categorize these
attack channels into two classes, namely the in-app and out-app exploitation class. The
in-app class contains attack channels that are dependent on the ad library’s host app. The
protected API’s, app local files and user input are examples of such channels. The out-app
class contains attack channels that are independent of the host app. The public API’s
are an example of this. In particular, Grace et. al. [3] identified that the list of installed
applications on a user’s device—which can be derived from a public API on Android—raises
privacy concerns. In this work I systematically explore how this information can be exploited
by an adversary in practice. I demonstrate and evaluate how well such APIs can result in
an adversary learning a user’s targeted data. Based on my data exposure modeling, I have
designed and developed a framework called Pluto. Pluto aims to facilitate assessment of the
privacy risk associated with embedding an untrusted library into an app. I show that Pluto
is able to reveal the potential data exposure of a given app to its ad libraries through the
considered attack channels. Frameworks like Pluto are extremely useful to app developers
who want to assess their app’s potential data exposure, markets aiming to better inform their
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users about the privacy risk associated with downloading a free app, and users themselves.
In addition, I hope that this will spur similar academic attempts to capture the capabilities
of third-party libraries on smartphones and serve as a baseline for comparison.
4.2 ANALYSIS
4.2.1 Threat Model
A risk is the potential compromise of an asset as a result of an exploit of a vulnerability by
a threat. In this case, I define assets to be user targeted data, the threat is an opportunistic
ad library, and a vulnerability is what allows the ad library to access targeted data without
the device user’s consent or the consent of the library’s host app. Here, we examine the
capabilities of the ad libraries to collect such data on an Android platform.
Because libraries are compiled with their host apps, are in extend authorized to run as
the same Linux process as their hosts on an Android OS. Thus the ad library code and the
host app’s code will share the same identifier as far as the system is concerned (both the
static UID and the dynamic PID). In essence, this means that any given ad library runs with
the same privileges as its host app. Consequently, the libraries inherit all the permissions
granted by the user to the host app. There is no way for the user to distinguish whether
that permission is used by her favorite app or the ad libraries embedded in the app. This
permission inheritance empowers the ad libraries to make use of permission-protected APIs
on the device. For example, if an app granted the GET ACCOUNTS permission, its libraries
can opportunistically use it to retrieve the user’s registered accounts (e.g., the email used to
login to Gmail, the email used to login to Facebook, the email used for Instagram, Twitter
and so on).
Furthermore, during their lifetime on the device, apps create local persistent files where
they store information necessary for their operations. These files are stored in app-specific
directories isolated from other applications. This allows the apps to o↵er seamless person-
alized services to their users even when they are not connected to the Internet. In addition
this practice enables the apps to avoid the latency of accessing their clouds, provided they
have one. Android o↵ers a convenient way through its SharedPreferences class to store
and retrieve application and user specific data to an XML file in its UID-protected directory.
In that directory, apps can also create their own files typically using standardized formats
such as XML, JSON, or SQLite. In this way, they can utilize widely available libraries and
Android APIs to swiftly and easily store and parse their data. The ad libraries, running
as the same Linux user as their host apps, inherit both the Linux DAC privileges and the
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SE Android MAC capabilities of their host apps. This allows them to access the app’s lo-
cally stored files as their hosts would. Consequently, the ad libraries could read the user
data stored in those files. Consider, for example, the app My Ovulation Calculator which
provides women a platform to track ovulation and plan pregnancy. This app, listed under
the MEDICAL category on Google Play, has been installed 1,000,000–5,000,000 times. By
parsing the app’s runtime generated local files, an ad library might learn whether its user
su↵ers from headaches, whether she is currently pregnant, and, if so, the current trimester
of her pregnancy. All these are targeted data which advertisers can monetize [127], making
them a valuable addition to ad libraries.
Moreover, an aggressive ad library could utilize its vantage position to peak on user input.
In particular, such a library could locate all the UI elements that correspond to targeted
data related to user input [58, 57] and monitor them to capture the data as they become
available. For example, by monitoring the user’s input on Text Me! Free Texting &
Call, a communication app with 10,000,000–50,000,000 downloads, an ad library would be
able to capture the user’s gender, age and zip code. Note that these data constitute
the quasi identifiers [128] proven to be enough to uniquely identify a large percentage of
registered voters in the US.
Nonetheless, an ad library can exploit both the inherited privileges of its host app and
the position on a user’s device. Irrespective of the host app, the ad libraries, can make use
of public APIs to learn more about the user. Such APIs are considered harmless by the
Android Open Source Project (AOSP) designers and are left unprotected. This means that
the apps can use those APIs without the need to request permissions from either the system
or the user. In this chapter, I show that by merely acquiring the list of installed applications
through such APIs, one can learn targeted data such as a user’s marital status, age, and
gender among others.
To model these attack channels, I further categorize them them into two classes, namely
the in-app and out-app exploitation class. The in-app class contains attack channels that
are dependent on the ad library’s host app. The protected API’s, app local files and user
input, are examples of such channels. The out-app class contains attack channels that
are independent of the host app. The public API’s are an example of this. Through the
rest of this work, we assume that an ad library can gain access to targeted data through
permission-protected APIs, runtime-generated app local files, user input, and unprotected
APIs.
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4.2.2 Data Exposure through In-App Shared Process Capabilities
Ad libraries can leverage their position within their host apps to access exposed targeted
data. Some targeted data are dependent on what the host apps themselves collect from the
users. An ad library can access such data by parsing the files its host app created at runtime
to store such information locally, that is in its own UID-protected storage. Furthermore,
it can inherit the permissions granted to its host app and leverage that privilege to collect
targeted data through permission-protected APIs. Finally, it can peek on what the host
app user inputs to the app. In this section, I explore what an ad library can learn through
these in-app attack channels. We elaborate on our methodology and provide insights from
real world examples. To gain insight on what an ad library can learn, I perform manual
inspection of some real-world free apps. This way we can validate the assumptions about
data exposure through in-app attack channels and further create ground truth for test data
that we can use to do evaluations of the framework in subsequent sections.
I first cherry-pick a few free apps I selected for purposes of illustration. I downloaded the
target apps from Google Play and used Apktool to decompile them. I located the packages
corresponding to the Google AdMob advertising network library and located an entry point
that is called every time an ad is about to be loaded. I injected our attack logic there to
demonstrate how the ad library can examine local files. In particular, this logic dumps the
database and xml files that the app has created at runtime. I then compiled the app and ran
it on a physical device by manually providing it with some input. Here are some examples
of what such an aggressive ad library could learn in this position (or what AdMob is, in
principle, able to learn now).
I’m Pregnant helps women track their pregnancy progress and experience. It has 1,000,000–
5,000,000 installations and is ranked with 4.4 stars 1 on Google Play. The code was able
to read and extract the local files created by the host app. After manually reviewing the
retrieved files, I found that the host app is storing the weight of the user, the height, cur-
rent pregnancy month and day, symptoms such as headaches, backache and constipation. It
also recorded events such as dates of intercourse (to establish the date of conception) and
outcomes like miscarriage or date of birth.
Diabetes Journal helps users better manage their diabetes. It has 100,000–500,000 in-
stallations and ranked with 4.5 stars on Google Play. The code was able to extract the local
files generated by the app. Manually reviewing these files, I found that it exposes the user’s
1Applications on Google Play are being ranked by users. A 5-star application is an application of the
highest quality.
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birth date, gender, first-name and last name, weight and height, blood glucose levels, and
workout activities.
TalkLife targets users that su↵er from depression, self-harm, or suicidal thoughts. It has
10,000–50,000 installations on Google Play and ranked with 4.3 stars. In contrast with the
other two apps above, TalkLife stores the user information in a user object which it serializes
and then stores in a local file. In this case, some knowledge of the host app allows our code
to deserialize the user object and get her email, date of birth, and first name. Deserializing
the user object also provided the library the user password in plain text.
Thus, if an opportunistic advertising library is included in apps like these, then a careful
manual review of the apps will reveal some pathways to targeted data. At this point it helps
to have a little more terminology. Let us say that a data point is a category of targeted data
point values. For example, gender is a data point, whereas knowing that Bob is a male is
a data point value. What we would like to do, is examine a collection of apps to see what
data points they expose to ad libraries.
To explore these ideas and their refinement I develop three datasets listed in the first three
rows of Table 4.1. For the first, I make a list of the 100 most popular free apps in each of
the 27 categories on Google Play to get 2700 apps. After removing duplicate apps, we are
left with 2535 unique apps. We can call this the Full Dataset, FD. From these I randomly
selected 300 apps for manual review. From these apps I removed the ones that crashed on
our emulator or required the use of Google Play Services. We will refer to this as the Level
One Dataset (L1). On this dataset, I searched for data point exposure by two means. First,
I inspected the manifest to see if the permissions themselves would suggest that certain types
of data points would be present. For example, we can predict that the address attribute
could be derived by the library if the host app is granted the ACCESS COARSE LOCATION or the
ACCESS FINE LOCATION permission, the email attribute from the GET ACCOUNTS permissions,
the phone attribute from the READ PHONE STATE permission and the online search from the
READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS permission. Second, I launched the app, looked to see what local
files it produced, and looked into these files to see if they expose any particular data points.
The data points we consider must include user data that the ad libraries are likely inter-
ested in harvesting. To this end, I extract data points mostly based on a calculator provided
by the Financial Times (FT) [127]. This calculator provides illustrative information sought
by data brokers together with an estimate of its financial value in the U.S. based on analysis
of industry pricing data at the time the calculator was created. For example, according
to the FT calculator, basic demographic information like age and gender are worth about
$.007. If an opportunistic advertising network can learn that a user is (probably) an accoun-
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also know that this accountant is engaged to be married, this increases the value to $.179.
Engaged individuals are valuable because they face a major life change, are likely to both
spend more money and change their buying habits. An especially noteworthy data point is
a pregnancy. This is well illustrated by events surrounding Target’s successful program to
use the habits of registered expecting shoppers to derive clues about unregistered ones in
order to target them with advertising about baby care products [129]. The FT calculator
provides us with a realistic way of exploring the relative value of an information gathering
strategy. The precise figures are not important, and have probably changed significantly
since the introduction of the calculator, but they give some ballpark idea of value and the
system provides a benchmark for what a more accurate and detailed database of its kind
might use.
I abstracted the questionnaire-like attributes from the FT calculator into keywords and
used these as a guide to data points to find in the apps reviewed. For example, I transformed
the question “Are you a fitness and exercise bu↵” into “workout”. We refer to the overall
attack technique that examines local files and uses protected APIs, as a level one inspection
(L1-I). I found 29 categories of data points in L1 by this means, including ‘gender’, ‘age’,
‘phone number’, ‘email address’, ‘home address’, ‘vehicle’, ‘online searches’, interests like
‘workout’ and others. Table 4.2 depicts some popular apps and the data points they expose
to ad libraries performing a level one inspection.
However, an ad library could also utilize the fact that it can eavesdrop on user inputs
in its host app. This can be done on Android by exploring the resource files of packages.
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Category App Name Num. of
Installation
Exposed Data Points
L1-I MEDICAL Menstrual Cal-
endar









5 ⇥ 106   10 ⇥
106
phone, email, first name, last
name, age, gender, address,
workout
L2-I LIFESTYLE BeNaughty -
Online Dating
App & Call
5 ⇥ 106   10 ⇥
106
phone, email, age, gender, ad-
dress, marital status, parent
Once an interesting layout file is found, an o↵ensive library can inflate the layout from the
library package and read from its UI elements. With this strategy, the ad library can find
targeted data that are input by the user but not necessarily kept in local files. Let us call
the attack strategy that utilizes not only local files and protected APIs, but also user input
eavesdropping, a level two inspection (L2-I). To better understand what data points are
exposed to an ad library performing a level two inspection, I selected 35 of the apps in the
L1 dataset and reviewed them manually to find data points that level two inspection could
reveal. Lets call this the L2 dataset. The 35 apps in question are ones that exposed one
or more data points other than ones derived from the manifest. We make this restriction
to assure that there was no straight-forward strategy for finding data points in these apps
so we could better test the automated inference techniques we introduce later. Table 4.2
depicts some popular apps and the data points they expose to ad libraries performing a level
two inspection. We observe that apps expose not only demographic information but also
more sensitive data such as user health information. The complete list of apps and the data
points they expose is omitted due to space limitations.
Figure 4.1a displays the number of apks in the level one inspection that were found to
expose the basic data points we listed earlier. Figure 4.1b portrays a similar graph for the
level two inspection. Here, I prune all data points with frequency less than three. We
observe that data points that can be derived by exploiting the host app’s permissions are
more prevalent than other ones. This is because the permissions are coarse-grained and app
developers are likely to use them for a number of reasons, whereas other data points would
be present only if the host app is explicitly collecting that information. Overall, it is clear
that targeted data is exposed by apps through in-app attack channels to ad libraries. Next
I will examine exposure through out-app channels.
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Figure 4.1: Number of apps with data points inferred by (a) level one inspection of L1, (b)
level two inspection of L2.
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4.2.3 Data Exposure through Out-App Shared Process Capabilities
Ad libraries can surreptitiously access targeted data not only through in-app attack chan-
nels but also from host-app-independent channels such as public APIs. Such APIs are con-
sidered to be harmless and thus made available to all applications on the platform without
the need of special permissions. In particular, Android provides a pair of publicly available
functions, which we will abbreviate as getIA and getIP, that return app bundles, the list of
installed apps on a mobile.2 They can be used by the calling app to find utilities, perform
security checks, and other functions. They also have high potential for use in advertising.
An illustration of this is the Twitter app graph program [130], which was announced in late
2014. Twitter asserted its plans to profile users by collecting their app bundles3 to “provide
a more personal Twitter experience for you.” Reacting to Twitter’s app graph announce-
ment, the Guardian newspaper postulated [131] that Twitter “reported $320m of advertising
revenues in the third quarter of 2014 alone, with 85% of that coming from mobile ads. The
more it can refine how they are targeted, the more money it will make.” This progression
marks an important point about the impact of advertising on privacy. Both the Financial
Times [127] and a book about the economics of the online advertising industry called The
Daily You [132] emphasize the strong pressures on the advertising industry to deliver better
quality information about users in a market place that is both increasingly competitive and
increasingly capable. This is a key insight of this chapter: what may seem opportunistic now
may be accepted business practice and industry standard in a few years, and what is viewed
as malicious today may be viewed as opportunistic or adventurous tomorrow. Twitter pro-
vides warnings to the user that Twitter will collect app bundles and o↵ers the user a chance
to opt out of this. Other parties are less forth-coming about their use of this technique of
user profiling.
Use of App Bundles
Getting app bundles is a great illustration of the trajectory of advertising on mobiles. In
2012 the AdRisk tool [3] showed that 3 of 50 representative ad libraries it studied would
collect the list of all apps installed on the device. The authors viewed this as opportunistic
at best at the time. But what about now? We did a study of the pervasiveness of the use
of app bundles by advertising networks in Google Play. The functions getIA and getIP are
2Their formal names are getInstalledApplications and getInstalledPackages. The first returns the
applications, the second returns the packages and, from these, one can learn the application names.
3We use the term app bundle rather than app graph because we do not develop a graph from the app
lists.
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built into the Android API and require no special permissions. We decompiled the 2700
apps we have collected from Google Play, into smali code 4 for analysis and parsed these
files to look for the invocations of getAP and getIP in each app. This allowes us to narrow
the set of apps for analysis to only those that actually collect a list of apps on the mobile,
which we deem an app bundle. I then conducted a manual analysis of the invocation of these
functions by ad libraries.
Of the 2700 apps selected for review, 165 apps were duplicates, narrowing our sample
size down to 2535 distinct apps. Of these, 27.5% (679/2535) contained an invocation of
either of the two functions. This total includes invocation of these functions for functional
(utility and security) as well as advertising purposes. To better understand if an ad library
invokes the function, analysis required a thorough examination of the location of the function
call to see if it is called by an advertising or marketing library. I found that many apps
pass information to advertisers and marketers. This analysis is conducted manually to best
capture a thorough list of invocations within ad libraries. Ultimately 12.54% of the examined
apps (318/2535) clearly incorporate ad libraries that invoke one of the functions that collects
the app bundle of the user. I found 28 di↵erent ad libraries invoking either getIA or getIP.
These results do not necessarily include those apps that collect app information themselves
and pass it to data brokers, advertising or marketing companies, or have their own in-house
advertising operation (like Twitter). These results demonstrate that many types of apps
have ad libraries that collect app bundles, including medical apps and those targeted at
children. Interestingly, I did not detect collection of app bundles by the three ad networks
identified by AdRisk. However, a number of other interesting cases emerged.
Radio Disney, for example, uses Burstly, a mobile app ad network whose library 5 calls
getIP. Disney’s privacy policy makes no direct reference to the collection of app bundles for
advertising purposes. Use of this technique in an app targeted at children is troubling because
it might collect app bundle information from a child’s device without notifying either the
parent who assisted the download or an older child that this type of information is collected
and used for advertising purposes. Disney does mention the collection of “Anonymous
Information” but the broad language defining this does not give any indication that the
Radio Disney app collects app bundles.6
4The smali format is a human-readable representation of the application’s bytecode.
5
burstly/lib/apptracking/AppTrackingManager.smali
6Formally, they define anonymous information as “information that does not directly or indirectly identify,
and cannot reasonably be used to identify, an individual guest.” App bundles are similar to movie play lists;
it is debatable whether they indeed satisfy this definition.
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Looney Tunes Dash! is a mobile app provided by Zynga that it explicitly states that
they collect ”Information about ... other third-party apps you have on your device.”7 In
fact, this is the privacy policy for all Zynga apps.
Several medical apps (12) collect app bundles. Most surprisingly, Doctor On Demand:
MD & Therapy, an app which facilitates a video visit with board-certified physicians and
psychologists collects app bundles through the implementation of google/ads/ conversion
tracking. However, their linked privacy policy makes no reference to passing any user in-
formation to advertisers. Other apps in the medical category with advertising libraries that
collect app bundles include ones that track ovulation and fertility, pregnancy, and remind
women to take their birth control pill.
Survey Study
Upon learning of the prevalence of the app bundle collection by advertisers, we need to
better understand what type of information could be learned by advertisers based on the
list of apps on a user’s mobile device. To do this, we can devise a study that would allow us
to collect our own set of app bundles to train a classifier.
The study consisted of a survey and an Android mobile app launched on the Google Play
Store. The protocol for all the parts of the study was approved by the Institutional Research
Board (IRB) for our institution. All participants gave their informed consent. We required
informed consent during both parts of the study, and participants could leave the study at
any time. Participants were informed that the information collected in the survey and the
information collected by the mobile app would be associated with one another.
Participants included individuals over the age of 18 willing to participate in the survey
and who owned an Android device. Crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk are proven to be an e↵ective way to collect high quality data [133]. The survey was
distributed over Microworkers.com a comparable crowdsourcing platform to Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk). We chose Microworkers.com over Amazon Mechanical Turk because
Amazon Mechanical Turk did not allow tasks that involve requiring a worker to download
or install any type of software.
Moreover, I designed the mobile app, AppSurvey, to collect the installed packages on a
participant’s phone. The study directed the participant to the Google Play Store to down-
load the mobile app. Upon launching AppSurvey, a pop-up screen provided participants
information about the study, information to be collected, and reiterated that the partici-




no information would be collected. If the participant consented, the app uploaded the app
bundles from the participants phone and anonymously and securely transmit it to our server.
AppSurvey also generated a unique User ID for each individual which participants were in-
structed to write down and provide in the survey part of the study. Finally, AppSurvey
prompted participants to uninstall the mobile app.
The survey is designed based upon the FT calculator. Specifically, it consisted of 25
questions about basic demographic information, health conditions, and Internet browsing
and spending habits. The survey also contained two control questions included to identify
survey participants not paying su cient attention while taking the survey. If either of these
questions were answered incorrectly, we excluded the survey response. In addition, the
workers were not compensated until after the finished tasks were reviewed and approved by
the survey conductors. Before taking the survey, participants were required to give informed
consent to the information collected in the survey. To link the app bundle information
collected by AppSurvey to the responses provided by participants in the survey, participants
were required to input the unique User ID generated by AppSurvey. The collection of this
data allows us to establish a ground truth for users’ app bundles.
The survey resulted in answers and app bundle information from 243 participants., and
1985 total distinct package names.
4.3 DETECTION DESIGN
The analysis in the previous section highlights the need for detecting information exposure
to ad libraries through shared process privileges. To this end I have design Pluto. Pluto
is a modular framework for estimating in-app and out-app targeted data exposure for a
given app. In-app Pluto focuses on local files that the app generates, the app layout and
string resource files, and the app’s manifest file. Out-app Pluto utilizes information about
app bundles to predict which apps will be installed together and employs techniques from
machine learning to make inferences about users based on the apps they have on their mobile.
I describe each of these in a pair of subsections.
4.3.1 In-app Pluto
In-app Pluto progresses in two steps as illustrated in Figure 4.2. First, the Dynamic
Analysis Module (DAM) runs the given app on a device emulator and extracts the files the
app creates. Then it decompiles the app and extracts its layout files, resource files, manifest




















Figure 4.2: Design of In-app Pluto
fed to a set of file miners. The file miners utilize a set of user attributes and user interests,
possibly associated with some domain knowledge, as a matching goal. A miner will reach a
matching goal when it decides that a data point is present in a file. When all the app’s files
are explored, the Aggregator (AGGR) removes duplicates from the set of matching goals and
the resulting set is presented to the analyst. Pluto’s in-app component’s goal is to estimate
o✏ine, the exposure of targeted data—or data points—to ad libraries at runtime. In-app
Pluto can be configured to estimate data points for a level 1 aggressive library by looking
only at the runtime generated files and available permissions. To perform exposure discovery
for a level 2 of aggression, it mines targeted data also from the resource and layout files. In
essence Pluto is trying to simulate what an ad library is allowed to do to estimate what is
the potential data exposure from a given app. To perform in-app exposure discovery, Pluto
employs dynamic analysis and natural language processing techniques to discover exposure
of in-app data points. Here I report on a prototype implementation focusing on manifest,
SQLite, XML, and JSON files.
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Dynamic Analysis
To discover the files that an app is generating at runtime, Pluto runs the app on an
emulator for 10 seconds and then uses a monkey tool to simulate user input. 8 This can
generate pseudo-random streams of clicks, touches, and system-level events. I chose to use
a monkey because some apps might require user stimulation before generating some of their
local files. To validate this assumption, we performed two experiments. First, I configured
Pluto’s DAM module to run all 2535 apps in the FD dataset for 10 seconds each. I repeat the
experiment, this time configuring DAM to issue 500 pseudo-random events to each app after
its 10 second interval is consumed. As we see on Table 4.3, Pluto explores approximately 5%
more apps in the second case. 9 More importantly, DAM Monkey generates 1196 more files
than DAM which results in 100 apps with ‘interesting’ files more. Android’s Monkey was
previously found to achieve approximately 25.27% LOC coverage [135]. However, Pluto’s
components can be easily replaced, and advances in dynamic analysis can be leveraged in
the future. For example, PUMA [136] is a very promising dynamic analysis tool introduced
recently. If new levels of library aggression are introduced in the future, PUMA could be
used instead of Android’s monkey to better simulate behaviors that can allow libraries to
access user attributes at runtime.







DAM 0.718 14556 9083 1911
DAM Monkey 0.763 15752 10171 2021
Once the execution completes, DAM extracts all the ‘runtime’ generated files. Subse-
quently, it decompiles the input android app package (apk) and extracts the Android layout
files, Android String resources and the app’s manifest file.
File Miners empowered by Natural Language Processing
Once the DAM module generates ‘runtime’ files, Pluto’s enabled file miners commence
their exploration. I have implemented four types of file miners in the prototype: MMiner;
GMiner; DBMiner; XMLMiner. The MMiner is designed to parse manifest files, the DBMiner
for SQlite database files, the XMLMiner for runtime generated XML files and the GMiner
8In our implementation we used the Android SDK-provided UI/Application Exerciser Monkey [134].
9An unsuccessful experiment includes apps that failed to launch or crashed during the experiment.
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is a generic miner well suited for resource and layout files. The miners take as input, a set
of data points, 10 in the form of noun words and a mapping between permissions and data
points that can be derived given that permission.
Input processing: Pluto utilizes Wordnet’s English semantic dictionary [37] to derive a
set of synonyms for each data point. However, a word with multiple meanings will result
in synonyms not relevant to Pluto’s matching goal. Consider for example the word gender.
In Wordnet, gender has two di↵erent meanings: one referring to grammar rules and the one
referring to reproductive roles of organisms. In our case it is clear that we are interested
in the latter instead of the former. In this prototype, the analyst must provide Pluto with
the right meaning. While it is trivial to make this selection, for other data points it might
not be as trivial. For example, age has 5 di↵erent meanings in Wordnet. Other data points
which we have not explored, might have even more complex relationships. Visuwords.com
is a helpful tool which can be used to visualize such relationships and immensely facilitated
such selections. For example, the list of data points in the FT calculator, is indeed feasible
to analyze manually. However, Pluto does not require this from an analyst. If the meaning
is not provided, Pluto will take all synonym groups into account with an apparent e↵ect on
precision.
NLP in Pluto: The NLP community developed di↵erent approaches to parse sentences
and phrases such as Parts of Speech (POS) Tagging and Phrase and Clause Parsing.
The former can identify parts of a sentence or phrase (i.e., which words correspond to nouns,
verbs, adjectives or prepositions), and the latter can identify phrases. However, these cannot
be directly applied in our case because we are not dealing with well written and mostly
grammatically correct sentences. In contrast, Pluto parses structured data written in a
technically correct way (e.g., .sqlite, .xml files). Thus in our case we can take advantage of the
well-defined structure of these files and extract only the meaningful words. For the database
files, potentially meaningful words will constitute the table name and the columns names.
Unfortunately, words we extract might not be real words. A software engineer can choose
anything for the table name (or filename), from userProfile, user profile, uProfil, to
up. We take advantage of the fact that most software engineers do follow best practices and
name their variables using the first two conventions, the camelCase (e.g. userProfile) and the
snake case structure (e.g. user profile). The processed extracted words are checked against
Wordnet’s English semantic dictionary. If the word exists in the dictionary, Pluto derives
its synonyms and performs a matching test against the data points and their synonyms. 11
10We derived most of the data points from the FT calculator [127].
11In our prototype we used the JWI [137] interface to Wordnet, to derive sets of synonyms.
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If a match is determined, then a disambiguation layer decides whether to accept or reject
the match. Next, I elaborate on the functions of the disambiguation layer.
Context Disambiguation Layer: Words that reach a matching goal, could be irrelevant
with the actual user attribute. Consider for example the word exercise. If a Miner unearths
that word, it will be matched with the homonymous synonym of the matching goal workout.
However, if this word is found in the Strings resource file that doesn’t necessarily mean that
the user is interested in fitness activities. It could be the case that the app in question
is an educational app that has exercises for students. On the other hand, if this word is
mined from an app in the Health and Fitness Google Play category, then it is more likely
this is referring to a fitness activity. Pluto employs a disambiguation layer that aims to
determine whether the match is valid. It attaches to every user interest the input app’s
Google Play category name. We call that a disambiguation term. For user attributes, the
disambiguation term is currently assigned by the analyst 12. In addition, Pluto assigns some
domain knowledge to data points. For attributes, it treats the file name or table name as
the domain knowledge, and for interests it uses the matching goal itself. The prototype’s
context disambiguation layer calculates the similarity between the disambiguation term
and the domain knowledge. If the similarity value is found to surpass a specific threshold,
then the match is accepted.
The NLP community already proposed numerous metrics for comparing how similar or
related two concepts are. The prototype can be configured to use the following existing
similarity metrics to disambiguate attribute matches: PATH [138]; LIN [139]; LCH [38];
LESK [140]. Unlike the first three metrics which are focused on measuring an is-a similarity
between two words, LESK is a definition-based metric of relatedness. Intuitively this would
work better with user interests where the disambiguation term is the app’s category name.
The other metrics are used to capture is-a relationships which cannot hold in most of
the user-interests cases. For example, there is no strong is-a relationship connecting the
user interest vehicle with the category transportation. 13 LESK seems well fit to address
this as it depends on the descriptions of the two words. Indeed, LESK scores the (vehicle,
transportation) pair with 132 with (vehicle, travel and local) coming second with 103.
However, in this study I found that LESK might not always work that well when applied
in this domain. Studying the scoring of LESK with respect to one of our most popular user
interests in our L1 dataset we found it to be problematic. When comparing the matching
goal workout with the category Health and Fitness, LESK assigns it one of the lowest
12We used the word Person.
13We found that similarity metrics that find these relationships do not assign the best score to the
pair(vehicle, transportation) when compared with other (vehicle, *) pairs.
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Table 4.4: Comparison between rankings of (interest, category name) pairs from LESK and




RANK LESK TF TF*LESK
VEHICLE 1 TRANSPORTATION FINANCE TRANSPORTATION
VEHICLE 2 BOOKS AND REF-
ERENCES
TRANSPORTATION FINANCE
VEHICLE 3 TRAVEL AND LO-
CAL
LIFESTYLE LIFESTYLE






WORKOUT 2 TRAVEL AND LO-
CAL
APP WIDGET NEWS AND MAGA-
ZINE
WORKOUT 3 MUSIC AND AUDIO NEWS AND MAGA-
ZINE
APP WIDGET
scores (33), with the maximum score assigned to the (workout, books and references) pair
(113).
Here I present a new improved similarity metric that can address LESK’s shortcomings
when applied to our problem. I call our similarity metric droidLESK. The intuition behind
droidLESK is that the more frequently a word is used in a category, the higher the weight
of the (word, category) pair should be. droidLESK is then a normalization of freq(w, c)⇥
LESK(w, c). In other words, droidLESK is the weighted LESK were the weights are assigned
based on term frequencies. To evaluate droidLESK, I create pairs of the matching goal
workout with every Google Play category name and assign a score to each pair as derived
from droidLESK and other state of the art similarity metrics. To properly weight LESK
and derive droidLESK, I perform a term frequency analysis of the workout word in all
‘runtime’ generated files of the L1 dataset. I repeat the experiment for the word vehicle.
droidLESK’s scoring was compared with the scores assigned to the pairs by the following
similarity metrics: WUP [141]; JCN [142]; LCH [38]; LIN [139]; RES [143]; PATH [138]; LESK [140]
and HSO [144].
The results are very promising—even though preliminary—as shown in table 4.4. 14 We
observe that the proposed technique correctly assigns the highest score to the pair (workout,
health and fitness) than any other pair (workout,*). The same is true for the pair (vehicle,
transportation). droidLesk was evaluated on the two most prevalent user interests in our
dataset. Since this approach might su↵er from over-fitting, in future work I plan to try this
new metric with more words and take into account the number of apps contributing to the
term frequency. I further discuss the e↵ects of using droidLESK in Pluto’s in-app targeted
data discovery in the evaluation Subsection 6.4.
14Due to space limitations, I omit uninformative comparisons.
51
4.3.2 Out-app Pluto
Out-app Pluto aims to estimate what is the potential data exposure to an ad library
that uses the unprotected public gIA and gIP APIs. That is, given the fact that the ad
library can learn the list of installed applications on a device, it aims to explore what data
points, if any, can be learned from that list. Intuitively, if an ad library knows that a user
installed a pregnancy app and local public transportation app, it would be able to infer the
user’s gender and coarse location. However, the list of installed applications derived from
gIA and gIP is dependent on the device the ad library’s host app is installed, which renders
estimation of the exposure challenging. To explore what an ad library can learn through this
out-app attack channel, I derive a set of co-installation patterns that reveals which apps are
usually installed together. This way we can simulate what the runtime call to gIA or gIP
will result in given invocation from an ad library incorporated into a particular host app. I
then feed the list of co-installed applications into a set of classifiers we trained to discover
the potential data exposure through the out-app channel.
The Pluto out-app exposure discovery system runs machine learning techniques on a cor-
pus of app bundles to achieve two goals. First, it provides a Co-Installation Pattern module
(CIP) which can be updated dynamically as new records of installed apps are received. The
CIP module runs state-of-the-art frequent pattern mining (FPM) algorithms on such records
to discover associations between apps. For example, such an analysis can yield an associ-
ation in the form of a conditional probability, stating that if app A is present on a device
then app B can be found on that device with x% confidence. When an analyst sets Pluto
to discover out-app targeted data regarding an app o✏ine, Pluto utilizes the CIP module
to get a good estimation of a vector of co-installed apps with the target app. The resulting
vector is passed to the classifiers which in turn present the analyst with a set of learned
attributes. Second, it provides a suite of supervised machine learning techniques that take
a corpus of app bundles paired with a list of user targeted data and creates classifiers that
predict whether an app bundle is indicative of a user attribute or interest.
Co-Installation Patterns
The CIP module uses frequent pattern mining to find application co-installation patterns.
This can assist Pluto in predicting what will an ad library learn at runtime if it invokes gIA
or gIP. We call a co-installation pattern, the likelihood to find a set of apps installed on a
device in correlation with another app installed on that device. In FPM, every transaction
in a database is identified by an id and an itemset. The itemset is the collection of one or
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more items that appear together in the same transaction. For example, this could be the
items bought together by a customer at a grocery store. Support indicates the frequency
of an itemset in the database. An FPM algorithm will consider an itemset to be frequent
if its support is no less than a minimum support threshold. Itemsets that are not frequent
are pruned. Such an algorithm will mine association rules including frequent itemsets in
the form of conditional probabilities that indicate the likelihood that an itemset can occur
together with another itemset in a transaction. The algorithm will select rules that satisfy a
measure (e.g., a minimum confidence level). An association rule has the form N:N, where N is
the number of unique items in the database. An association rule is presented asX ) Y where
the itemset X is termed the precedent and Y the consequent. Such analysis is common
when stores want to find relationships between products frequently bought together.
Pluto’s CIP uses the same techniques to model the installations of apps on mobile devices,
as itemsets bought together at a grocery store. Our implementation of Pluto’s CIP module
uses the FPGrowth [145] algorithm, a state of the art frequent pattern matching algorithm
for finding association rules. I have chosen FPGrowth because it is significantly faster than
its competitor Apriori [146]. CIP runs on a set of app bundles collected periodically from
a database containing user profiles that include the device’s app bundles and derives a
set of association rules, indicating the likelihood that apps can be found co-installed on a
device. Our CIP association rule will have the form 1:N because Pluto is interested in finding
relationships between a given app and a set of other apps.
CIP uses confidence and lift as the measures to decide whether an association rule is
strong enough to be presented to the analyst. Confidence is defined as conf(X ) Y ) =
supp(X[Y )
supp(X) , where supp(X) is the support of the itemset in the database. A confidence of 100%
for an association rule means that for 100% of the times that X appears in a transaction, Y
appears as well in the same transaction. Thus an association rule facebook ) skype, viber
with 70% confidence will mean that for 70% of the devices having Facebook installed, Viber
and Skype are also installed.
Another measure CIP supports is Lift. Lift is defined as: lift(X ) Y ) = supp(X[Y )
supp(X)⇥supp(Y ) .
Lift indicates how independent the two itemsets are in the rule. A Lift of one will indicate
that the probability of occurrence of the precedent and consequent are independent of each
other. The higher the Lift between the two itemsets, the stronger the dependency between
them and the strongest the rule is.
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Learning Targeted Data from App Bundles
Pluto uses supervised learning models to infer user attributes from the CIP-estimated app
bundles. Pluto aims to resolve two challenges in training models based on app bundles: 1)
skewed distribution of values of attributes; 2) high dimensionality and highly sparse nature
of the app bundles.
Balancing distributions of training sets: Based on the empirical data collected,
some attributes have a more skewed distribution in their values. To orient the reader using
a concrete example, consider an example where 1 of 100 users has an allergy. In predicting
whether a user has an allergy in this dataset, one classifier can achieve an accuracy of 0.99
by trivially classifying each user as having an allergy. In view of this, for the attribute “has
an allergy” the value “yes” can be assigned a higher weight, such as 99, while the value “no”
has a weight of 1. After assigning weights, the weighted accuracy for predicting an attribute
now becomes the weighted average of accuracy for each user; the weight for a user is the
ratio of the user’s attribute value weight to the total attribute value weights of all users.
Therefore, in this example, the weighted accuracy becomes 0.5, which is fair, even when
trivially guessing that each user has the same attribute value. In order to train an e↵ective
model for Pluto, the distribution of training sets is balanced following the aforementioned
idea. To balance we adjust the weights of existing data entries to ensure that the total
weights of each attribute value are equal. In this way, the final model would not trivially
classify each user to be associated with any same attribute value. Accordingly, I will adopt
measures weighted precision and weighted recall in the evaluation where the total weights of
each attribute value are equal; this is to penalize trivial classification to the same attribute
value [147].
Dimension reduction of app-bundle data: Another challenge we face in this context
is the high dimensionality and highly sparse nature of the app bundles. There are over 1.4
million apps [148] on Google Play at this moment, and it is both impractical and undesirable
for the users to download and install more than a small fraction of those on their devices. A
recent study from Yahoo [149] states that users install on average 97 apps on a device. To
make this problem more tractable I used a technique borrowed from the Machine Learning
community which allows us to reduce the considered dimensions. The prototype employs
three classifiers, namely K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Random Forests, and SVM.
To apply these classifiers to our data, each user ui in the set of users U is mapped to an
app installation vectors aui = {a1, . . . , ak}, where aj = 1 (j = 1, . . . , k) if ui installs aj on
the mobile device, otherwise aj = 0. Note that the app installation vector is k-dimensional
and k can be a large value (1985 in our study). Thus, classifiers may su↵er from the “curse
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of dimension” such that the computation could be dominated by less relevant installed apps
when the dimension of space goes higher. To mitigate this problem, we can use principal
component analysis (PCA) by selecting a small number of the principal components to
perform dimension reduction before applying a classifier.
4.4 DETECTION EVALUATION
In this section I evaluate Pluto’s components in estimating data exposure. We will first
evaluate Pluto’s performance to discover Level-1 and Level-2 in-app data points. Next we
will apply Pluto’s CIP module and classifiers on real world data app bundles and the collected
ground truth, and evaluate their performance.
4.4.1 Evaluation of Pluto’s in-app exposure discovery
In this section I present empirical findings on applying Pluto on real world apps.
Experimental setup: I provided Pluto with a set of data points to look for, enhanced
with the meaning—sense id of the data point in Wordnet’s dictionary—and the class of
the data point (i.e., user attribute or user interest). I also provide Pluto with a mapping
between permissions and data points and we configured it to use the LCH similarity metric
at the disambiguation layer for user attributes and our droidLESK metric for user interests.
I found that setting the LCH threshold to 2.8 and the droidLESK threshold to 0.4 provides
the best performance. To tune the thresholds, I parameterized them and ran Pluto multiple
times on the L1 dataset. A similar approach can be used to tune the thresholds on any
available - ideally larger - dataset 15, and data point set. In all experiments, all Miners
were enabled unless otherwise stated. The MMiner mined in manifest files, the DBMiner
in runtime-generated database files, the XMLMiner in runtime-generated XML files and the
GMiner in String resource files and layout files. I compared Pluto to the level-1 and level-2
ground truth we manually constructed as described in Section 4.2.
In-app exposure estimation: I ran Pluto on the set of 262 apps (Pluto L1) and the
full set of 2535 apps (Pluto FD). Figure 4.3 plots the distribution of apps with respect to
data points found within those apps. I observed that the number of data points found in
apps remains consistent as we increased the number of apps. I repeated the experiment for
the level-1 dataset that consists of 35 apps. Figure 4.4. depicts Pluto’s data point discovery.




















Figure 4.3: CDF of apps and number of data points (level-1)
I compared Pluto’s data point prediction with the respective level-1 and level-2 manual
analysis 4.2.
Evidently, Pluto is optimistic in estimating in-app data points. In other words, Pluto’s
in-app discovery component can flag apps as potentially exposing data points, even though
these are not actually there. A large number of Pluto’s false positives stem from parsing the
String constants file. Parsing these files increases coverage by complementing our dynamic
analysis challenge in generating files that host apps created after the user logged in. It also
addresses the layer-2 aggressive libraries can read from the user input. However, this results
in considering a lot of extra keywords that might match a data point or its synonyms. Their
location in the Strings.xml makes it harder for Pluto to disambiguate the context for certain
data point classes. In this study, I makes the first attempt towards mitigating this pathology
by proposing droidLESK.
Pluto is designed to find user attributes, user interests, and data points stemming from
the host app’s granted permissions. Next, I present the performance of Pluto’s prototype
implementation with respect to the above categories.
Finding user-attributes: Figure 4.5 depicts the performance of Pluto in finding the
data point gender when compared to the level-1 and level-2 datasets and Figure 4.6 shows
the same for the user attribute age. Gender had absolute support of 13 in the level-1 dataset
and 18 in the level-2 and age had 12 and 9 respectively. We observe that Pluto is doing




















Figure 4.4: CDF of apps and number of data points (level-2)
the word age, was found in a lot of layout files and Strings.xml files while the same was not
present in the runtime generated files. Comparing age with the level-1 ground truth, results
in a high number of false positives, since the analyst has constructed the ground truth for
a level-1 aggressive library. When Pluto is compared with the ground truth for a level-2
aggressive library, its performance is significantly improved.
Finding interests: Next, I evaluated Pluto’s performance in discovering user interests.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the user interest workout when Pluto is compared against the level-1
ground truth and the level-2 ground truth. Workout had absolute support of 5 in the level-1
dataset and 6 in the level-2. Again, Pluto does much better in the latter case for the same
reasons stated before.
Preliminary results for droidLESK: In the experiments I used droidLESK as the most
appropriate similarity metric on Pluto’s context disambiguation layer for user interests.
I compared that with an implementation of Pluto with no disambiguation layer and an
implementation that uses the LESK metric. droidLESK achieved an astonishing 103.3%
increase in Pluto’s precision whereas LESK achieved an improvement of 11.37%. This is
a good indication that droidLESK is a promising way of introducing domain knowledge
when comparing the similarity between words in the Android app context. I plan to further
explore droidLESK’s potential in future work.
Finding data point exposure through permission inheritance: Pluto’s MMiner
















Figure 4.5: gender prediction performance given the L1 and L2 ground truth.
or level-2 aggressive library to get access to user attributes or interests. I compared Pluto’s
performance in two di↵erent configurations. In configuration 1 (L1 or L2), Pluto is set to look
for a data point using all of its Miners whilst in configuration 2 (L1:MMiner and L2:MMiner)
Pluto is set to look for a data point only using the MMiner, if the data point can be derived
from the host app permissions. We performed the experiment on the larger level-1 dataset,
providing as input the mapping between the permissions ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
and ACCESS FINE LOCATION with the data point address. Figure 4.8 depicts Pluto’s
performance in predicting the presence of address given the above two configurations for
both the L1 and L2 datasets and ground truths. As expected, Pluto’s prediction is much
more accurate when only the MMiner is used. It is clear that in the cases where an data
point can be derived through a permission, the best way to predict that data point exposure
would be to merely look through the target app’s manifest file.
The main reason for the false negatives we observe in all previous experiments was because
some data points that the analyst has discovered were in runtime files generated after the user
has logged in the app, or after a specific input was provided. Pluto’s DAM implementation
















Figure 4.6: age prediction performance given the L1 and L2 ground truth.
4.4.2 Evaluation of Pluto’s out-app exposure discovery
Next, weneed to evaluate Pluto’s ability to construct co-installation patterns and predict
user attributes and interests based on information that can be collected through the out-app
channel. I ran Pluto’s CIP module and classifiers on the ABD dataset we collect from real
users (see Section 4.2).
Mining application co-installation patterns: Pluto’s CIP module implementation
uses FPGrowth [145], the state of the art frequent pattern matching (FPM) algorithm for
finding association rules. I chose FPGrowth because it is significantly faster than its competi-
tor Apriori [146]. I applied Pluto’s CIP module on the app bundles we collected through our
survey. I set FPGrowth to find co-installation patterns in the form 1:N and prune events with
support less than 10%. Table 4.5 lists the 5 strongest—in terms of confidence—association
rules that CIP found when run on the survey dataset.
We observe that Facebook is likely to be installed together with the Facebook Messenger
app. This is likely because Facebook asks their users to install the Facebook Messenger app
when using the Facebook app. Our survey dataset reflects this as well. The strong relation-
ship between the Facebook app and Facebook Messenger app revealed by FPM illustrates its
















Figure 4.7: workout prediction performance given the L1 and L2 ground truth.
patterns between the input application and other applications. Pluto leverages such pat-
terns to provide an estimation of what user attributes can be potentially derived from the
app bundles of users that have the input app. Co-installation patterns can also be used to
reduce redundancy when combining the in-app data exposure of multiple applications. For
example, one might want to estimate what are the in-app data points exposed by app A
and app B. However, if these applications are installed on the same device, then the total
amount of information the adversarial library will get will be the union of both removing
duplicates.
Table 4.5: The strongest co-installation patterns found by the CIP module when run on
the survey app bundles.
Precedent Consequence Conf Lift
com.facebook.katana com.facebook.orca 0.79 2.10
com.lenovo.anyshare.gps com.facebook.orca 0.75 2.01
com.viber.voip com.facebook.orca 0.74 1.98
com.skype.raider com.facebook.orca 0.71 1.88


















Figure 4.8: address prediction performance in di↵erent configurations, given the L1 and
L2 ground truth.
Performance of Pluto’s classifiers: Pluto’s classifiers can be used to estimate user
attributes derived from CIP app bundles or real-time app bundles from user profiles. I
evaluated the performance of Pluto’s classifiers on real app bundles we collected from our
survey (see Section 4.2). I used the users’ answers to the questionnaire in the survey as the
ground truth to evaluate the classification results. To justify our use of dimension reduction
technique, we evaluated the classifier on both dataset before dimension reduction and dataset
after dimension reduction. The results on representative attributes are shown in Table 4.6
and Table 4.7 respectively.
Based on the results shown in both tables, Random Forest performs best across all pre-
diction tasks. The superiority of Random Forest in our evaluation agrees with the existing
knowledge [150]. Specifically, because our dataset has a relatively smaller number of in-
stances, the pattern variance is more likely to be high. The ensemble technique (voting by
many di↵erent trees) employed by Random Forest could reduce such variance in its predic-
tion and thus achieve a better performance.
Comparison of Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show dimension reduction can e↵ectively im-
prove the performance of Random Forest and KNN. However, the performance of SVM
becomes poorer after dimension reduction. One possible reason is that SVM can handle
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Table 4.6: Performance of classifiers before dimension reduction
Classifier
Age Marital Status Sex
P(%) R(%) P(%) R(%) P(%) R(%)
Random Forest 64.1 66.3 89.8 83.6 91.5 89.6
SVM 65.5 63.6 89.0 82.1 87.4 83.1
KNN 62.7 60.0 86.3 77.7 83.4 74.8
P = Weighted Precision, R = Weighted Recall
Table 4.7: Performance of classifiers after dimension reduction
Classifier
Age Marital Status Sex
P(%) R(%) P(%) R(%) P(%) R(%)
Random Forest 88.6 88.6 95.0 93.8 93.8 92.9
SVM 44.8 35.4 66.9 50.5 80.9 70.1
KNN 85.7 83.6 92.5 91.2 91.6 89.9
P = Weighted Precision, R = Weighted Recall
high-dimension data such as our original dataset. The model complexity of SVM is deter-
mined by the number of support vectors instead of dimensions.
4.5 UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS
Utility of Pluto: In this chapter, I propose an approach that can be leveraged to assess
potential data exposure through in-app and out-app channels to a third-party library given
its access to shared intra-process privileges. Note that even though I use ad libraries in
free apps as a motivating example, this approach can be adapted to assess data exposure
by any app to any third-party library. I chose ad libraries because they are quintessential
examples of third-party libraries with strong business incentives for aggressive data harvest-
ing. Motivated by rising privacy concerns related to mobile advertising, users can exert
pressure on markets to integrate data exposure assessment into their system and present
the results in a usable way to users when downloading an app. In light of this information,
users would be able to make more informed decisions when choosing an app. Furthermore,
government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), could benefit from
this approach to facilitate their e↵orts in regulating mobile medical device apps [151] and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could leverage Pluto to discover apps that potentially
violate user privacy.
Next, I describe a simple way for markets (and in extend other interested parties) to
utilize Pluto’s results and rank apps based on their data exposure. Intuitively, the harder
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Table 4.8: Most risky apps based on their in-app data exposure. M = MEDICAL, HF =
HEALTH & FITNESS




M com.excelatlife.depression Depression manage-
ment
100 ⇥ 103  
500⇥ 103
8.14
M com.medicaljoyworks.prognosis Clinical case simulator
for physicians





Workout management 100 ⇥ 103  
500⇥ 103
7.33
HF com.cigna.mobile.mycigna Personal health infor-
mation management
100 ⇥ 103  
500⇥ 103
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it is for an adversary to get a data point of a user, the more valuable that data point might
be for the adversary. Also, the more sensitive a data point is, the harder it will be to get it.
Thus sensitive data points should be more valuable for adversaries. Consequently, a market
could use a cost model, such as the one o↵ered by the FT calculator, to assign the proposed
values acting as weights to data points. In fact, Google, which acts as a data broker itself,
would probably have more accurate values and a larger set of data points. They could then
normalize the set of exposed data points and present the data exposure score for each app.
For example, let D be the set of data points in the cost model and X the set of data point
weights in the cost model, where |D| = |X| = n. We include the null data point in D
with a corresponding zero value in X. Also, let ↵ be the app under analysis. Then the new





where x↵ is the sum of all weights of the data
points found to be exposed by app ↵. Here, min(X) corresponds to an app having only
the least expensive data point in D.
nP
i=1
xi corresponds to an app exposing all data points
in D. z↵ would result in a value from 0 to 1 for each app ↵ under analysis. The higher
the value the more the data exposure. This can be presented in the applications download
site in application markets along with other existing information for that app. For better
presentation, markets could use a number from 0 to 10, stars, or color spectrum with red
corresponding to the maximum data exposure.
To provide the reader with a better perspective on the result of this approach, I applied
Pluto and performed the proposed ranking technique on the collected apps from the MEDICAL
and HEALTH & FITNESS Google Play categories respectively. In the absence of co-installation
patterns for all target apps, I do not take into account the e↵ect of having an app on the
same device with another data exposing app 16. We found that most apps have a low risk
score. In particular 97% of MEDICAL and also 97% of HEALTH & FITNESS apps had scores
16Note that to perform the out-app Pluto analysis one needs co-installation patterns for all ranked apps.
Markets can easily derive those using the FPM approach described earlier. In that case, one should take
into account the UNION of in-app and out-app exposed attributes.
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below 5.0. Those apps either expose a very small amount of highly sensitive targeted data,
targeted data of low sensitivity, or both. For example, we found net.epsilonzero.hearingtest,
a hearing testing app, exposed two attributes, the user’s phone number and age, and scored
0.02. This ranking technique ensures that only a few apps stand out in the rankings. These
are apps with a fairly large number of exposed data points including highly sensitive ones.
For example, the highest scored medical app com.excelatlife.depression with a score of
8.14, exposes 16 data points including “depression,” “headache,” and “pregnancy,” which
have some of the highest values in the FT calculator. Table 4.8 depicts the two most risky
apps per category. Pluto in conjunction with the proposed ranking approach can help a
user/analyst to focus on those high risk cases.
These ranking results also depict the prevalence of targeted data exposure. As we observe
on Table 4.8 the highest ranked apps were installed in the order of hundreds of thousands of
devices. Consequently, highly sensitive data of hundreds of thousands of users are exposed to
opportunistic third-party libraries. I defer to future work the study of practical approaches
to mitigate the data exposure by apps to third-party libraries.
App Bundles: The collection of app bundle information by app developers, advertising
companies, and marketing companies is troubling. Currently, the ability of apps to use gIP
or gIA with no special permissions provides an opportunity for abuse by both app devel-
opers and advertisers. My research demonstrates that this abuse is occurring. I further
demonstrate that such information can be reliably leveraged to infer users’ attributes. Un-
fortunately, companies fail to notify consumers that they are allowing the collection of app
bundles. With this, they have also failed to notify users as to what entity collects the in-
formation, how it is used, or steps to mitigate or prevent the collection of this data. The
failure of the Android API to require permissions for the gIP or gIA removes from the users
the possibility to have choice and consent to this type of information gathering. To prevent
abuse of gIP or gIA, app providers should notify users, both in the privacy policy and in the
application, that app bundles are collected. Additionally, applications should provide the
user the opportunity to deny the collection of this information for advertising or marketing
purposes. Potentially, the Android API could require special permissions for gIP or gIA.
However, the all-or-nothing permissions scheme might not add any additional value besides
notice to the user and the warning may not be necessary for an app that is using these two
functions for utility and functional purposes.
Limitations of the proposed approach: The estimation of data exposure to libraries
is constrained by the specific attack channels we consider. The prototype employs specific
examples for each channel and performs data exposure assessment based on those. Never-
theless, the cases we considered are not the only ones. For example, someone could include
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the CAMERA permission or the RECORD AUDIO in the protected APIs. The camera could be
used opportunistically to get pictures of the user in order to infer her gender or location.
The microphone could be used to capture what the user is saying and, by converting speech
to text and employing POS tagging, infer additional targeted data. More channels can also
be discovered such as new side channels or covert channels. These can be used to extend
Pluto for a more complete assessment. The current prototype and results can serve as a
baseline for comparison.
4.6 SUMMARY
In this Chapter I performed an analysis on the security of shared intra-process privileges.
I showed how an untrusted incentivized third-party library can exploit those shared priv-
ileges to aggressively harvest sensitive user information on a smartphone. In my analysis
I detailed the adversary model in this setting, and introduced previously unknown infer-
ence techniques for such advertisers. I then utilized these observations to built a tool for
automatically detecting potential information leakage to such adversaries. Figure 4.9 visu-
alizes this contribution on the smartphone ecosystem. The tool combines techniques from
code analysis, natural language processing and machine learning to emulate the informa-
tion reach of third-party libraries on smartphones. This study reveals a pressing need for
considering such intra-process adversaries when designing resource isolation mechanisms on
smartphones. Next I will look into the security of another shared resource, in particular






































Figure 4.9: Detecting information leakage to third-party libraries.
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CHAPTER 5: SHARING FILESYSTEM RESOURCES
Mobile applications can access filesystem resources made available by the host operating
system. Android in particular is built on top of a stripped down version of the Linux kernel,
which is optimized for mobile devices. The Linux kernel uses a virtual process filesystem
(procfs) for e ciently mirroring some of the kernel data structures to userspace programs.
Files in this filesystem are protected using a traditional discretionary access control scheme.
However, files which hold seemingly harmless information on a static platform (e.g. desktop
machines) can be hazardous when accessed on a mobile platform. In Chapter I will present
my analysis on the Android shared filesystem resources. I will show that malicious mobile
applications can exploit unprotected files as side-channels to perform inference attacks and
compromise user confidentiality [11]. .
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Android provides unprivileged applications with access to basic local filesystem resources.
All such public resources are considered to be harmless and their releases are part of the
design which is important to the system’s normal operations. Examples include the coordi-
nation among users through the ps command and among the apps using audio resources they
access through he API call AudioManager.requestAudioFocus. However, those old design
assumptions on the public local resources are becoming increasingly irrelevant in front of
the fast-evolving ways to use smartphones. In [11] I identified two fundamental design/use
gaps that are swiftly widening, a↵ecting the Android ecosystem:
Firstly, I found that there is a gap between Linux’s design and the smartphone use.
Linux comes with the legacy of its original designs for workstations and servers. Some of
its information disclosure, which could be harmless in these stationary environments, could
become a critical issue for mobile phones. For example, Linux makes the MAC address of
the wireless access points (WAP) available under its virtual process filesystem (procfs). This
does not seem to be a big issue for a workstation or even a laptop back a few years ago.
For a smartphone, however, knowledge about such information will lead to disclosure of a
phone user’s location, particularly with the recent development that databases have been
built for fingerprinting geo-locations with WAPs’ MAC addresses (called Basic Service Set
Identification, or BSSID).
Secondly, I observed the manifestation of a gap between the assumptions on Android public
resources and evolving app design, functionalities and background information throughout
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this study. For example, an app is often dedicated to a specific website. Therefore, the
adversary no longer needs to infer the website a user visits, as it can be easily found out by
looking at which app is running (through ps for example). Most importantly, today’s apps
often come with a plethora of background information like tweets, public posts and public
web services such as Google Maps. As a result, even very thin information about the app’s
behavior (e.g., posting a message), as exposed by the public resources, could be linked to
such public knowledge to recover sensitive user data.
Specifically, in this study I carefully analyzed the ways filesystem resources are utilized by
the OS and popular apps on Android, together with the public online information related
to their operations. My study discovered two confirmed new sources of information leaks:
• App network-data usage (Section 5.2.2). I found that the data usage statistics disclosed
by the procfs can be used to precisely fingerprint an app’s behavior and even infer
its input data, by leveraging online resources such as tweets published by Twitter.
To demonstrate the seriousness of the information leakage from those usage data,
I developed a suite of inference techniques that can reveal a phone user’s disease
conditions she is interested in from the network-data consumption of WebMD app, her
identity from that of Twitter app, and the stock she is looking at from Yahoo! Finance
app.
• Public ARP information (Section 5.2.3). I further discovered that the public ARP
data released by Android (under its Linux public directory) contains the BSSID of
the WAP a phone is connected to, and demonstrate how to practically utilize such
information to locate a phone user through BSSID databases.
I built a zero-permission app that stealthily collects information for these attacks. This
chapter elaborates on side-channel attacks designed and executed based on these newly found
information leaks throufh shared filesystem resources and discusses mitigation strategies.




The adversary considered in this study runs a zero-permission app on the victim’s smart-
phone. Such an app needs to operate in a stealthy way to visually conceal its presence
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from the user and also minimize its impact on a smartphone’s performance. On the other
hand, the adversary has the resources to analyze the data gathered by the app using publicly
available background information, for example, through crawling the public information re-
leased by social networks, searching Google Maps, etc. Such activities can be performed by
ordinary Internet users.
In addition to collecting and analyzing the information gathered from the victim’s device,
a zero-permission malicious app needs a set of capabilities to pose a credible privacy threat.
Particularly, it needs to send data across the Internet without the INTERNET permission.
Also, it should stay aware of the system’s situation, i.e., which apps are currently running.
This enables the malicious app to keep a low profile and start data collection only when its
target app is being executed. Here we show how these capabilities can be obtained by the
app without any permission.
A malicious app should be able to share the surreptitiously stolen data with the adversary’s
remote location. Leviathan’s blog describes a zero-permission technique to smuggle out data
across the Internet [65]. The idea is to let the sender app use the URI ACTION VIEW Intent
to open a browser and sneak the payload it wants to deliver to the parameters of an HTTP
GET from the receiver website. I re-implemented this technique in my research and further
made it stealthy. Leviathan’s approach does not work when the screen is o↵ because the
browser is paused when the screen is o↵. I improved this method to smuggle data right
before the screen is o↵ or the screen is being unlocked. Specifically, the adversarial app
continuously monitors /lcd power (/sys/class/lcd/panel/lcd power on Galaxy Nexus),
an LCD status indicator released under the sysfs. Note that this indicator can be located
under other directory on other devices, for example, sys/class/backlight /s6e8aa0 on
Nexus Prime. When the indicator becomes zero, the phone screen dims out, which allows
the app to send out data through the browser without being noticed by the user. After the
data transmission is done, the app can redirect the browser to Google and also set the phone
to its home screen to cover this operation.
A malicious app should also be aware of the system’s situation or state. The designed zero
permission app defines a list of target applications such as stock, health, location applications
and monitors their activities. It first checks whether those packages are installed on the
victim’s system (getInstalled Applications()) and then periodically calls ps to get a
list of active apps and their PIDs. Once a target is found to be active, our app will start
a thread that closely monitors the /proc/uid stats/[uid] and the /proc/ [pid]/ of the
target.
69
5.2.2 Side-Channel 1: per-App Network Tra c
Usage Monitoring and Analysis
Mobile data usages of Android are made public under /proc/uid stat/ (per app) and
/sys/class/net/[interface] /statistics/ (per interface). The former was introduced
by Android to keep track of individual apps. These directories can be read by any app
directly or through TrafficStats, a public API class. Of particular interest here are two
files /proc/uid stat /[uid]/tcp rcv and /proc/uid stat/[uid]/tcp snd, which record
the total numbers of bytes received and sent by a specific app respectively. I found that
these two statistics are actually aggregated from TCP packet payloads: for every TCP packet
received or sent by an app, Android adds the length of its payload onto the corresponding
statistics. These statistics are extensively used for mobile data consumption monitoring [41].
However, my research shows that their updates can also be leveraged to fingerprint an app’s
network operations, such as sending HTTP POST or GET messages.
To catch the updates of those statistics in real time, I built a data-usage monitor that
continuously reads from tcp rcv and tcp snd of a target app to record increments in their
values. Such an increment is essentially the length of the payload delivered by a single
or multiple TCP packets the app receives and sends, depending on how fast the monitor
samples from those statistics. Our current implementation has a sampling rate of 10 times
per second. This is found to be su cient for picking up individual packets most of the
time, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, in which I compare the packet payloads observed by Shark
for Root (a network tra c sni↵er for 3G and WiFi) [152], when the user is using Yahoo!
Finance, with the cumulative outbound data usage detected by our usage monitor.
From the figure 5.1 we can see that most of the time, our monitor can separate di↵erent
packets from each other. However, there are situations in which only the cumulative length
of multiple packets is identified (see the markers in the figure). This requires an analysis
that can tolerate such non-determinism, which I will discuss later.
In terms of performance, the monitor has a very small memory footprint, only 28 MB,
even below that of the default Android keyboard app. When it is running at its peak speed,
it takes about 7% of a core’s cycles on a Google Nexus S phone. Since all the new phones
released today are armed with multi-core CPUs, the monitor’s operations will not have
noticeable impacts on the performance of the app running in the foreground as demonstrated
by a test described in Table 5.1 measured using AnTuTu [153] with a sampling rate of 10Hz
for network usage 5.2.2 and 50Hz for audio logging. To make this data collection stealthier,
I adopted a strategy that samples intensively only when the target app is being executed,
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the total length of two packets
Figure 5.1: Monitor tool precision
which is identified through ps (Section 5.2.1). The UI of the monitor tool is shown in Figure
5.2.
Table 5.1: Performance overhead of the monitor tool: there the baseline is measured by
AnTuTu [153]
Total CPU GPU RAM I/O
Baseline 3776 777 1816 588 595
Monitor Tool 3554 774 1606 589 585
Overhead 5.8% 0.3% 11.6% -0.1% 1.7%
However, the monitor cannot always produce deterministic outcomes: when sampling the
same packet sequence twice, it may observe two di↵erent sequences of increments from the
usage statistics. To obtain a reliable tra c fingerprint of a target app’s activity we designed
a methodology to bridge the gap between the real sequence and what the monitor sees.
My approach first uses Shark for Root to analyze a target app’s behavior (e.g., click on
a button) o✏ine - i.e in a controlled context - and generate a payload-sequence signature
for its behavior. Once the monitor collects a sequence of usage increments from the app’s
runtime on the victim’s Android phone, I compare this usage sequence with the signature
as follows. Consider a signature (· · · , si, si+1, · · · , si+n, · · · ), where si,··· ,i+n are the payload
lengths of the TCP packets with the same direction (inbound/outbound), and a sequence
(· · · ,mj, · · · ), where mj is an increment on a usage statistic (tcp rcv or tcp snd) of the
direction of si, as observed by our monitor. Suppose that all the elements before mj match
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Figure 5.2: Monitor tool UI
the elements in the signature (those prior to si). We say that mj also matches the signature
elements if either mj = si or mj = si + · · · + si+k with 1 < k  n. The whole sequence is
considered to match the signature if all of its elements match the signature elements.
For example, consider that the signature for requesting the information about a disease
condition ABSCESS by WebMD is (458, 478, 492!), where “!” indicates outbound tra c.
Usage sequences matching the signature can be (458, 478, 492!), (936, 492!) or (1428!).
The payload-sequence signature can vary across di↵erent mobile devices, due to the dif-
ference in the User-Agent field on the HTTP packets produced by these devices. This
information can be acquired by a zero-permission app through the android.os.Build API.
The User-Agent is related to the phone’s type, brand and Android OS version. For example,
the User-Agent of the Yahoo! Finance app on a Nexus S phone is:
User-Agent: YahooMobile/1.0 (finance; 1.1.8.1187014079); (Linux; U; Android 4.1.1;
sojus
Build/JELLY BEAN);
Given that the format of this field is known, all the adversary needs, is a set of parameters
(type, brand, OS version etc.) for building up the field, which is important for estimating
the length of the field and the payload that carries the field. Such information can be easily




Next I will show that the data-usage statistics a zero-permission app collects through
shared filesystem resources, leak out apps’ sensitive inputs, e.g., disease conditions a user
selects on WebMD mobile [154]. This has been achieved by fingerprinting her actions with
data-usage sequences they produce. The same attack technique also works on Twitter 5.2.2
and Yahoo! Finance 5.2.2.
WebMD mobile is an extremely popular Android health and fitness app, which has been
installed 1 ⇠ 5 million times in the past 30 days [154]. To use the app, one first clicks to
select 1 out of 6 sections, such as “Symptom Checker”, “Conditions” and others as seen
in Figure 5.3. In my research, I analyzed the data under the “Conditions” section, which
includes a list of disease conditions (e.g., Asthma, Diabetes, etc.). Each condition, once
clicked on, leads to a new screen that displays the overview of the disease, its symptoms and
related articles. As we can see from Figure 5.4, all such information is provided through a
simple, fixed user interface running on the phone, while the data there is downloaded from
the web. I found that the changes of network usage statistics during this process can be
reliably linked to the user’s selections on the interface, revealing the disease she is interested
in.
Attack Methodology. I first analyzed the app o✏ine (i.e. in a controlled context) using
Shark for Root, and built a detailed finite state machine (FSM) for it based on the payload
lengths of TCP packets sent and received when the app moves from one screen (a state of
the FSM) to another. The FSM is illustrated in Figure 5.5. Specifically, the user’s selection
of a section is characterized by a sequence of bytes, which is completely di↵erent from those
of other sections. Each disease under the “Conditions” section is also associated with a
distinctive payload sequence.
In particular, every time a user clicks on a condition she is interested in, there are a num-
ber of requests being generated: 3 POST {p1, p2, p3} requests which correspond to Overview,
Symptoms and Related Articles and 4 GET requests for ads and tracking. The 4 GETs can
be readily filtered out due to their fixed packet sized with small variations, e.g., the GET
ads/dcfc.gif is always 174 bytes and the size of GET event.ng/type=... is always 391-
415 bytes. Interestingly, di↵erent from what has been observed from the browser-based web
applications [64], whose information leaks typically happen through the responses, for the
simple app studied here, even the sizes of its request payloads give away enough informa-
tion for a first order classification of all 204 conditions into 32 categories with 4 conditions
being already uniquely identified (see Figure 5.6). Table 5.2 shows an example of distinct
transmission tra c patterns between ”Anemia. iron deficiency” and “Vulvodynia”.
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Figure 5.3: WebMD: First Screen



























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.5: WebMD Finite State Machine
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Figure 5.6: First Order Tra c Classification of WebMD’s conditions
Furthermore, lets denote the corresponding response pattern with {r1, r2, r3} excluding the
ads tra c. The latter gives us some trouble but can be removed from the analysis also due
to its predictable packets pattern, for example it always contains a 450±100 bytes GIF image
and a packet of 2100± 200 bytes payload. From the signature {p1, p2, p3 !; r1, r2, r3  }, we
first utilize {p1, p2, p3} to classify all 204 conditions into 32 categories using the technology
in 5.2.2. Subsequently we can use the information from {r1, r2, r3} to further di↵erentiate
between conditions of the same category.
In a real attack, however, the zero-permission app cannot see the tra c. The usage
increments it collects could come from the combination of two packets. For the requests,
this problem can be easily addressed using the technique described in Section 5.2.2, as their
payload lengths are fixed and we can compare an observed increment to the cumulative length
of multiple packets. The approach becomes less e↵ective when we work on the responses,
due to the non-determinism of payload lengths. Fortunately, inter-packet duration of the
inbound tra c is reasonably long, allowing the usage monitor to accurately identify di↵erent
payloads most of the time.
Another fact that the adversary must address in a real context is that when a request is
being made from the application to the server, the device’s user agent is also being sent.
This can a↵ect the matching of the o✏ine created signatures with the data the malicious
app collects when the corresponding devices used di↵er in model, especially when the attack
relies on accuracy of byte granularity. To compensate for that the malevolent app can readily
76
Table 5.2: WebMD. Comparison of Bytes Transmitted between two Conditions of di↵erent
Categories
Anemia, iron deficiency
Request Description Bytes TX
... ...
Get Overview (POST) 474
Get Symptoms (POST) 494
Get Related Articles (POST) 508
Vulvodynia
Request Description Bytes TX
... ...
Get Overview (POST) 461
Get Symptoms (POST) 481
Get Related Articles (POST) 495
acquire the device’s user agent and sent it out to the attacker’s remote server before it starts
emitting any of the previous metrics it records. To be consistent we integrate this piece of
functionality to our prototype despite its trivial nature.
To collect the data the adversary needs to complete her attack I used the following method-
ology: As stated before, using Shark for Root we can create a detailed map of the states the
application can be at any possible time. We can refer to states as screens being displayed
to the user as denoted by the simplified state diagram on Figure 5.5 . For each state of
the application we can record the length of the bytes (TCP payload) that were sent and
received for that screen to be displayed. The recordings are at the granularity of HTTP
requests/responses. This technique would allow us to distinguish the user’s navigation on
the device. To achieve that we used the outbound tra c because of the requests’ consis-
tency among di↵erent iterations of the same experiment. The inbound tra c contained
advertisement data that change as the advertisement being fetched is di↵erent every time.
Furthermore this issue is aggravated when a user is visiting disease conditions: For each
Condition screen three pieces of disease specific information are being received. Firstly the
application receives the “Overview” of the disease, then the “Symptoms” that appear to a
su↵ering patient and lastly some links to disease “Related Articles” redirecting the user for
further reading as shown in Figure 5.4. However some other information relative to the app
or advertisements is being retrieved from di↵erent ports of the responding server or even dif-
ferent servers. If these information responses happen faster than our tool’s sampling speed
then the tool will report multiple response readings in one record. This makes the break-
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Table 5.3: WebMD. Tra c Analysis for the ACUTE SINUSITIS condition navigation
ACUTE SINUSITIS
No HTTP Request Bytes TX HTTP Response Bytes RX
1 GET /b/ss/webmdplglobal... 638 HTTP 1/1 200 OK 512
2 GET html.ng/transactionID=.. 341 < ad > < /.. > ⇠ 2202
3 GET event.ng/type=.. 415 HTTP/1.1 302
FOUND
349
4 GET ads/dcfc.gif 174 HTTP1/1 200 OK
(GIF87a)
401
5 POST GetOverview 464 < Overview > <
/.. >
9308
6 POST GetSymptoms 484 < Symptoms > <
/.. >
3334
7 POST GetRelatedArticles 498 < Related > < /.. > 4857
down of that record to the individual responses hard especially when multiple conditions
receive information that vary less than the advertisement variation range.
WebMD has 204 available conditions for user perusal (at the time of writing). Using the
payload of the outbound requests we classified them into 32 Categories (Figure 5.6). The
request on row 1 of Table 5.3 is specific to the condition but can vary sometimes: For every
such request the condition’s name is passed as a parameter which results in collisions when
the titles of two di↵erent conditions have the same number of HTTP characters. A specific
id is also used for every condition but in most cases is of the same number of digits. Lastly
whether the request was made on a day of the month that can be described with 1 digit
or 2 a↵ects the request. For the classification I have used the requests made for the three
aforementioned condition specific information, which I mark at the fifth, sixth and seventh
row of Table 5.3. Those requests are always identical when visiting the same Condition.
The other requests are common for all conditions. Nevertheless, some Categories result in a
high number of collisions (many counts per bin on Figure 5.6). To address that we used the
inbound tra c for a second order Classification. With much less possible candidates - the
category’s members - to match our tool’s inbound tra c recording and based on the fact
that our tool’s high sampling rate can help us distinguish at least a fraction of the responses,
we managed to identify all the Condition visits.
To collect the data and construct tables with inbound and outbound tra c (see Table 5.3)
generated with each condition click and also understand the application protocol in place,
I ran a set of experiments. For those experiments I have used a Google Nexus S 4G device
running Android 4.1.1 with root access to the Operating System, available. On the device I
installed Shark for Root which can capture the tra c and generate pcap files that we can
analyze using an appropriate tool such as Wireshark. I have also installed WebMD and
the monitor tool on the device. Before every experiment, I launch the tool, set to monitor
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WebMD’s tra c, and Shark which captures all network tra c on the device. Then I launch
WebMD and navigate to a particular condition. Subsequently I stop the tool and Shark,
and analyze the results matching the tool’s recordings with the measurements from Shark.
Based on this analysis I generate tables for each condition that hold the Number of Bytes
TX and Number of Bytes RX for each HTTP response and request of WebMD. For example,
the data collected for ”ABSCESS” is shown on Table 5.3.
Attack evaluation. To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the attack on WebMD, I repeated the
experiments. This time, I didn’t mark the tool’s output with the Condition being visited on
the device by the user. Conversely I perform experiments visiting all available Conditions
on WebMD and then use a script that shu✏ed the results. Shu✏ing the results eliminates
the possibility that the analyst remembers the order of condition visiting. By the end of this
process I have performed 221 experiments for 204 available Conditions. The shu✏ing tool
rejected 2 outputs which leaves us with 219 results to analyze. I manually scrutinized the
experiments’ outputs and tried to match the recorded measurements with our data collected
o✏ine. According to the bytes received we can locate the Category of Conditions that
particular output corresponds to. Then I further analyze the inbound tra c to identify the
precise condition in the Category that has similar tra c with the observed one. The tool’s
sampling rate has been proven instrumental to this e↵ort as in most cases, a single reading
of it could disclose one exact match with one of the 3 total Condition relevant responses.
Conditions on the same Category rarely have identical such responses as the information
received is very specific to the Condition they describe.
Out of the 219 available experiments’ outputs I was able to uniquely identify all 204
Conditions. In 5 cases a Condition was matched twice. This can be attributed to the
fact that network connectivity in some cases rendered the application unable of retrieving
the Condition’s information. In those cases I had repeated the experiment. Even if the
experiment failed in the sense that it didn’t simulate a normal navigation to a condition, we
were able from the fraction of information received by WebMD and recorded by our tool, to
identify the Condition clicked. Finally, 11 outputs failed to be identified as a condition and
were the result of erroneous clicks by the user, that inadvertently followed a di↵erent path
on the application (i.e. a Condition was not visited).
Identity
Next I will show that the data-usage statistics collected by the zero-permission app through
shared filesystem resources, also leak out an Android user’s identity. A person’s identity, such
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as name, email address, etc., is always considered to be highly sensitive [155, 156, 157, 158]
and should not be released to an untrusted party. For a smartphone user, unauthorized
disclosure of her identity can immediately reveal a lot of private information about her (e.g.,
disease, sex orientation, etc.) simply from the apps on her phone. Here I show how one’s
identity can be easily inferred using the shared resources and rich background information
from Twitter.
Twitter is one of the most popular social networks with about 500 million users worldwide.
It is common for Twitter users to use their mobile phones to tweet extensively and from
diverse locations. Many Twitter users disclose there identity information which includes
their real names, cities and sometimes homepage or blog URL and even pictures. Such
information can be used to discover one’s accounts on other social networks, revealing even
more information about the victim according to prior research [159]. In [11] we performed
a small range survey on the identity information directly disclosed from public Twitter
accounts to help us better understand what kind of information users disclose and at which
extend. By manually analyzing randomly selected 3908 accounts (obvious bot accounts
excluded), we discovered that 78.63% of them apparently have users’ first and last names
there, 32.31% set the users’ locations, 20.60% include bio descriptions and 12.71% provide
URLs. This indicates that the attack I describe below poses a realistic threat to Android
users’ identity.
Attack Methodology. In this attack, a zero-permission app monitors the mobile-data
usage count tcp snd of the Twitter 3.6.0 app when it is running. When the user sends
tweets to the Twitter server, the app detects this event and stealthily sends its timestamp to
the malicious server. This results in a vector of timestamps for the user’s tweets, which we
can then be used to search the tweet history through public Twitter APIs for the account
whose activities are consistent with the vector: that is, the account’s owner posts her tweets
at the moments recorded by these timestamps. Given a few of timestamps, we can uniquely
identify that user. An extension of this idea could also be applied to other public social media
and their apps, and leverage other information as vector elements for this identity inference:
for example, the malicious app could be designed to figure out not only the timing of a
blogging activity, but also the number of characters typed into the blog through monitoring
the CPU usage of the keyboard app, which can then be correlated to a published post.
To make this idea work, we need to address a few technical challenges. Particularly, search-
ing across all 340 million tweets daily is impossible. My solution is using less protected data
such as the coarse location (e.g, city) of the person who tweets, to narrow down the search
range (see Section 5.2.3 for an attack that allows an adversary to gain such information).
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To fingerprint the tweeting event from the Twitter app, I use the aforementioned method-
ology to first analyze the app o✏ine to generate a signature for the event. This signature is
then compared with the data usage increments the zero-permission app collects online from
the victim’s phone to identify the moment she tweets.
Specifically, during the o✏ine analysis, I observed the following TCP payload sequence
produced by the Twitter app: (420|150, 314, 580–720). The first element here is the payload
length of a TLS Client Hello. This message normally has 420 bytes but can become 150 when
the parameters of a recent TLS session are reused. What follow are a 314-byte payload for
Client Key Exchange and then that of an encrypted HTTP request, either a GET (download
tweets) or a POST (tweet). The encrypted GET has a relatively stable payload size, between
541 and 544 bytes. When the user tweets, the encrypted POST ranges from 580 to 720 bytes,
due to the tweet’s 140-character limit. So, the length sequence can be used as a signature
to determine when a tweet is sent.
As discussed before, we want to use the signature to find out the timestamp when the user
tweets. The problem is that our usage monitor running on the victim’s phone does not see
those packets and can only observe the increments in the data-usage statistics. The o✏ine
analysis shows that the payload for Client Hello can be reliably detected by the monitor.
However, the time interval between the Key-Exchange message and POST turns out to be
so short that it can easily fall through the cracks. Therefore, we have to resort to the
aforementioned analysis methodology (Section 5.2.2) to compare the data-usage sequence
collected by our app with the payload signature: a tweet is considered to be sent when the
increment sequence is either (420|150, 314, 580–720) or (420|150, 894–1034).
From the tweeting events detected, we obtain a sequence of timestamps T = [t1, t2, · · · , tn]
that describe when the phone user tweets. This sequence is then used to find out the user’s
Twitter ID from the public index of tweets. Such an index can be accessed through the
Twitter Search API [160]: one can call the API to search the tweets from a certain geo-
location within 6 to 8 days. Each query returns 1500 most recent tweets or those published
in the prior days (1500 per day). An unauthorized user can query 150 times every hour.
To collect relevant tweets, we need to get the phone’s geo-location, which is specified by
a triplet (latitude, longitude, radius) in the twitter search API. Here all we need is a coarse
location (at city level) to set these parameters. Android has permissions to control the access
to both coarse and fine locations of a phone. However, I found that the user’s fine location
could also be inferred from shared filesystem resources, once the victim user connects her
phone to a Wi-Fi hotspot (see Section 5.2.3). Getting her coarse location in this case is much
easier: the zero-permission app can invoke the mobile browser to visit a malicious website,
which can then search her IP in public IP-to-location databases [161] to find her city. This
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Table 5.4: City information and Twitter identity exploitation
Location Population City size Time interval covered (radius) # of timestamps
Urbana 41,518 11.58 mi2 243 min (3 mi) 3
Bloomington 81,381 19.9 mi2 87 min (3 mi) 5
Chicago 2,707,120 234 mi2 141 sec (3 mi) 9
allows the adversary to set the query parameters using Google Maps. Note that smartphone
users tend to use Wi-Fi whenever possible to conserve their mobile data (see Section 5.2.3),
which gives the adversarial app chances to get the victims’ coarse locations. Note that the
adversary does not require the user to geo-tag each tweet. The twitter search results include
the tweets in a area as long as the user specified her geo-location in her profile.
As discussed before, the adversarial app can only sneak out the timestamps it collects from
the Twitter app when the phone screen dims out. This could happen minutes away from
the moment a user tweets. For each timestamp ti 2 T , the adversary can use the twitter
API to search for the set of users ui who tweet in that area in ti± 60s (due to the time skew
between mobile phone and the twitter server). The target user is in the set U = \ui. When
U contains only one twitter ID, the user is identified. For a small city, oftentimes 1500 tweets
returned by a query are more than enough to cover the delay including both the ti ± 60s
period and the duration between the tweet event and the moment the screen dims out. For a
big city with a large population of Twitter users, however, we need to continuously query the
Twitter server to dump the tweets to a local database, so when the app reports a timestamp,
the adversary can search it in the database to find those who tweeted at that moment.
Attack Evaluation. In [11] we evaluated the e↵ectiveness of this attack at three cities,
Urbana, Bloomington and Chicago. Table 5.4 describes these cities’ information.
We first studied the lengths of the time intervals the 1500 tweets returned by a Twitter
query can cover in these individual cities. To this end, we examined the di↵erence between
the first and the last timestamps on 1500 tweets downloaded from the Twitter server through
a single API call, and present the results in Table 5.4. As we can see here, for small towns
with populations below 100 thousand, all the tweets within one hour and a half can be
retrieved through a single query, which is su cient for our attack: it is conceivable that
the victim’s phone screen will dim out within that period after she tweets, allowing the
malicious app to send out the timestamp through the browser. However, for Chicago, the
query outcome only covers 2 minutes of tweets. Therefore, we need to continuously dump
tweets from the Twitter server to a local database to make the attack work.
In the experiment, we ran a script that repeatedly called the Twitter Search API, at
a rate of 135 queries per hour. All the results without duplicates were stored in a local
SQL database. Then, we posted tweets through the Twitter app on a smartphone, under
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the surveillance of the zero-permission app. After obvious robot Twitter accounts were
eliminated from the query results, our Twitter ID were recovered by merely 3 timestamps at
Urbana, 5 timestamps at Bloomington and 9 timestamps in Chicago, which is aligned with
the city size and population.
Investment Data
A person’s investment information is private and highly sensitive. Here I demonstrate how
an adversary can infer her financial interest from the network data usage of Yahoo! Finance,
a popular finance app on Google Play with nearly one million users. I show that Yahoo!
Finance discloses a unique network data signature when the user is adding or clicking on a
stock.
Attack Methodology. Similar to all aforementioned attacks, I assume that a zero-
permission app which irunning in the background collects network data usage related to
Yahoo! Finance and sends it to a remote attacker when the device’s screen dims out.
Searching for a stock in Yahoo! Finance generates a unique network data signature, which
can be attributed to its network-based autocomplete feature (i.e., suggestion list) that re-
turns suggested stocks according to the user’s input. Consider for example the case when
a user looks for Google’s stock (GOOG). In response to each letter she enters, the Yahoo!
Finance app continuously updates a list of possible autocomplete options from the Internet,
which is characterized by a sequence of unique payload lengths. For example, typing “G” in
the search box produces 281 bytes outgoing and 1361 to 2631 bytes incoming tra c. Each
time the user enters an additional character, the outbound HTTP GET packet increases by
one byte. In its HTTP response, a set of stocks related to the letters the user types will
be returned, whose packet size depends on the user’s input and is unique for each character
combination.
From the dynamics of mobile data usage produced by the suggestion lists, we can identify
a set of candidate stocks. To narrow it down, we further studied the signature when a stock
code is clicked upon. We found that when this happens, two types of HTTP GET requests
will be generated, one for a chart and the other for related news. The HTTP response for
news has more salient features, which can be used to build a signature. Whenever a user
clicks on a stock, Yahoo! Finance will refresh the news associated with that stock, which
increases the tcp rcv count. This count is then used to compare with the payload sizes
of the HTTP packets for downloading stock news from Yahoo! so as to identify the stock
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chosen by the user. Also note that since the size of the HTTP GET for the news is stable,
352 bytes, our app can always determine when a news request is sent.
Attack Evaluation. In this study, we ran the zero-permission app to monitor the Yahoo!
Finance app on a Nexus S 4G smartphone. From the data-usage statistics collected while
the suggestion list was being used to add 10 random stocks onto the stock watch list, we
managed to narrow down the candidate list to 85 possible stocks that matched the data-
usage features of these 10 stocks. Further analyzing the increment sequence when the user
clicked on a particular stock code, which downloaded related news to the phone, we were
able to uniquely identify each of the ten stocks the user selected among the 85 candidates.
5.2.3 Side-Channel 2: ARP Info
This Section elaborates on how Android unprotexted local resources can leak a user’s
location. As with all the side-channel attacks, this is work conducted with Zhou et al. [11].
The precise location of a smartphone user is widely considered to be private and should
not be leaked out without the user’s explicit consent. Android guards such information with
a permission ACCESS FINE LOCATION. The information is further protected from the websites
that attempt to get it through a mobile browser (using navigator.geolocation.getCurrent
Position), which is designed to ask for user’s permission when this happens. In this section,
we show that despite all such protections, our zero-permission app can still access location-
related data, which enables accurate identification of the user’s whereabouts, whenever her
phone connects to a Wi-Fi hotspot.
As discussed before, Wi-Fi has been extensively utilized by smartphone users to save their
mobile data. In particular, many users’ phones are in an auto-connect mode. Therefore, the
threat posed by our attack is very realistic. In the presence of a Wi-Fi connection, we show
in Section 5.2.2 that a phone’s coarse location can be obtained through the gateway’s IP
address. Here, we elaborate how to retrieve its fine location using the link layer information
Android discloses.
Location Inference
My analysis further revealed that the BSSID of a Wi-Fi hotspot and signal levels perceived
by the phone are disclosed by Android through another shared procfs entry. Such information
is location-sensitive because hotspots’ BSSIDs have been extensively collected by companies
(e.g., Google, Skyhook, Navizon, etc.) for location-based services in the absence of GPS.
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However, their databases are proprietary, not open to the public. In this section, we show
how we address this challenge and come up with an end-to-end attack.
Interestingly, in proc files /proc/net/arp and /proc/net/wireless, Android documents
the parameters of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) it uses to talk to a network gateway
(a hotspot in the case of Wi-Fi connections) and other wireless activities. Of particular
interest to us is the BSSID (in the arp file), which is essentially the gateway’s MAC address,
and wireless signal levels (in the wireless file). Both files are accessible to a zero-permission
app. The app I implemented periodically reads from procfs once every a few seconds to
detect the existence of the files, which indicates the presence of a Wi-Fi connection.
The arp file is inherited from Linux, on which its content is considered to be harmless: an
internal gateway’s MAC address does not seem to give away much sensitive user information.
For smartphone, however, such an assumption no longer holds. More and more companies
like Google, Skyhook and Navizon are aggressively collecting the BSSIDs of public Wi-Fi
hotspots to find out where the user is, so as to provide location-based services (e.g., restaurant
recommendations) when GPS signals are weak or even not available. Such information has
been gathered in di↵erent ways. Some companies like Skyhook wireless and Google have
literally driven through di↵erent cities and mapped all the BSSID’s they detected to their
corresponding GPS locations. Others like Navizon distribute an app with both GPS and
wireless permissions. Such an app continuously gleans the coordinates of a phone’s geo-
locations together with the BSSIDs it sees there, and uploads such information to a server
that maintains a BSSID location database.
All such databases are proprietary, not open to the public. In the contxt of this study we
communicated with Skyhook in an attempt to purchase a license for querying their database
with the BSSID collected by our zero-permission app. They were not willing to do that
due to their concerns that our analysis could impact people’s perceptions about the privacy
implications of BSSID collection.
Nevertheless, an adversary can exploit commercial location services that are being used
by their respective apps: Many of those commercial apps that o↵er location-based services,
need a permission ACCESS WIFI STATE, so they can collect the BSSIDs of all the surrounding
hotspots for geo-locating their users. In our case, however, our zero-permission app can only
get a single BSSID, the one for the hotspot the phone is currently in connection with. We
need to understand whether this is still enough for finding out the user’s location. Since we
cannot directly use those proprietary databases, we have to leverage these existing apps to
get the location. The idea is to understand the protocol these apps run with their servers
to generate the right query that can give us the expected response.
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Home 5 4 0ft
Hospital1 74 2 59ft
Hospital2 57 4 528ft
Subway 6 4 3ft
Starbucks 43 3 6ft
Train/Bus Station 14 10 0ft
Church 82 3 150ft
Bookstore 34 2 289ft
Specifically, we utilized the Navizon app to develop such an indirect query mechanism.
Like Google and Skyhook, Navizon also has a BSSID database with a wide coverage [162],
particularly in US. In our research, we reverse-engineered the app’s protocol by using a
proxy, and found that there is no authentication in the protocol and its request is a list
of BSSIDs and signal levels encoded in Base64. Based upon such information, we built a
“querier” server that uses the information our app sneaks out to construct a valid Navizon
request for querying its database for the location of the target phone.
Attack Evaluation
To understand the seriousness of this information leak, we ran our zero-permission app
to collect BSSID data from the Wi-Fi connections made at places in Urbana and Chicago,
including home, hospital, church, bookstore, train/bus station and others. The results are
illustrated in Table 5.5.
In particular, our app easily detected the presence of Wi-Fi connections and stealthily
sent out the BSSIDs associated with these connections. Running our query mechanism, we
successfully identified all these locations from Navizon. On the other hand, we found that
not every hotspot can be used for this purpose: after all, the Navizon database is still far
from complete. Table 5.5 describes the numbers of the hotspots good for geo-locations at
di↵erent spots and their accuracy.
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5.3 MITIGATION DESIGN
Given the various unprotected filesystem resources on Android, the information leaks the
analysis revealed 5 are very likely to be just a tip of the iceberg. Finding an e↵ective solution
to this problem is especially challenging with rich background information of users or apps
gratuitously available on the web. To mitigate such threats, lets first take a closer look at the
attacks revealed in the analysis. The ARP data (see 5.2.3) has not been extensively utilized
by apps and can therefore be kept away from unauthorized parties by changing the related
file’s access privilege to system. A simple solution to control the audio channel can be to
restrict the access to its related APIs, such as isMusicActive, only to system processes
whenever sensitive apps (e.g. navigation related) are running in the foreground. The most
challenging facet of such a mitigation venture is to address the availability mechanism of the
data usage statistics (see 5.2.2), which have already been used by hundreds of apps to help
Android users keep track of their mobile data consumption. Merely removing them from the
list of public resources is not an option. In this section, I report our approach on mitigating
the threat deriving from the statistics availability, while maintaining their utility.
5.3.1 Mitigation Strategies
To suppress information leaks from the statistics available through tcp rcv and tcp snd,
we can release less accurate information. Here I analyze a few strategies designed for this
purpose.
One strategy is to reduce the accuracy of the available information by rounding up or down
the actual number of bytes sent or received by an app to a multiple of a given integer before
disclosing that value to the querying process. This approach is reminiscent of a predominant
defense strategy against tra c analysis, namely packet padding [64, 163]. The di↵erence
between that and our approach is that we can not only round up but also round down to
a target number and also work on accumulated payload lengths rather than the size of an
individual packet. This enables us to control the information leaks at a low cost, in terms
of impact on data utility.
Specifically, let d be the content of a data usage counter (tcp rcv or tcp snd) and ↵
an integer given to our enforcement framework implemented on Android (Section 5.3.2).
When the counter is queried by an app, our approach first finds a number k such that
k↵  d  (k + 1)↵ and reports k↵ to the app when d  k↵ < 0.5↵ and (k + 1)↵ otherwise.
We call this strategy Round up and round down.
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A limitation of the simple rounding strategy (Round up and round down) results from
the fact that it still gives away the payload size of each packet, even though the information
is perturbed. As a result, it cannot hide packets with exceedingly large payloads. To address
this issue, we can accumulate the data usage information of multiple queries, for example,
conditions on WebMD the user looks at, and only release the cumulative result when a
time interval expires. This can be done, for example, by updating an app’s data usage to
the querying app once every week, which prevents the adversary from observing individual
packets. We will refer to this technique as Aggregation.
5.3.2 Enforcement Framework
A naive idea to address the leakage of information from Android public local resources,
would be adding yet another permission to Android’s already complex permission system and
have any data monitoring app requesting this permission in AndroidManifest.xml. However,
prior research shows that the users do not pay too much attention to the permission list when
installing apps, and the developers tend to declare more permissions than needed [27]. On the
other hand, the tra c usage data generated by some applications (e.g banking applications)
is exceptionally sensitive, at a degree that the app developer might not want to divulge them
even to the legitimate data monitoring apps. To address this problem, our solution is to let an
app specify special “permissions” to Android, which defines how its network usage statistics
should be released. Such permissions, which are essentially a security policy, was built into
the Android permission system in our research. Using the usage counters as an example,
our framework supports four policies: NO ACCESS, ROUNDING, AGGREGATION and
NO PROTECTION. These policies determine whether to release an app’s usage data to a
querying app, how to release this information and when to do that. They are enforced at
a UsageService, a policy enforcement mechanism we added to Android, by holding back
the answer, adding noise to it (as described in Section 5.3.1) or periodically updating the
information.
To enable the enforcement of the aforementioned policies in our framework, public re-
sources on the Linux layer, such as the data usage counters, are set to be accessible only
by system or root users. Specifically, for the /proc/uid stat/ resources, we modified the
create stat file in drivers/mis/uid stat.c of the Android Linux kernel and changed
the mode of entry to disable direct access to the proc entries by any app. With direct
access turned o↵, the app will have to call the APIs exposed in TrafficStats.java and
NetworkStats.java such as getUidTxBytes() to gain access to that information. In our
research, we modified these APIs so that whenever they are invoked by a query app that
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Figure 5.7: E↵ectiveness of round up/down mitigation technique
requests a target app’s statistics, they pass the parameters such as the target’s uid through
IPC to the UsageService, which checks how the target app (uid) wants to release its data
before responding to the query app with the data (which can be perturbed according to the
target’s policy). In our implementation, we deliberately kept the API interface unchanged
so existing data monitor apps can still run.
5.4 MITIGATION EVALUATION
To understand the e↵ectiveness of this technique, we first evaluated the round up and
round down scheme using the WebMD app. Figure 5.7 illustrates the results: with ↵ in-
creasing from 16 to 1024, the corresponding number of conditions that can be uniquely
identified drops from 201 to 1. In other words, except a peculiar condition DEMENTIA
IN HEAD INJURY whose total reply payload has 13513 bytes with its condition overview
of 11106 bytes (a huge deviation from the average case), all other conditions can no longer
be determined from the usage statistics when the counter value is rounded to a multiple
of 1024 bytes. Note that the error incurred by this rounding strategy is no more than 512
bytes, which is low, considering the fact that the total data usage of the app can be several
megabytes. Therefore its impact on the utility of data consumption monitoring apps is very
small (below 0.05%).
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We further measured the delay caused by the modified APIs and the new UsageService on
a Galaxy Nexus, which comes from permission checking and IPC, to evaluate the overhead
incurred by the enforcement mechanism we implemented. On average, this mechanism
brought in a 22.4ms delay, which is negligible.
Our defense mechanism is demonstrably e cient and e↵ective when applies on the tra c
usage information. Nevertheless, it is challenging to come up with a bullet proof defense
against all those information leaks from unprotected local resources for the following rea-
sons. a) Shared resources are present all over the Linux’s file system from /proc/[pid]/,
/proc/uid stat/[uid], network protocols like /proc/net/arp or /proc /net/wireless
and even some Android OS APIs. b) Public (rest-of-the-world accessible) resources are dif-
ferent across di↵erent devices. Some of this information is leaked by third party drivers
like the LCD backlit status which is mounted in di↵erent places in the /sys file system on
di↵erent phones. c) Tra c usage is also application related. For the round up and round
down defense strategy to be applied successfully, the OS must be provided with the tra c
patterns of the apps it has to protect before calculating an appropriate round size capable
of both securing them from malicious apps and introducing su ciently small noise to the
data legitimate tra c monitoring apps collect. A more systematic study is needed here to
better understand the problem.
5.5 SUMMARY
In this Chapter we saw how Android shared filesystem resources can leak private infor-
mation that an adversary can utilize to infer a user’s health and financial information, her
identity, and her location. The side-channel attacks I described, leverage the system’s erro-
neous security design at both the Linux (shared files) and the framework layer (shared APIs).
I performed an analysis to model the adversary which can exploit those shared resources and
introduced new strategies such adversaries can employ. To mitigate these problems I pro-
posed an alternative design of sharing filesystem resources, where information is released
in coarse-grained manner to tackle such nuance adversaries. These results are published at
a security conference [11]. Figure 5.8 visualizes this proposed addition to the smarpthone
operating system.
After this work, a lot of other researchers have also focused on exploiting other shared
filesystem resources. Zhang et al. [97] introduced another technique for mitigating such
adversaries from a trusted userspace app which kills processes responsible for aggressive file
monitoring. Finally, in version 6, Google has introduced further restrictions to third-party






































Figure 5.8: Alternative sharing of filesystem resources.
So far we analyzed adversaries exploiting shared intra-process privileges and shared filesy-
sem resources and introduced designs of strategies for detection and prevention. Next I will
look into the security of another shared resource on Android. In particular I will examine
how Android allows third-party application developers to share their application components
and access system resources.
91
CHAPTER 6: SHARING SYSTEM AND APPLICATION RESOURCES
Android uses a permission model to govern third-party application access to system re-
sources. Moreover, it allows third-party application developers to share their own applica-
tion components with other apps. Android provides developers the ability to declare their
owncustom permissions to protect their shared application components. In this Chapter I
will present my security analysis on the Android permission model. I will show that this
model su↵ers from grave design issues which allows untrusted third-party apps to escalate
their privileges and gain unfettered access to system resources and permission-protected
application components of other apps. I will also demonstrate, how we can re-design this
permission model to eradicate this issues [12].
6.1 INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to protect shared platform resources (e.g., microphone,
Internet etc.), Android uses system permissions, which are a predefined set of permissions
introduced by the platform itself. The permission model also provides the platform with
finer-grained security as a means to protect Inter-Process Communication (IPC) between
di↵erent shared app or system components. Specifically for this purpose, Android introduces
custom permissions : these are application-defined permissions which allow developers to
regulate access to their app components by other apps. In fact, the use of custom permissions
is very common among third-party applications. According to our study on the top free apps
on the Google Play Store, 65% of the apps define custom permissions, while 70% request
them for their operation.
Unfortunately, design flaws and vulnerabilities in custom permissions can completely com-
promise the security of IPC, inevitably leading to exploits on third-party apps and the plat-
form itself. Previous work has consistently found custom permissions to be problematic
[85, 86], and as a response to these studies, Google made an e↵ort to address the identified
problems by releasing bug fixes. However, similar vulnerabilities still exist even after Google
patched this initial wave of vulnerabilities. In this chapter, we present an analysis on the
security provided by the Android permission model for shared platform resources and ap-
plication components. In particular, the analysis results in one critical observation: there
is no separation of trust between system and custom permissions in the Android framework,
which leads to the manifestation of permission vulnerabilities.
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First, system and custom permissions are currently insu ciently isolated and they receive
the same kind of treatment from Android, which opens up opportunities for malicious apps
to utilize custom permissions to obtain unauthorized access to platform resources. Second,
there is currently no enforced naming convention for when declaring custom permissions—
apps are allowed to declare custom permissions with any name they desire. This creates
a confused deputy problem where a privileged app’s protected resources can be utilized by
unauthorized apps that possess di↵erent custom permissions declared with the same name
as of the ones used by the privileged app to protect its resources. In order to systemati-
cally address these problems, I propose a design and corresponding implementation which
we call CUSPER. CUSPER decouples the handling of custom permissions from system per-
missions to prevent an adversary from escalating their privileges and stealthily acquiring
system resources. Additionally, CUSPER implements an OS-level naming convention for
custom permissions to prevent custom permission spoofing. This is backward-compatible
with existing apps and enables the system to properly identify custom permissions accord-
ing to the developer signature of their definer apps. CUSPER is not only empirically tested
but also proven to be formally correct with respect to two fundamental security properties:
1) there should be no unauthorized component access, and 2) there should be no access to
high-risk (‘dangerous’) platform resources without user’s consent.
6.2 ANALYSIS
Custom permissions provide security to IPC that apps harness for their operations. They
are utilized by app developers to restrict access to shared app components as per the sen-
sitivity of the protected resource. In this section, we investigate the prevalence of custom
permissions among the top free apps on Google Play and showcase two high-profile apps that
we selected to launch attacks on by exploiting the vulnerabilities in custom permissions.
6.2.1 Prevalence
Custom permissions provide security to IPC that apps harness for their operation. They
are utilized by app developers to restrict access to shared app components as per the sen-
sitivity of the protected resource. Here, I investigate the prevalence of custom permissions
among the top free apps on Google Play. Towards this end we collected 50 top free apps
from each of the Google Play Store categories (with some failures in collection) and in total
analyzed 1308 apps to identify statistics regarding the use of custom permissions. We found
that 65% of the apps in the dataset declare custom permissions (statically or dynamically)
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and 70% of them request custom permissions for their operations. This highlights that cus-
tom permissions are widely used by third-party application developers for sharing access to
resources. It also highlights that any potential vulnerabilities in their use create risks for
the security of both shared platform resources and shared app components.
6.2.2 Adversary Model
Here I consider an adversary that has the ability to crawl app markets (e.g., Google
Play Store) to download victim apps of interest, reverse engineer them by utilizing several
tools [164, 165, 166], and analyze the Android manifest files and source code of these apps
to observe the cases where custom permissions are used to protect app components. The
adversary can build and distribute on app markets a set of malicious apps that exploit
potential vulnearabilities on the security of shared platform and application resources on
Android.
After a close inspection of the Android runtime permission model we identified serious
vulnerabilities. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, an app can bypass user consent screens
for granting/denying permissions to obtain high-risk system resources and can also gain
unauthorized access to protected components of other apps. We reported these to Google
which acknowledged both of them as severe vulnerabilities. Next I will provide a high level
overview of these attacks. I refer an interested reader to Gliz et al. [12] for more details.
6.2.3 Attack on Shared System Resources
Android runtime permission model (supported by Android 6.0 and onward) requires user’s
approval for granting apps permissions of protection level dangerous. This attack enables
a malicious app to completely bypass the user consent screen and automatically obtain any
dangerous system permissions [167].
First, the adversary creates an app that includes in its manifest file a custom permission
declaration with the protection level normal or signature and sets this custom permission
to be a part of a system permission group (e.g., storage, camera etc.). Then, they update
the definition of this custom permission so that the protection level is changed to dangerous
and proceed to push an update to their app on the respective app market. Here, this
update can be pushed to all the app users after the app reaches a target user base. In
addition, specific user groups can be targeted via the use of push services (e.g., Google
Cloud Messaging (GCM) [168], which is used by 94% of the apps in our database that utilize
custom permissions) that allow sending update notifications, and via enterprise app stores
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(e.g., Appaloosa [169]) that enable enforced targeted updates. The expectation is that since
the custom permission is of level dangerous, the user will be prompted at runtime to make
a decision on whether to grant or deny this permission in the runtime permission model.
However, the malicious app automatically gets granted the permission. In addition, since
the runtime permission model grants dangerous permissions on a group basis, the app also
automatically obtains all the other requested dangerous permissions of the system permission
group that the original permission belongs to. Same procedure can be followed to attack any
system permissions group; hence, the adversary can silently obtain all system permissions
simultaneously. Requesting dangerous permissions in the Android manifest constitutes no
problems for the adversary, as permission requirements of an app are not directly presented
to users at installation since Android 6.0. Hence, the user will be completely unaware that
all these system permissions are granted to the app.
6.2.4 Attack on Shared Application Components
In this attack, the adversary exploits the lack of naming conventions for custom permis-
sions on Android to launch an attack on a victim app that utilizes custom permissions to
protect its shared components [170]. To do this, the adversary counterfeits the custom per-
missions of the victim app by reusing their names in her own permission declarations and
takes advantage of the system’s inability to track the true origin of permissions to access
protected components of the victim app. The adversary’s goal is to get the operating system
to grant their apps a signature custom permission of a victim app that is signed by a di↵erent
key than that of the adversary and therefore obtain unauthorized access to the components
protected by this signature permission.
In order to achieve this, the adversary develops two applications: 1) a definer attack app
which spoofs the custom permission of the the victim app by reusing the same permission
name but changing the protection level to dangerous, 2) a user attack app which only
requests this permission in its manifest file. The reason adversary needs two apps to carry
out this particular attack is that Android currently does not allow two applications that
declare a custom permission with the same name to coexist on the same device. Hence,
the adversary’s app cannot simultaneously exist on the device along with the victim app
if it declares a permission with the same name to the one used by the victim. However,
the adversary can divide their attack into two di↵erent apps, one that spoofs the custom
permission as long as the victim app is not installed on the device, and a second one that
only requests this permission and is able to coexist with the victim. The definer attack app
needs to be installed first by the user, and this should be followed by the installation of the
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user attack app. After the spoofed permission of the definer attack app is granted to the user
attack app at runtime, the definer attack app can be uninstalled by the user or updated by
the app developer (for all users or targeted to a specific group by using services like GCM or
Appaloosa) to remove the custom permission definition so that the victim can be installed
afterwards. After the installation of the victim app, the user attack app is able to launch an
attack on the victim to freely access victim’s signature-protected components even though
it is not signed with the same app certificate as the victim. Google acknowledged this as a
high-severity attack since it bypasses operating system protections that isolate application
data from other applications.
Note that there can be many ways for an adversary to get the user to install two ap-
plications on their device. For instance, the app developer can use in-app advertisements
and links to direct the user to app stores to download their other app (e.g., Facebook and
Messenger). Another e↵ective way would be to utilize a common Android app development
practice called plug-in architectures [171, 172], which on demand unravel new features to
the user in the form of new apps in order to foster re-usability and save storage space by
unlocking features only if they are necessary. An example to apps using this architectures is
Yoga Guru [173], which unlocks users new yoga exercises—as part of new apps—only after
making progress with the set of exercises they currently have.
This a serious problem which can a↵ect very popular applications and lead to severe
information leakage. For example Skype is an Android app by Microsoft that allows users to
make voice and video calls over the Internet. It has 500,000,000+ downloads and a 4+ rating.
Skype has an activity which can be invoked to start the call functionality to any telephone
number. This activity is protected using a signature permission which, once bypassed, would
allow the adversary to invoke calls to a specified person or number. This could have many
implications. For example, it could be used as part of a suite of other spying capabilities.
This attack is able to spoof the original permission and launch Skype calls without the user’s
knowledge through this protected activity.
Also, CareZone is a medical Android app produced by a company with the same name.
It has 1,000,000+ downloads and has a 4+ rating on the Google Play Store. The app al-
lows users to store medical-related information such as health background (e.g., blood type,
medical conditions, allergies etc.), medication lists, medical contacts and their addresses,
calendar events, insurance information, and photos or health files in an organized manner.
It also features calendars to track appointments as well as to-do and notification lists for
tracking tasks. All of this medical data and meta-data is stored in a single content provider
which has been exported and is protected by a signature permission. There are no other
dynamic checks on accessing the content provider. Our attack is able to bypass the signature
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requirements and read the entire content provider, which gives us access to the aforemen-
tioned sensitive data without the user’s explicit consent or knowledge. The fact that all this
data was stored in a single content provider seems to reflect the developer’s implicit reliance
on the security guarantees provided by the platform.
6.3 MITIGATION DESIGN
System permissions are defined by the platform—a privileged principal—whereas cus-
tom permissions are defined by apps—less privileged principals. The former kind typically
protects shared system resources while the latter is utilized to protect shared application
resources. The fact that the system treats them the same, results in severe security vul-
nerabilities as the ones we discovered (Section 7.2). Note that other vulnerabilities might
also exist or might manifest in the future because of this non-separation between the two
classes of permissions. Ideally, we need a new design which will allow us to achieve a clean
separation of trust between the system and custom permissions. This way, the system will
have to handle the two cases di↵erently avoiding logic errors and at the same time, any
potential vulnerabilities in third party app custom permissions will not allow privilege es-
calation, which can enable exploits of system permissions and platform resources. However,
such a new design needs to be carefully constructed to be practical. In fact, it needs to
be as simple as possible to be adopted in practice, and backward compatible. A complete
redesign of the Android permission model would require non-trivial modifications to the
Android framework while thousands of apps relying on custom permission would be imme-
diately a↵ected. Instead, in our work, we introduce two main design principles which can
easily be incorporated into the current design of Android permissions, require no changes to
the existing apps, and can guarantee a separation of trust eliminating the threat of privilege
escalation in permissions, without breaking the operation of system and third-party compo-
nents that rely on permissions. These design principles are: (a) decoupling of system and
custom permissions; (b) new naming scheme for custom permissions. I implement these in
our system that we call Cusper.
6.3.1 Isolating System from Custom Permissions
Currently, Android does not maintain distinct representations for system and custom per-
missions, that is, the system does not track whether a permission originated from the system
or from a third-party app. Due to this reason, both types of permissions are also granted
and enforced in the same fashion. As as shown in Section 7.2, this is problematic as it allows
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apps to use custom permissions to gain unauthorized access to system permissions. For ex-
ample, a malicious app can declare a custom permission and assign it to a system permission
group. This behavior is allowed by Android since it does not di↵erentiate between the two
permission types. Thus, when the custom permission is granted, the app automatically gains
access to the system permissions in the same group, essentially elevating its privileges from
a permission defined by a low trust principal to permissions defined by the platform. Cusper
never allows custom permissions to share groups with system permissions. Additionally, the
fact that Android internally treats all permissions the same way is an important limitation
with security repercussions: platform developers tend to overlook the existence of custom
permissions when handling permissions. The custom permission upgrade attack is an exam-
ple of that. To overcome this, system and custom permissions have distinct representations
in Cusper. By doing this, we can now di↵erentiate between the two types of permissions
during granting as well as enforcement and apply di↵erent strategies depending on the type
of permissions.
Implementation. In order to decouple the two permission kinds, one could create separate
object representations and data structures. This would require a complete redesign of the An-
droid permission implementation throughout the Android framework which we think is im-
practical. Alternatively one could use existing fields in the current permission representation
in Android which can give us information on the source of a permission. BasePermission
class has a sourcePackage field that indicates the originating package of a permission. For
system permissions defined in the platform manifest, this field is set to android, for sys-
tem permissions defined in system packages, it usually starts with com.android, and for
custom permissions it is the package name of the defining third-party app. However, the
package name itself cannot be used to identify whether a package is system or third-party,
as there are already system apps with package names not starting with com.android (e.g.,
browser) and even third-party apps can have package names starting with the system pre-
fixes (com.android etc.). Hence, sourcePackage is not a reliable identifier of whether a
permission is custom or system.
Instead, a both practical and robust approach, would be to extend the object representa-
tion of a permission with an additional member variable, indicating whether this permission
is a custom permission. In Cusper, I implement this by augmenting the BasePermission
and the PackageParser. Permission classes. The value of the new variable is assigned
when an app’s manifest is parsed (PackageParser.java) during installation or upgrade. If
the app under investigation is untrusted (as indicated by its non-platform signature), we
mark its permissions as custom. When parsing an untrusted app’s manifest, Cusper fur-
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ther checks whether the app developer assigned a custom permission to a system permission
group. In this case, Cusper ignores the assignment, which results in the permission having no
group. Moreover, if the app declares a custom permission group, Cusper ensures it does not
use a system permission group prefix (android.permission-group). In essence, we thwart
the vulnerability while ensuring that even if future vulnerabilities manifest, there will be no
escalation to system permissions.
After doing this, we can now track the creation of custom permissions by third-party apps.
In order to particularly thwart the Custom Permission Upgrade, when a custom permission—
which we can now e↵ectively and e ciently di↵erentiate from system permissions—is created
with the protection level normal or signature (i.e., install permission), Cusper ensures that
the permission will not be granted automatically if it is later updated to be a dangerous
(runtime) permission.
6.3.2 Naming Conventions for Custom Permissions
Android allows third-party apps from di↵erent developers to declare permissions with the
same name. The current solution is to never allow two permission declarations with the
same name to exist on the device. While this sounds e↵ective, it is unfortunately unable to
stop the second attack we demonstrated: a definer app A declares a permission and another
app B gets the permission granted. When the first app A is uninstalled and a victim app
C comes in declaring and using the same permission to protect its shared components, it is
vulnerable to confused deputy attacks from app B. To solve this problem I introduced a new
internal naming convention in Cusper: Cusper enforces that all custom permission names
are internally prefixed with the source id of the app that declares it. Note that Cusper does not
expect app developers to change their practices. Custom permissions are still declared with
their original names in the manifest files of apps to allow backward compatibility. However,
in Cusper, the custom permission names are translated to source id : permission name.
Thus, even if permission revocation such as in the above attack scenario fails, the attack
will be rendered ine↵ective. This is because, as far as Cusper is concerned, the granted
permission to app B will be an entirely di↵erent permission than the one app C uses to
protect its components.
Choosing the appropriate source id is not straightforward. Consider for example using an
app’s package name as the source id. This introduces two main problems. First, repackaged
apps distributed on third-party application markets could use the package name of an app
distributed on Google Play. Thus, the repackaged app could take the role of the definer
attack app (see Section 7.2) and instigate a confused deputy attack. This is possible since
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the repackaged app and the victim app share the same package name and a permission
created by the repackaged app cannot be distinguished from the one created by the victim
if they share the same permission name. Second, using the package name as the source id
might break the utility of signature custom permissions for some use cases. For example,
developers that have a set of applications which utilize each other’s components, commonly
use signature permissions to protect the components of their apps from others. Since the
installation order cannot be determined in advance, each app in the set has to declare the
same permission (i.e., same name and protection level) in their manifest to make sure this
permission will be created in the system. If permissions are prefixed with their declarer
app’s package name, then the system will treat them as di↵erent permissions. Therefore,
any attempted interaction will be wrongfully blocked.
Cusper instead uses the app’s signature as the source id to prefix permission names. In
the case of a repackaged app, assuming the malicious developer does not possess the private
keys of the victim app developer, the declared permission will be a di↵erent permission in the
system than the victim’s declared permission. Moreover, utility is preserved since custom
permissions with the signature level will be treated as the same permission as long as they
come from the same developer, which is exactly the purpose. Note that the same scheme
can also be utilized for permission tree names.
Lastly, the o cial suggestion to Android app developers which declare custom permissions,
is to use names that follow the reverse domain name paradigm (similar to the one for package
names). However, Android does not enforce this naming convention. Even though it will
ignore a permission declaration with the exact same name as an existing permission, it
allows third-party apps to use a system permission name prefix (e.g., android.permission)
in their custom permission declarations. Since permission names and groups are currently
the only information the system has regarding the intention and source of the permission,
this treatment is at the very least hazardous. Cusper, we addresses this naturally as it adds
prefixes to permission names and never allows a custom permission to use a name prefix
reserved for system permissions. Since we decouple the two types, we can now identify
the type and origin of permissions, and readily enforce this rule. To maintain backward
compatibility and ensure that the custom and system permission names are distinct, we also
ignore system permission names for custom permissions (as the original system currently
does).
Implementation. To thwart custom permission spoofing attacks of any sort (including our
Confused Deputy attack), apart from distinguishing between custom and system permissions,
we further need a way to track the origin of custom permissions and uniquely identify them
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in the system. Towards this end, I implement a naming convention for custom permissions in
Cusper. The implementation consists primarily of a permission name translation operation
to prefix the permission names with their source id to ensure uniqueness in the system. This
translation happens during installation and update for the names of the declared custom
permissions and requested install time permissions, and at runtime for dangerous permissions
and the permissions used to protect components (guards).
At the time of installation, Cusper allows the system to parse declared custom permission
names from an untrusted app’s manifest; however, it translates their names to be prefixed
with the hash of their app’s signature before the actual permission is created in the sys-
tem. In the case an app is signed with multiple keys, Cusper sorts the hashes of the keys
and concatenate them. Note that one could attempt to perform the translation in place.
For example, it could perform the translation while parsing a permission name from the
manifest. However, at that point, the app’s certificates are not yet collected. Doing so
would incur non-negligible overhead since it involves a number of file opening and reading
operations (PackageParser.collectCertificates()). Instead, Cusper keeps the parsed
data unaltered until after the certificate collection normally happens. Then, it scans the
package’s meta-data to perform the necessary translations. This approach resulted in great
performance savings which keep Cusper’s performance comparable to the original system
(see Section 6.4).
Similarly, Cusper first proceeds to translate the names of the requested permissions during
installation or update. This is done to correctly grant install time permissions (i.e., normal
and signature). Note that a requested permission might not necessarily exist in the system at
this time and therefore the permission name translation cannot happen. For example, an app
that declares the permission might be installed at a later point in time. Since the declared
permission will be translated, it will essentially be treated as a di↵erent permission than the
one requested, violating application developers’ expectations. This is not a problem with
install time permissions: the permission correctly will not be granted as its definition does
not exist on the system at the time of installation, which is on a par with the behavior of the
original Android OS. In the case of dangerous permissions which are granted by the user at
runtime, we need to dynamically check for existing declared permissions. Therefore, Cusper
performs a requested permission translation at runtime. In particular, when a dangerous
permission is to be displayed to the user, Cusper performs a scan on all declared permissions
to find a custom permission with the same su x as the requested permission. In Cusper’s
implementation, the system does not allow declaration of custom permissions with the same
name which ensures that the scan will result in only one possible permission. This is also
the current design of Android which does not allow two apps to declare the same permission.
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Note, however, that since we prefix custom permissions, one could extend Cusper to allow
multiple apps to use the same custom permission names. In case of an app requesting
that permission, we could readily resolve the conflict if one of the declarers has the same
signature. If all declarer apps come from di↵erent developers, a mechanism similar to Intent
filters could be utilized to allow the user to select the appropriate declarer app.
It is worth noting that one could alternatively create a separate hash map for custom
permissions (e.g., key-value pairs of (su x, prefix)) to avoid the linear scan for su x lookup.
However, this hash map would need to be kept consistent with the original hash map for all
declared permissions in the system (e.g., tracking addition/removal of permissions), which
is hard to achieve since there are multiple places throughout the Android source code where
this in-memory data structure is updated or sometimes even constructed from scratch from
files in persistent storage. Hence, for the sake of consistency and not breaking utility, we
prefer the linear scan method and do not change the structure of the in-memory data types
for permissions. As I will show in our evaluation in section 6.4, this method does not result
in any significant overhead.
Finally, as for permissions that are used to protect app components (guards), their name
translation takes place at runtime during enforcement since a guard might not necessarily
exist in the system at the time of installation.
6.4 MITIGATION EVALUATION
Here I provide evidence regarding the practicality of Cusper’s system implementation. To-
ward this end, I empirically evaluate Cusper’s implementaiton on Android (version 6), with
respect to (a) its ability to thwart the specific attacks we presented and (b) its performance
overhead incurred in the a↵ected Android operations.
E↵ectiveness: empricical evaluation. To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of Cusper, I carried
out the two attacks mentioned in Section 7.2 on Cusper-augmented Android and showed
that both attacks fail.
First, I attempted the Custom Permission Upgrade attack on Cusper-augmented Android
and verified that the attack could no longer succeed. The user is correctly being consulted
to grant the pemission by the system once a permission declaration changes from a normal
protection level to dangerous. Moreover, I verified that a third-party app can neither assign
a custom permission in a system permission group, nor declare a custom permission group
using the system permission group naming convention. At the same time, normal operations
of benign third-party and system apps are preserved.
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With respect to the Confused Deputy attack, using the the apps mentioned in Section 7.2
(i.e., Skype, CareZone) as well as other real-world apps, I verified that the attack can no
longer succeed while again utility is preserved with Cusper. I further tested that permission
revocation happens correctly when the declarer app is uninstalled. Moreover, I verified that
declared custom permissions are prefixed by a hash of the app developer’s signature, and
the same happens for the custom permissions used to protect app components. Finally, I
tested that granting normal and signature permissions at installation time, granting dan-
gerous permissions at runtime, and using the permissions to access protected app or system
components, happen correctly; hence, Cusper does not break any utility.
E ciency. In evaluating the performance of our system, we focused on the operations af-
fected by Cusper modifications on the original Android operating system. These include the
app install operation, the app uninstall operation, runtime (dangerous) permission granting,
and permission enforcement. Here I omit the evaluation for the app update operation as
its performance is similar to that of app installation. A Nexus 5 phone running Android
6.0 (android-6.0.1 r77) was usedfor all experiments. According to a previous study, Android
users have on average 95 apps [174] installed on their devices. In addition, during the analy-
sis stage, apps were found to create one custom permission on average. In order to evaluate
Cusper under realistic conditions, I mimic this average case in the experiments and create

















Figure 6.1: Performance evaluation of Cusper for app installation
In the app install and app uninstall experiments, the Android Debug Bridge (adb) was
used to install and uninstall an app of size 1.2 MB 100 times. The app declares a custom
permission, with protection-level dangerous, uses the permission, and declares a service
which is protected by that permission. For the experiments the installPackageAsUser()
































Figure 6.3: Performance evaluation of Cusper for runtime (dangerous) permission granting.
app installation. The end time is captured at the point before the system broadcasts the
ACTION PACKAGE ADDED intent indicating the completion of the package installation. For app
uninstallation, the methods deletePackage() and deletePackageX() were instrumented,
to get the start time and end time respectively. Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate the
experiments’ results.
Next Cusper is compared with the unmodified Android version (Android). During in-
stallation, Cusper performs checks during parsing, performs the permission translation, and
handles the permission revocation. While parsing, it checks and stores whether a permission
definition is for a custom permission and it enforces the permission group checks. Then,
it parses the in-memory meta-data of an app to perform a custom permission translation.
Nonetheless, as shown in the evaluation, the performance overheads are indeed negligible:















Figure 6.4: Performance evaluation of Cusper for component access (Activity).
In addition, I evaluated the operation of granting a dangerous permission at runtime.
For this we can use an app which requests a custom permission previously defined in the
system. Note that this is a process which involves user interaction: the system pops up
a dialog box asking the user to grant or deny the permission request. This process was
automated and ran this experiment 100 times. However, to avoid the unpredictable temporal
variable of user interaction, the time between the display of the dialog box and the time the
dialog box is removed is not counter. The evaluation instrumentation is deployed in the
GrantPermissionsActivity class. Figure 6.3 summarizes the results. Evidently, Cusper
does not incur any distinctive overhead.
Finally, I present the evaluation of the performance of permission enforcement for custom
permissions. For this case, I show performance results for accessing permission-protected
app components of all kinds: activity (Figure 6.4), service (Figure 6.5), broadcast receiver
(Figure 6.6), and content provider (Figure 6.7). As can be seen, Cusper indeed incurs
negligible overhead for all types of component invocation operations that require permission
checks.
In summary, the modifications to the Android system are shown to have no perceivable
performance overhead while they greatly strengthen the security of the Android OS.
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Figure 6.5: Performance evaluation of Cusper for component access (Service).
6.5 MITIGATION FORMAL VERIFICATION
As a part of the software development process, to verify that a piece of software meets
the requirements, it is common practice in industry to rely only on software testing and not
provide formal proofs of program correctness for the underlying model as formal verification
is highly time consuming, di cult and expensive. However, fundamental components like
a permission system are naturally worth more e↵ort as any failure in such components can
make way for critical security vulnerabilities or even render the security of the whole system
ine↵ective. Additionally, numerous security bug reports on similar issues present further
proof that the current testing methodologies for Android permissions are not completely
e↵ective and a better way of proving program correctness is necessary.
Formal verification allows us to systematically reason about the design of Cusper by
covering many cases that would otherwise be di cult to investigate with static analysis
or testing. This is not to say software testing is unnecessary when a formal correctness
proof is provided. In fact, we still need software testing to verify that our implementation
conforms to our proposed model (which is formally verified to be correct). On the other hand,
“formal verification reduces the problem of confidence in program correctness to the problem















Figure 6.6: Performance evaluation of Cusper for component access (Broadcast Receiver).
not on the actual implementation but on a representation that is as close to the original
implementation as possible. This is because it is challenging to perform formal verification
at a scale required by source code, especially at the huge scale of the Android source code.
Progress in the area does exist towards this for other programming languages [176], but
such approaches are typically employed at the time of development, where the developer is
required to annotate the code. This would be infeasible in our case where a large portion
of the Android source code is already written. Additionally, correctness is proved only with
respect to a set of fundamental properties that were defined based on the specification. There
is no guarantee the system will behave correctly under any condition that was not a part of
the defined properties or in case of redesigns of the system that might invalidate the model
assumptions. Hence, the state of the art formal verification is not a silver bullet but still a
best e↵ort technique for proving correctness.
To analyze the security of Android permissions, previous work proposed formal models
that correspond to the older Android versions which supported only install-time permissions
[78, 79, 80]. Unfortunately, no such model exists for Android’s currently-adopted runtime
permissions. In [12], we build the first formal model of the Android runtime permissions and















Figure 6.7: Performance evaluation of Cusper for component access (Content Provider).
cases such as all possible installation orders and app declarations. Note that having such a
formal model has other benefits; for example, security researchers can use it to verify other
properties of their interest on the runtime permission model. We based our model on the
Alloy implementation of [78] as Alloy is a high-level specification language that is easy to
interpret. However, we spend a significant amount of e↵ort to extend this model to conform
to the o cial specification for the new runtime permissions [35].
We analyze the security of the model through an automated analysis and show that when
it is augmented with the design of Cusper, two fundamental security properties that were
violated in the original Android runtime permission model are satisfied in Cusper. The
properties are: 1) there should be no unauthorized component access, and 2) there should
be no access to high-risk (‘dangerous’) platform resources without user’s consent. This
greatly imprives our confidence regarding the security o↵ered by the proposed system. I









































Figure 6.8: Alternative permission model which splits management of custom and system
permissions.
6.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter I analyzed the security of shared platform and application resources. I
found that the permission model used to protect access to these resources sufers from seri-
ous security vulnerabilities which allow a malicious application to ain unfettered access to
all sensitive system resources and protected application components. My analysis identified
the root causes of those vulnerabilities which stem primarily from (a) a lack of distinction
between system permissions declared by a privileged principal (the system) and custom per-
missions declared by untrusted principals (third-party applications) and, (b) the incapacity
of the system to track custom permission ownership. To mitigate these problems I proposed
a redesign of the Android permission model which systematically eradicates those problems.
Figure 6.8 visualizes this change on the smartphone operating system. The proposed sys-
tem (Cusper), is empirically found to be both e↵ective and e cient. Moreover, Cusper is
formally verified to be correct with fundamental security properties grealy improving our
confidence regarding the security o↵ered by the proposed mechanisms. The vulnerabilities
discovered during the analysis of shared system resources and application components, were
reported to Google which acknowledged them as serious security vulnerabilities. Google will
be addressing these issues in future releases of Android, starting from version 8.
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So far we analyzed adversaries exploiting shared intra-process privileges, shared filesysem
resources and shared system resources and application components. In response I introduced
e↵ective and e cient designs of strategies for detecting and preventing these problems. On
Android, third-party apps also share communication channels to connect with devices in
proximity and other external resources such as incoming SMSs. Next I will present my
analysis on the security of such shared communication channels.
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CHAPTER 7: SHARING DIRECT COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
In this Chapter I will present my analysis on the communication channels Android o↵ers
to third-party applications for accessing external resources. I will demonstrate that yet
another shared resource is subject to attacks from a mobile adversary; I will also illustrate
the design of a robust and flexible defense mechanism within the smartphone OS which can
achieve fine-grained access control to such shared resources [13, 14].
7.1 INTRODUCTION
As a mobile platform Android is equipped with communication channels to enable con-
nections with an assortment of external resources. As we seen on Chapter 2, the Android
Security Model only controls the access right on the channel used for communicating with
such external resources, such as Bluetooth, NFC and Audio devices, SMSs. As long as an
app acquires a system permission for such a channel, it automatically gains access to any
information communicated through it. Specifically, all apps with the same permission are
either a liated with the same Linux group (GID) in which case the kernel enforces the access
control or being checked whether they owned the appropriate permission by the framework
right before the appropriate system Service decides to return or not the requested data.
Nevertheless, Android does not have the capability to overhaul any semantics of the data
being requested. For example it will either allow reading all SMSs or deny reading any of
them. For this I argue that the security model is too coarse-grain to satisfy the utility of the
apps while preserving the confidentiality of the data originating from external resources.
In this chapter I will elaborate on my studies on the risks associated with this coarse
granularity of the Android security model when it comes to share communication channels.
On Section 7.2.1 I will take a closer look at the Bluetooth channel and elaborate on attacks
stemming from the fact that a Bluetooth device is paired with the phone instead of pairing
with the app that actually wants to use it. I will refer to this as the Device Mis-Bonding
Threat or simply DMB. After that I will discuss (see Section 7.2.4) other risks rising from
the coarse granularity of the OS’s security model and its inherent inability to safeguard the
SMS, Audio, and NFC channel. Lastly, I will present the design of a system which o↵ers
strong security guarantees for shared communication channels 7.3
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7.2 ANALYSIS
7.2.1 Bluetooth Mis-Bonding Problem
The fundamental cause of the DMB problem is the inadequacy of the Android security
model in protecting communication channels with external devices. As an example, con-
sider a medical device that communicates with its Android app using Bluetooth. To make
this happen, the smartphone hosting the app first needs to pair with the device, which
forms a bond between the phone and the device. This pairing process yields a set of bonding
information, which allows these two devices to connect to each other automatically in the fu-
ture. The bonding information includes the external device’s MAC address and its Universal
Unique Identifier (UUID), together with a secret link key for authentication and encrypted
communication (when the devices decide to do so). Note that such a bond relation is only
established on the device level; there is nothing to prevent an unauthorized app (with Blue-
tooth permissions) on an authorized phone from connecting to the device. This permission
also makes the app a member in the net bt admin group. As a result, the unauthorized app
is given the privilege to break the bonding with an authorized medical device and pair the
phone with a malicious one configured with the former’s bonding information so as to feed
fake medical data into a patient’s medical record [13].
Given the limitations of the Android security model, device manufacturers are on their
own to address this security risk. One thing they can do is to design a way to secure the
communication between the device and its o cial app. An instance we are aware about is
the Square credit card reader [5], which connects to a smartphone through its audio port. Its
early version is vulnerable because every app with audio permission can read from it. The
later one comes with an encryption capability: the reader encrypts the data (using AES)
collected from a credit card using a hard-coded key and transmits the ciphertext through
the phone to the web. Most other devices, however, do not provide any app-device level
protection, as confirmed in our measurement study (Section 7.2.3), possibly due to the fact
that most of them are simple sensors, without su cient computing resources to support
cryptographic operations. These devices can upload the data to the online service through
the smartphone, which also provides an interface for the user to see and analyze their data.
Encrypting this data in the device and just using the phone as a communication relay would
severely a↵ect the usability of the device, as the user would not be able to use her phone
to see her data. All the devices we analyzed have apps that display the user data on the
smartphone. Hence, the treatment adopted by Square does not seem to be suitable for these
devices.
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Adversary Model and Targeted Bluetooth Devices
In my research, I have conducted a study on this under-researched yet critical security
problem. As the first step, the study focuses on Bluetooth healthcare devices, which are
becoming increasingly popular in recent years, especially with the advent of wearables. The
security risks discovered and the new adversarial technique introduced, are extended to other
types of external resources, as we will see on Section 7.2.4.
I assume that a malicious app is present on the victim’s Android phone with both the
Bluetooth and Bluetooth Adminstration permissions. These two permissions are claimed
by almost all the Bluetooth-capable apps. For a data-injection attack, in which a malicious
party clones the target device, we also assume that the fake device can be placed close to
the victim’s phone (within 100 meters).
As mentioned before, I will first focus on Bluetooth devices. Specifically, I analyzed four
popular healthcare devices. All of them except one (iThermometer) are FDA approved Class
II medical devices [177], in the category of X-ray machines, infusion pumps, etc., which are
used to deal with real patient care and life critical information. The first three devices
either have their online services available or are capable of synchronizing the information
they collect with other cloud based health-services. Here is more detailed information about
these devices:
• Bodymedia Wireless LINK Armband [178] is one of the most popular activity moni-
toring systems, which has been used in over 120 clinical studies [179]. It utilizes four
di↵erent sensors to collect data about the user’s motion, temperature, perspiration,
etc., for accurate calculation of calories burned and monitoring of sleep patterns. The
output of the device can be displayed by a mobile app running on Android or iOS, and
further synchronized to an activity manager website. Disclosure of the data can leak
out the user’s health status and daily activities.
• Nonin Onyx II 9560 Pulse Oximeter [180] is one of the best wireless finger pulse
oximeters. Along with a smartphone app, it enables clinicians to remotely monitor
blood-oxygen saturation levels and pulse rates of the patients with chronic diseases
such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or asthma [177]. The device
uses Bluetooth to connect to the smartphone, which can deliver the data to the health
provider, online health services or stored locally for later analysis. The data collected
here is also critical for understanding the patient’s status and choosing an e↵ective
treatment. This device is Microsoft HealthVault1 certified [177].
1Microsoft HealthVault is a free online service for personal health information management.
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• Entra Health System MyGlucoHealth Blood-Glucose Meter [181] is one of the most
popular glucose monitoring devices. It comes with a complete diabetes management
system (including testing at home) uploading data to the online account through its
Android app, which helps a patient manage her disease and share this data with her
health provider. Glucose levels determine the amount of insulin to be injected into the
patient’s body, which is private and also life-critical: a wrong amount of injection can
have severe implications, including death [182]. Along with FDA, this device is also
approved by CE2 and is fully HL73 compliant [181].
• iThemometer [183] is an electronic thermometer that works with Android through
Bluetooth for personal health or long-distance monitoring of elderly persons or babies.
The body temperature is an indicator for life-threatening conditions like infection.
All these devices involve user’s critical data, whose confidentiality and integrity is impor-
tant to her health and well-being. In the presence of the malicious insider app, however, I
will show that such data becomes extremely vulnerable to the DMB threat.
7.2.2 Data-stealing Attack
In my research, I investigated the feasibility of data-stealing attacks on Bluetooth devices,
in which a malicious app running on the victim’s phone attempts to steal sensitive data
collected by the target device. The attack turns out to be more complicated than it appears
to be: particularly, depending on the nature of a device, the malicious app needs to capture
a small time window during which the device is on and in proximity, under the competition
of the o cial app that also wants to make a connection to the device. Here I describe how
an adversary can overcome such technical challenges to design end-to-end attacks on real
devices.
Attack Strategies
Given the BLUETOOTH and BLUETOOTH ADMIN permissions, a malicious app appears to have
all it needs to steal data from these healthcare devices, and merely because Android does
not mediate which app is supposed to connect to the devices. Any app with access to the
channel immediately gets access to all data communicated through it. In practice, however,
2CE Mark is medical device approval mechanism in Europe.
3HL7 – Health Level Seven International – is a globally interoperable standard for health information
exchange.
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Figure 7.1: Data-stealing Attack
the situation is much more subtle than it appears to be at a first look: a malicious app
must not be oblivious to the fact that the target device could or could not be in proximity
and even when they are, for some of them one needs to push a button or take some actions
to activate their Bluetooth services. Specifically, the Bodymedia armband is activated a
few seconds after it is put on one’s arm; the iThemometer has such a button on it; the
Nonin pulse oximeter turns on when one inserts her finger into the device and turns o↵
once she takes out her finger; and the MyGlucoHealth meter has a button for activating
the Bluetooth and the meter turns o↵ automatically after sending data to the phone. Also
complicating the attack is the presence of the o cial app. Once the o cial app establishes
a socket connection with the target device, the malicious app cannot directly talk to the
device before this connection is torn down and vice versa.
A straightforward solution is an opportunistic strategy in which the malicious app either
periodically invokes the service discovery protocol to find out whether the target device is in
its vicinity or blindly makes repeated connection probes, hoping to get to the device as soon
as it shows up. However, neither of these approaches works well in practice due to alarmingly
increasing power usage of the Bluetooth radio, a power-consuming practice that is usually
suggested against [184]. For instance, a user may keep the Bluetooth communication o↵
to save power. Then, when she wants to use it, she runs a Bluetooth-capable app that
automatically turns on Bluetooth. A malicious app using this strategy must repeatedly
enable Bluetooth to discover the target device; this consumes more battery power than
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expected and could also be noticed by the user, given the presence of the Bluetooth icon on
the top notification bar of the Android phone.
In my research, I found that an adversary can use a lightweight and stealthy strategy to
perform the surveillance. Simply put, the execution of the device’s o cial app is a strong
indication that the device is in action and also within the connection range of the target
device. Based on this observation, the malicious app can keep checking when any of the
target apps launches, an event that can be used to trigger an attempt to catch the window of
opportunity. Specifically, our app, which works as a service in the background, periodically
runs the Android API getRunningTasks() to get the app running in the foreground in
constant time O(1). This needs an additional permission GET TASKS. Alternatively, we can
use getRunningAppProcesses(), which does not need any permission, but returns a list of
running processes in an unspecified order that the malicious app needs to traverse in search
for the target app, which takes O(n) running time, where n is the number of concurrently-
running processes on the phone. The same result can be achieved by executing the Linux
command ps. After the malicious app determines that one of the target apps is in the
foreground, it attempts to establish a Bluetooth connection with its respective device.
A catch here is that, when the o cial app is in communication with the target device, the
malicious app cannot connect to it. To get the data, the malicious app needs to connect to
the device right before this legitimate connection is established, right after it completes, or
during some disruption of the connection. Below I summarize these options:
• Pre-connection. The o cial apps of these devices, once executed, often need the user’s
intervention to start the communication with their devices. For example, all the apps
for the MyGlucoHealth, iThermometer and the Bodymedia armband have a soft button
that needs to be pushed to initiate the connection. These apps can also be configured to
attempt automatic connections to their respective devices as soon as they are launched.
Therefore, in order to capture data from the target device, the malicious app should be
in position to exploit the time gap between the moment it discovers that the target app
is running and the moment when the legitimate connection is established (after the soft
button is pushed or the automatic connection goes through). The likelihood of this
succeeding is contingent on how frequently the malicious app checks currently-running
processes, i.e., its sampling rate for monitoring the o cial app.
• Post-connection. After discovering the running o cial app, the malicious app can
simply wait until its connection ends and then immediately connect to the device.
This strategy avoids aggressive monitoring of the o cial app: the malicious app can
keep a slow sampling rate, as long as it can still detect the target during its execution.
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There is a risk, however, that the user turns o↵ the target device before exiting its app.
When this happens, the adversary loses the chance to get data at that specific point.
• Disruption. The malicious app can disrupt the legitimate app’s communication by de-
activating Bluetooth on the phone. It can then reactivate the channel and immediately
make a connection to the target device. During this attack, the user might observe
the disruption and have to manually click the button on the app again to resume data
collection. The approach makes the attack less stealthy but more reliable in getting
the data from the target device.
Here I elaborate how an adversary can utilize these techniques to launch data-stealing
attacks on the healthcare devices.
Attack Implementation
I demonstrated the data-stealing attacks on all four healthcare devices. To prepare for the
attacks, the adversary analyzes the code of these devices’ o cial apps and their Bluetooth
tra c captured using hcidump [185] to facilitate her understanding of their protocols (for
talking to the devices), and further built these protocols into the malicious app. During its
operation, the malicious app calls the getBondedDevices() API to get a list of external
devices already paired with the phone and their bonding information, including the name,
the MAC address and the UUID of the device of interest. Using such information, the
malicious app makes RFCOMM connections to the device to download sensitive user data.
The attack strategy I implement includes a surveillance component that periodically calls
the API getRunningTasks() to monitor the execution of the device’s o cial app twice per
second. With this implementation, the adversarial app can keep a low profile incurring, on
average, around only 3mW of extra power consumption. In the meantime, given that human
interventions (clicking on a button after the app is activated) can take seconds, the app stands
a good chance of capturing the time window before the o cial app establishes a connection
to its device. In case, automatic connection is configured on the target apps, there is a race
condition on the socket establishment. To make sure that we do not miss the opportunity
to capture data when a target app is launched, the adversarial design incorporates both
the pre-connection and the post-connection strategies: as soon as the malicious app finds
that the target app is running, it first makes a connection attempt; if not successful, the
app listens for the asynchronous ACTION ACL DISCONNECTED event broadcasted by the OS,
which notifies the app once a low level –(Asynchronous Connection-Less (ACL)– connection
with a remote device ends, and then tries to connect to the target device again if the device
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is the one disconnected and the disconnection is not caused by the malicious app itself. If
either the pre-connection or post-connection attempt succeeds, the malicious app requests
and captures the data from the appropriate external Bluetooth device, sends them to the
adversary and closes the connection, to make it available to the legitimate app.
It is particularly tricky when the o cial app is configured to automatic connections: once
the pre-connection attack succeeds, the malicious app rapidly finishes its operations and
releases the socket that is almost instantly captured by the legitimate app. This causes
the OS to miss reporting the DISCONNECT event and the consecutive CONNECT. Hence,
when the legitimate app releases the socket, the malicious app believes that the disconnection
is initiated by itself. As a result, it skips the post-connection opportunity and thus misses
the new data the device collects during the period of the legitimate app’s connection. To
address this issue, the malicious app checks whether enough time elapses from the moment
it sends out a disconnection request to when it receives a disconnection event from the OS;
if so, the app believes that the event it gets is about another app and then goes ahead to
make another connection attempt.
E↵ectiveness Evaluation
I run the malicious app on a Nexus 4 development phone running JellyBean (4.2), together
with all target devices’ apps. I evaluated the e↵ectiveness of the data-stealing attack by ob-
serving the success rate when the apps were configured to initiate automatic connections to
their respective devices once launched. This is the worst case scenario as this operation is
much faster than its alternative where the user must click a button to initiate such connec-
tions, hence the window of opportunity is smaller for the pre-connection attempt. I found
that the malicious app is often successful in capturing this window. The experimental results
are presented in Table 7.1.
For the Bodymedia armband device, I found that in 100 pre-connection trials, the ma-
licious app managed to connect 99 times to the device, get the sensitive data and send
them to a remote server. The case that the connection failed was attributed to a device
de-synchronization issue that rendered even the o cial app unable to connect to it. The
adversary achieves this high success rate because the Bodymedia Link Armband mobile app
does some pre-processing operations before attempting to connect to its device, which gives
enough time for the malicious app to perform its operations and release the socket. The
success rates were also high for other apps, except for iThermometer (e.g., 42 out of 100
trials) due to its app’s prompt response in establishing Bluetooth socket connections. When
the malicious app won the race, the authorized app failed to connect but it automatically
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retried after 10 seconds, and succeeded as this interval was often enough for the malicious
app to finish its task and release the socket. The post-connection attacks succeeded most of
the time except for the glucose meter, MyGlucoHealth, as long as the devices were switched
o↵ after the o cial apps stopped. MyGluooHealth automatically turns itself o↵ after send-
ing data to its app to save its battery power, so none of the post-connection attacks on it
succeeded. I also tested the disruption strategy, which also worked, allowing the adversarial
app to discontinue the o cial app’s connection and get the health data. A problem with
this attack strategy, is that the legitimate connection needs to be interrupted, which could
be noticed by the user.
Table 7.1: Success rate of data-stealing attack. This table depicts the successful
connections made by the malicious app on 100 trials.
Target Device Pre-connection Post-connection
Bodymedia LINK Armband 99/100 100/100
iThermometer 42/100 100/100
Nonin Pulseoximeter 99/100 92/100
myGlucoHealth 100/100 0/100*
*the device turns o↵ few seconds after sending data to the phone.
Power Consumption Evaluation
A rough estimation of the power consumption of di↵erent surveillance strategies is impor-
tant for understanding the stealthiness of the malicious app, because this activity dominates
all of its operations in terms of the time interval that it has to run. We tested the dif-
ferent options we had. I evaluated getRunningTasks (the strategy implemented in the
malicious app) and its alternatives including calling getRunningAppProcesses() and mak-
ing repeated attempts to connect to or check the existence of the target Bluetooth device.
I ran the app using each strategy independently for 10 minutes. The average power con-
sumption of the strategy under scrutiny is illustrated in Table 7.2. As depicted, the adopted
strategy (getRunningTasks) turned out to be both much more e cient and stealthier (as
the Bluetooth sign appears on the screen only when it is supposed to be, i.e., when the the
o cial app is running). I further compared the power consumption of this strategy with that
of two popular apps, as described in Table 7.3. As we can see here, the surveillance strategy
has a comparable power-consumption level (3mW) as those apps (1 to 18mW). Accurate
power consumption measurement is not required to do this evaluation, we only need rough
relative power measurement. The software used for the power consumption evaluation pro-
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Table 7.2: Average power consumption over 10 minutes per surveillance technique using
PowerTutor[184].
Technique Avg Power Con-
sumption
Sampling Rate
getRunningAppProcesses() 8mW 2 samples/s
getRunningTasks() 3mW 2 samples/s
connect() 17mW 0.18 samples/s
startDiscovery() 15mW 0.054 samples/s
Table 7.3: Average power consumption over an hour. Comparison between our surveillance
technique and 2 popular applications using PowerTutor[184].




vides accurate measurement for a very limited number of phones and rough measurements
for all Android phones. This rough measurement su ces for this evaluation.
7.2.3 Measuring the DMB threat
As discussed before, the DMB problem in the shared bluetooth communication channel
stems from the lack of a bonding between an Android external device and its o cial app
which allows another app with access to the same channel to steal data from the external
resource, or a spurious external resource to inject data into a victim app. In the absence
of OS-level protection, this threat can only be addressed by the app-device authentication
developed by individual device manufacturers. The design and implementation of such an
authentication mechanism, however, can be non-trivial, which could raise the cost of the
devices. To find out whether such a security measure has already been taken in practice,
we performed a measurement study that analyzed a relevant set of apps from Google Play.
The study reveals that all of the selected apps are actually vulnerable, indicating that the
DMB problem is indeed realistic and serious. Given the pervasiveness of vulnerable devices
and challenges in fixing them (which could require modifying their hardware), an OS-level
solution becomes inevitable (see 7.3).
To perform our study we collected relevant o cial apps for di↵erent Bluetooth devices.
Our methodology for collecting those apps is as follows: we first searched Google Play
for those apps compatible with Google NEXUS 4, using the following terms: “Bluetooth
Door Lock”, “Bluetooth Health”, “Bluetooth Medical Devices” and “Bluetooth Meter”. All
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Table 7.4: Sampled apps
Total apps 90
Apps not using Bluetooth (eliminated) 2
Device apps with sensitive information 68
Device apps with insensitive information 20
Figure 7.2: Classifications of the sampled apps. Some of them collect information in
multiple categories.
together, these queries gave us 90 apps. For each of these apps, we manually inspected its
descriptions to determine whether it received sensitive user data from its device. Among
these 90 apps, 68 involved some private user information, such as the heart rate, blood
pressure, body temperature, glucose level, daily activities, and so on as summarized in
Figure 7.2.
Application Analysis
To avoid purchasing all 68 devices that can be used with our sampled apps, we analyzed the
apps’ code to find out whether they included any app-device authentication. This analysis
was done both automatically and manually, as follows.
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We first decompiled all the 68 apps and searched for authentication-related programming
structures. Authentication should be based upon a secret, which was not hard-coded into
any of those apps, given the fact that from two independent downloads of the same app,
we always got the same code and data. Therefore, such a secret should either come from
some external inputs of the app, particularly its user interfaces, web communication or
internal memory files, or is generated by cryptographic operations. In our study, we in-
spected all such potential sources of authentication secrets (Table 7.5) to determine whether
their outputs a↵ected the inputs of the app’s Bluetooth communication, particularly that of
BluetoothSocket.write, which transmits data to the device through a Bluetooth socket
connection.
We ran a script that used grep to locate the APIs related to those sources and identified
the apps where such APIs only appeared within public libraries. For example, we found
that, for most apps, their cryptographic APIs (provided by Java JCE, Bouncy castle and
spongycastle [186, 187, 188]) were all included in shared libraries such as Google ads, Twitter
authentication, OAuth, etc. Those libraries are used for specific purposes, getting ads or
performing web-based authentication, for example. It is unlikely that they be used for
authenticating the app to its Bluetooth device. Therefore, we removed all the apps that did
not have any of those APIs outside the public libraries. There were 48 such apps among all
we collected.
For the remaining 20 apps, we manually inspected all the occurrences of these “suspicious”
APIs (Table 7.5) in their code. We looked at the functions where the calls to the APIs were
made. It turned out that they were all used for the purposes having nothing to do with
app-device authentication. For example, most reads from memory files appeared in the
crash-handling mechanisms and most cryptographic operations were performed on the SQL
queries on web databases. We also found that HttpClient was used in the functions for
sharing tweets or getting the user’s workout data from the web. None of these API outputs
were propagated to the inputs of the app’s Bluetooth communication.
We further installed all the 68 apps and manually inspected their user interfaces. None of
them asked for passwords, PINs, etc. for authenticating themselves to their corresponding
devices.
Study Results
As discussed above, we found no evidence that any of these 68 apps, which were relevant
apps in Google Play, performed any app-device authentication. Table 7.5 summarizes our
findings. The 48 apps we removed automatically either did not have any suspicious APIs or
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Table 7.5: Manual analysis on 20 apps. The other 48 apps were automatically filtered out























had such APIs in their shared libraries, including those for advertising, web authentication,
crash analysis, etc. For the 20 apps we manually analyzed, 9 called cryptographic APIs in
their own code, 5 invoked web APIs and 15 read from memory files. Also, for all the 68 apps
we studied, none had user inputs for app-device authentication. Again, none of these apps
generated any data flow that a↵ected the inputs of Bluetooth communication functions.
This study also shows that most of these apps supported secure Bluetooth communica-
tion: 42 apps utilized secure socket only; 12 worked under both secure and insecure com-
munications and the rest utilized insecure communication only. This indicates that most of
the devices processing sensitive user data do take privacy protection seriously. However, the
presence of malicious apps with the Bluetooth permissions on Android (which since version 6
are granted automatically) renders such device-device authentication insu cient for protect-
ing access to shared communication channels resulting in leakage of private user information.
This study on Bluetooth suggests that indeed the Android Security Model is too coarse-
grained to both support the utility of the apps and protect the confidentiality of the infor-
mation communicated through that shared channel. These findings inspired the study of
more such channels of communication with external resources which I report on the next
Section (7.2.4).
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7.2.4 Other External-Resources Attacks
To understand the significance and the applicability of the problem incurred to Android
due to to unprotected external resources, a study was carried on other external resources
namely NFC, SMS, Audio. For this study we analyzed a set of prominent accessories and
online services that utilize popular channels, including SMS, Audio and NFC. Our findings
echo our previous findings on on Bluetooth 7.2.1 and related studies on the Internet (local
socket connections) [189] channels. The latter study found that all no-root third-party
screenshot services can be exploited by a malicious app connecting to them through the
Internet channel. This Section demonstrates that the SMS, Audio and NFC channels are
equally under-protected, exposing private user information like bank account balances, pass-
word reset links etc. These findings point to the security challenges posed by the widening
gap between the coarse-grained Android protection and the current way of sharing external
resources on smartphones.
Methodology
To further study channels of communication with external resources, we collected apps
from Google Play, choosing those that may access private user data or perform sensitive
operations through Audio or NFC. Specifically, we searched the Play store for popular apps
using these channels and then went down the list to pick out 13 Audio and 17 NFC apps that
could perform some security-related operations. For SMS, we looked into 14 popular online
services, including those provided by leading financial institutes (Bank of America, Chase,
Wells Fargo, PayPal) and social networks (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, WeChat, Naver
Line, etc.), and a web mail (Gmail). Those services communicate with com.android.sms
and sometimes, their own apps using short text messages.
Table 7.6 provides examples for the apps and services used in our study. All the services
we analyzed clearly involve private user data, so do 6 fitness, credit-card related Audio apps.
Some payment related apps using the Audio jack, are heavily obfuscated and we were not able
to decompile them using popular de-compilation tools (dex2jar, apktool). Most of the other
apps in the Audio category are remote controllers or sensors that work with a dongle attached
to the phone’s Audio jack. Although those devices do not appear to be particularly sensitive
(e.g., the camera that can be commanded remotely to take pictures), such functionalities
(e.g., remote control) could have security implications when they are applied to control more
sensitive devices. Our study also reveals that Most NFC apps are for reading and writing
NFC tags (tags with microchips for short-range radio communication), which can be used
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Table 7.6: Critical Examples
Channel App Usage # of down-
loads
Details
AUDIO EMS+ Credit card
reader
5,000 - 10,000 Decrypt : Creates a private key of
RSA with hardcoded modulus and
private exponent. Uses it to load
session key which is used in AES to
process messages from credit card
dongle.






Doesn’t include any authentication
features. A repackaged app with
di↵erent credential is able to read






NA Both SMS can be read by any app
with SMS permission.Alert mes-
sages: sensitive financial activity
and amount info. Text banking:






2 step authentication; verification
code sent via SMS.
NFC SquareLess Credit card
reader
10,000 - 50,000 Reads credit card information.
Malicious apps may also read






10,000 - 50,000 Reads credit card information.
Malicious apps may also read
credit card data as this app does.
to keep sensitive user data (e.g., a password for connecting to one’s Wi-Fi access point) or
trigger operations (e.g., Wi-Fi connection). A more sensitive application of NFC is payment
through a digital wallet. However, related NFC equipment is hard to come by.
Over those apps and services, we conducted both dynamic and static analyses to determine
whether there is any protection in place when they use those channels. For SMS, we simply
built an app with the SMS permission to find out what it can get. All NFC apps were studied
using NFC tags, in the presence of an unauthorized app with the NFC permission. For those
in the Audio category, we analyzed a Jawbone UP wristband, a popular fitness device whose
app (com.jawbone.up) has 100,000 to 500,000 downloads on Google Play, to understand its
security weakness. In the absence of other Audio dongles, relevant apps were decompiled
for a static code inspection to find out whether there is any authentication and encryption
protection during those apps’ communication with their external devices. Specifically, we
looked for standard or homegrown cryptographic libraries (e.g., javax.crypto, BouncyCastle,
SpongyCastle) within the code, which are needed for establishing a secret with the dongles.
Also, the apps are expected to process the data collected from their dongles locally, instead
of just relaying it to online servers, as a few payment apps do. This forces them to decrypt
the data if it has been encrypted. Finally, we ran those apps to check whether a password
or other secrets need to enter for connecting to their dongles. Our analysis was performed
on a Nexus 4 with Android 4.4.
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Study Results
This analysis shows that most external resources studied have not been protected by apps
and service providers. The consequences here can be very serious, as elaborated below.
Firstly we examine the SMS-based services. As expected, all short messages leading online
services delivered to our Nexus 4 phone were fully exposed to the unauthorized app with the
SMS permission. Note that such messages should only be received by com.android.sms to
display their content to the owner of the phone, as well as those services’ o cial apps: for
example, Facebook, Naver Line, WeChat and WhatsApp, directly extract a verification code
from their servers’ messages to complete a two-step authentication on the owner’s behalf.
Information leaks through this under-regulated channel are serious and in some cases,
catastrophic. A malicious app can easily get such sensitive information as account balances,
incoming/outgoing wire transfers, debit card transactions, ATM withdrawals, a transac-
tion’s history, etc. from Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo, authorized amount for
a transaction, available credit, etc. from Chase Credit Card and Wells Fargo Visa, and
notifications for receiving money and others from PayPal. It can also receive authentication
secrets from Facebook, Gmail, WhatsApp, WeChat, Naver Line and KakaoTalk, and even
locations of family members from Life360, the most prominent family safety online service.
An adversary who controls the app can also readily get into the device owner’s Facebook
and Twitter accounts: all she needs to do is to generate an account reset request, which will
cause those services to send the owner a message with a reset link and confirmation code.
With such information, even the app itself can automatically reset the owner’s passwords,
by simply sending requests through the link using the mobile browser. A video demo of
those attacks is posted online [190]. Note that almost all banks provide mobile banking,
which allows enrolled customers to check their account and transaction status through SMS
messages.
Secondly we inspect the risks associated with the Audio channel. To do that, we analyzed
the Jawbone UP wristband [28], one of the most popular fitness devices that utilize the
low-cost Audio channel. The device tracks its user’s daily activities, when she moves, sleeps
and eats, and provides summary information to help the user manage her lifestyle. Such
information can be private. However, we found that it is completely unprotected. We ran
an unauthorized app that dumped such data from the device when it was connected to the
phone’s Audio jack.
For all other apps in the Audio category, we did not have their hardware pieces and there-
fore could only analyze their code statically. Specifically, among all 5 credit-card reading
apps, PayPal, Square and Intuit are all heavily obfuscated, which prevented us from de-
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compiling them. Those devices are known to have cryptographic protection and designed to
send encrypted credit-card information from their card readers directly to the corresponding
web services [191, 192]. The other two apps, EMS+ and Payment Jack, were decompiled
in our research. Our analysis shows that both of them also receive ciphertext from their
card-reader dongles. However, they decrypt the data on the phone using a hard-coded se-
cret key. Since all the instances of these apps share the same key, an adversary can easily
extract it and use it to decrypt a user’s credit-card information downloaded from the app’s
payment dongle. Furthermore, all other apps, which either support sensors (e.g, wind meter)
or remote controllers (e.g., remote picture taking), are unprotected, without authentication
and encryption at all.
Lastly lets take a look at NFC. 5 out of 17 popular NFC apps (e.g., NFC Tools) we
found are used to read and write NFC tags. They allow users to store any data on tags,
including sensitive information (e.g., a password for one-touch connection to a Wi-Fi access
point). However, there is no authentication and encryption protection at all4. We ran an
unauthorized app with the NFC permission to collect the data on the tag whenever our Nexus
phone touched the tag. Note that in the presence of the authorized app, Android will ask
the user to choose the right one each time the tag is detected5. Although this mechanism
does o↵er some protection, it completely relies on the user’s judgment during every tap on
an NFC device and cannot be used by system administrators to enforce their mandatory
policies.
Among the rest of apps, NFC ReTag FREE utilizes the serial number of an NFC tag to
trigger operations. Again, since the communication through the NFC channel is unprotected,
a malicious app can also acquire the serial number, which leaks out the operation that the
legitimate app is about to perform. The only NFC app with protection is the NFC Passport
Reader. What it does is to use one’s birth date, passport number and expiration date to
generate a secret key for encrypting other passport information. The problem is, once those
parameters are exposed, the adversary can recover the key to decrypt the data collected
from the NFC channel.
4There are more expensive tags such as MIFARE that support encryption and authentication.
The app using those tags needs the user to manually enter a secret. Clearly, they are not used
for protecting the information like Wi-Fi passwords, which should be passed to one’s device con-
veniently.
5More specifically, this happens when both the authorized app and the malicious app register
with the same priority to receive the notification for device discovery.
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7.3 MITIGATION DESIGN
In the previous section, I have discussed how the Android Security Model is incapable
of protecting access to shared communication channels for interfacing with external devices
and sources of information. In par with my previous studies, the natural next step after
understanding an adversary’s capabilities is to try finding ways to protect against possible
attacks. In this Section I will address this challenge, and discuss the design, implementation
and evaluation of a solution to this problem.
The analysis on Bluetooth, SMS, Audio and NFC 7.2, and prior findings on Internet [189]
emphasize the urgent need to enhance Android access control, to better protect shared com-
munication channels for direct interaction with external resources. In this section, I present
the first uniform, backward compatible, and easily maintainable design of a system for this
purpose. The system, called SEACAT (Security-Enhanced Android Channel Control), ex-
tends SEAndroid’s MAC 2.2.3 to cover SMS, NFC, Bluetooth and Internet, and also adds in
a DAC module to allow the user and app developers to specify rules for all these channels, in
addition with Audio. I implemented SEACAT on Android 4.4 with an SEAndroid enhanced
kernel 3.4.0.
7.3.1 Design Overview
The objective is to develop a simple security mechanism that supports flexible, fine-grained
mandatory and discretionary protection of various external resources through controlling
their channels of communication with smartphones. However, achieving this goal is by no
means a smooth sail. Here are a few technical challenges that need to be overcome in the
design and implementation of such a system.
• Limitations of SEAndroid. Today’s SEAndroid does not model external resources.
Even after it is extended to describe them, new enforcement hooks need to be added
to system functions scattered across the framework/library layer and the Linux kernel.
For example, the Bluetooth channel on Android 4.4 (Bluedroid stack) is better pro-
tected on the framework layer, which has more semantic information, while the control
on the Internet should still happen within the kernel. Supporting these hooks requires
a well though-out design that organizes them cross-layer under a unified policy engine
and management mechanism for both MAC and DAC.
• Complexity in integration. Current Android already has the permission-based DAC
and SEAndroid-based MAC 2.2. An additional layer of DAC protection for external
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resources could complicate the system and a↵ect its performance6. How to integrate
SEACAT into the current Android in the most e cient way is challenging.
To address these challenges, I will introduce a design that integrates policy compliance
checks from both the framework and the kernel layer, and enforces MAC and DAC policies
within the same security hooks (Figure 7.3). More specifically, the architecture of SEACAT
includes a policy module, a policy enforcement mechanism and a DAC policy management
service. At the center of the design is the policy module, which stores security policies and
provides an e cient compliance-check service to both the framework and the kernel layers.
It maintains two policy bases, one for MAC and the other for DAC. The MAC base is static,
which has been compiled into the Linux kernel in the current SEAndroid implementation
on AOSP. The DAC base can be dynamically updated during the system’s runtime. Both
of them are operated by a policy engine that performs compliance checks. The engine is
further supported by two Access Vector Caches (AVCs), one for the kernel and the other for
the framework layer. Each AVC caches the policies recently enforced using a hash map. Due
to the locality of policy queries, this approach can improve the performance of compliance
checks. Since DAC policies are in the same format as MAC rules, they are all served by the
same AVC and policy engine.
The enforcement mechanism comprises a set of security hooks and two pairs of mapping
tables. These hooks are placed within the system functions responsible for the operations on
di↵erent channels over the framework layer and the kernel layer. Whenever a call is made to
such a function, its hook first looks for the security contexts of the caller (i.e., app) and the
object (e.g., a Bluetooth address, the Sender ID for a text message) by searching a MAC
mapping table first and then a DAC table. The contexts retrieved thereby, together with
the operation being performed, are used to query the AVC and the policy engine. Based
upon the outcome, the hook decides whether to let the call go through. Just like the AVC,
each mapping table has two copies, one for the framework layer and the other for the kernel.
Also, the MAC table is made read-only while the DAC table can be updated during runtime.
Both the DAC policy base and DAC mapping table are maintained by the policy manage-
ment service, which provides the user an interface to identify important external resources
(from their addresses, IDs, etc.) and the apps allowed to access them. Also it can check
manifest files of newly installed apps to extract rules embedded there by the developer (e.g.,
only the o cial Chase app can get the text message from Chase) to ask for the user’s ap-
6Note that this new DAC cannot be easily integrated into the permission mechanism, since the
objects there (di↵erent Bluetooth devices, web services, etc.) can be added into the system during
runtime.
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proval. Those policies and the security contexts of the labeled resources are uploaded to the
DAC base and the mapping tables respectively.
Figure 7.3: SEACAT architecture
7.3.2 Trusted Compute Base and Adversary Model
Like SEAndroid, the security guarantee of SEACAT depends on the integrity of the kernel.
We have to assume that the adversary has not compromised the kernel to make the approach
work. In the meantime, SEACAT can tolerate corrupted system apps, as long as they are
confined by SEAndroid. Furthermore, the DAC mechanism is configured by the user and
therefore could become vulnerable. However, the proposed design makes sure that even when
it is misconfigured, the adversary still cannot bypass the MAC protection in place. Finally,
I assume the presence of malicious apps on the user’s device, with proper permissions to
access all aforementioned channels.
7.3.3 Policy Specification and Management
To control access to external resources through shared communication channels, we first
need to specify the right policies and identify the subjects (i.e., apps) and objects (e.g., a
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Bluetooth glucose meter, the Chase bank which sends a sensitive SMS, etc.) to apply them.
This is done within the policy module and the policy management service.
SEACAT has to provide a convenient way of specifying policies. Remember from the Back-
ground Chapter (Section 2.2.3), an SEAndroid rule determines which domain is allowed to
access which resources, and how this access should happen. To specify such a rule for exter-
nal resources, both relevant domains (for apps) and types (for external resources) need to
be defined. The domain part has already been taken care of by SEAndroid: we can directly
declare ones for any new apps whose access rights, with regard to external resources, need to
be clarified. When it comes to types, those within the AOSP Android have been marked as
file type, node type (for sockets and further used to specify IP range), dev type, etc. In
my research, I further specified new categories of types (or attributes), including BT type
for MAC addresses of Bluetooth devices, NFC type for NFC serial numbers and SMS type
for SMS Sender ID (originating addresses). Here is an example policy based upon these
domains and types:
allow trusted app bt dev:btacc rw perms
where bt dev is a type for Bluetooth devices (identified by their MAC addresses) and btacc
includes all the operations that can be performed on the type. This policy allows the apps in
the domain trusted app to read from and write to the MAC addresses in the type bt dev.
Later I describe how to associate such a domain with authorized apps, and the type with
external resources.
The DAC policies used in SEACAT are specified in the same way, using the same format,
which enables them to be processed by the policy engine and AVC also serving MAC policies.
The DAC policy base, includes a set of types defined for the Audio channel. Audio has
not been included in the MAC policies since the device attached to it cannot be uniquely
identified: all we know is just whether the device is an input (headset) or output (speaker)
device or the one with both capabilities. For user-defined DAC policies, SEACAT provides
a mechanism to lock the whole audio channel when necessary, a process elaborated later.
Moreover, although the DAC base is supposed to be updated at runtime, to avoid the
overheads that come with such updates, SEACAT uses a predefined a set of “template”
policies that connect a set of domains to a set of types in di↵erent categories (Bluetooth,
NFC, SMS, Internet and Audio) with read and write permissions. The domains and types of
those policies are dynamically attached to the apps and resources specified by the user during
runtime. In this way, SEACAT only needs to maintain a mapping table from resources to
their security contexts (user seres contexts) before the template rules run out.
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Next, SEACAT must provide a mechanism for assigning domains to apps. For the domains
defined for MAC, how they are assigned to apps can also be specified in the policies. SEA-
CAT allows the administrator to grant trusted apps, permissions to use restrictive external
resources. Such apps are identified from the parties who sign them. Specifically, when an
app is being installed, SEAndroid assigns it an seinfo tag according to its signature. The
mapping between this tag and the app’s domain is maintained in the file seapp contexts,
which Zygote (see Section 2.1), the Android core process that spawns other processes, reads
when determining the app’s security context during its runtime.
Labeling apps for DAC is handled by SEACAT’s policy management service, which in-
cludes a set of hooks within the PackageManager and installd. Before an app is installed,
these hooks present to the user a “dialogue box”, alongside the app’s permission informa-
tion. This allows the user to indicate whether the app should be given a domain associated
with certain channels (Bluetooth, NFC, SMS, Internet and Audio), so that it can later be
given the privilege to access protected external resources. For an app assigned a domain, the
PackageManager labels it with an seinfo tag di↵erent from the default one (for untrusted,
unprivileged apps) and stores the tag alongside its related domain within a dynamic map-
ping file user seapp contexts. Note that this action will only be taken, in the absence of
a MAC rule already dictating the domain assignment for this app.
SEACAT furthers requires modification of libselinux, which is used by Zygote, to assign
the appropriate security context to the process forked for an app. An instrumentation
within libselinux enables loading user seapp contexts for retrieving the security context
associated with a user-defined policy. Note that again, when an seinfo tag is found within
both seapp contexts and
user seapp contexts, its context is always determined by the former, as the MAC policies
always take precedence. In fact the system will never create a DAC policy for an external
resource that conflicts with a MAC policy. Nevertheless, if a compromised system app
manages to inject erroneous DAC policies, they will never a↵ect or overwrite MAC policies.
The design of SEACAT also allows the app developer to declare within an app’s manifest
the external resource the app needs exclusive access to. With the user’s consent, the app will
get a domain and the resource will be assigned a type to protect their interactions through
a DAC rule. This approach makes declaration of DAC policies convenient: for example,
the o cial app of Chase can state that only itself and Android system apps are allowed to
receive the text messages from Chase; a screenshot app using an ADB service can make the
IP address of the local socket together with the port number of the service o↵ limit to other
third-party apps.
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Labelling apps is of course not enough. We need a way to label external resources as well,
or in SEAndroid terms, we need to assign types to those objects in par with the labelling
of local resources by SEAndroid. For standard local resources, such as files, SEAndroid
includes policies that guide the OS to find them and label them properly. For example, the
administrator can associate a directory path name with a type, so that every file stored under
the directory is assigned that type. The security context of each file (which includes its type)
is always kept within its extension, making it convenient to retrieve the context during policy
enforcement. When it comes to external resources, however, we need to find a new way to
label their identifiers and store their tags. This is done in our research using a new MAC
policy file seres contexts, which links each resource (the MAC address for Bluetooth, the
serial number for NFC, the Sender ID for SMS and the IP/port pair of a service) to its
security context. The content of the file is pre-specified by the system administrator and is
maintained as read-only throughout the system’s runtime. It is loaded into memory bu↵ers
within the framework layer and the Linux kernel respectively, and utilized by the security
hooks there for policy compliance checks (Section 5.3.2).
Labeling external resources for the DAC policies is much more complicated, as new re-
sources come and go, and the user should be able to dynamically enable protection on them
during the system’s runtime. SEACAT provides three mechanisms for this purpose: 1)
connection-time labeling, 2) app declaration and 3) manual setting. Specifically, connection-
time labeling happens the first time an external resource is discovered by the OS, for example,
when a new Bluetooth device is paired with the phone. Also, as discussed before, an app
can define the external resource that should not be exposed to the public (e.g., only system
apps and the o cial Facebook app can get messages from the Sender ID “FACEBOOK”).
Finally, the user is always able to manually enter new DAC policies or edit existing ones
through an interface provided by the system.
For di↵erent channels, some labeling mechanisms work better than others. Bluetooth and
NFC resources are marked mainly when they are connected to the phone: whenever there are
apps assigned domains but not associated with any Bluetooth or NFC resources, SEACAT
notifies the user once a new Bluetooth device is paired with the phone or an NFC device is
detected; if such a new device has not been protected by the MAC policies, the user is asked
to select, through an interface, all apps (those assigned domains) that should be allowed
to access it (while other third-party apps’ access requests should be denied). After this is
done, a DAC rule is in place to mediate the use of the device. Note that once all such apps
have been linked to external resources, SEACAT will no longer interrupt the user for device
labeling, though she can still use the policy manager to manually add or modify security
rules.
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In SEACAT’s implementation, a few system apps and services are modified to accommo-
date this mechanism. For Bluetooth, we need to change Settings, the Bluetooth system
app and the Bluetooth service. When the Settings app helps the user connect to a newly
discovered Bluetooth device, it checks the device’s MAC address against a list of mandatory
rules. If the address is not on the list, the Bluetooth service pops an interface to let the user
choose from the existing apps assigned domains but not paired with any resources. This
is done through extending the RemoteDevices class. The MAC address labeled is kept in
the file user seres contexts, together with its security context. This file is uploaded into
memory bu↵ers (for both the kernel and the framework layer) for compliance checks. For
NFC, whenever a new device is found, Android sends an Intent to the app that registers with
the channel. SEACAT’s implementation instruments the NFC Intent dispatcher to let the
user label the device and specify the apps allowed to use it when the dispatcher is working
on such an Intent. This is important when the NFC device is security critical, as now the
control is taken away from the potentially untrusted apps and delegated to the user (if no
MAC mechanism is in place) during runtime. Furthermore, by providing this mechanism,
the system can protect itself, and it is deprived of any dependency on end-to-end authenti-
cation between apps and external devices. Lastly, by utilizing the association of apps with
resources specified in MAC and DAC policies, the user can read already labeled tags directly,
avoiding going through the app selection mechanism every time, which immensely improves
the usability of the reading-an-NFC-device task. Again, the result of the DAC labeling is
kept in user seres contexts. The syntax of the MAC policy file seres contexts and the
DAC policy file user seres contexts is demonstrated below:
resource id=xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx channel=BLUETOOTH type=bt dev2
resource id=XXXXXXXX channel=NFC type=nfc dev1
resource id=24273 channel=SMS type=sms dev3
resource id=AUDIO channel=AUDIO type=audio dev
External resources associated with SMS and Internet are more convenient to label through
app declaration and manual setting. As discussed before, an app can request exclusive access
to the text messages from a certain SMS ID. The user can also identify within the interface
of our policy manager a set of SMS IDs (“GOOGLE”, 32665 for “FACEBOOK”, 24273
for Chase, etc.) to make sure that only com.android.sms can get their messages7. Use
of Internet resources should be specified by the app. For example, those using ADB-level
7The SMS IDs for services are public. It is easy to provide a list of well-known financial, social-
networking services to let the user choose from.
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services [189] can state the local IP address and their services’ port numbers to let our system
label them.
Pertaining Audio, we need to label the whole channel at the right moment. Specifically,
the DAC rule for the channel is expected to come with the app requiring it or set manually
by the user through the policy manager. Whenever the system observes the Audio jack is
connected to a device that fits the profile (input, output or mixed), SEACAT just pops up
a “dialogue box” asking the user whether the device needs protection, if a DAC rule has
already been required by either an app or the user. We can avoid this window popup when
the app (the one expected to have exclusive access to the Audio channel) is found to run in
the foreground. In either case, the whole Audio channel is labeled with a type, which can
only be utilized by that app, system apps and services. This information is again stored in
user seres contexts for policy enforcement. Notably, as soon as the device is detached
from the Audio jack, the type is dropped from the file, which releases the entire channel for
other third-party apps. To completely remove the pop-ups, the user can set the system to
an “auto” mode in which the Audio is only labeled (automatically) when the authorized app
is running. In this case, the user needs to follow a procedure to first start the app and then
plug in the device to avoid any information leak.
7.3.4 Policy Compliance Check and Enforcement
To perform a compliance check, a hook needs to obtain the security contexts of the subject
(the app), the object (MAC address, NFC serial number, etc.) and the operation to be
performed (e.g., read, write, etc.) to construct a query for the policy engine (see Figure 7.4).
Here the subject’s context can be easily found out: on the framework layer, this is done
through the SEAndroid function getPidContext, which utilizes the PID of a process to
return its context information. Although the same approach also works within the Linux
kernel, a shortcut is used in controlling Internet connections through sockets. Specifically,
within the socket’s structure, SEAndroid already adds a field sk security to keep the
security context of the process creating the socket. The field is used by the existing hooks
to mediate the access to IP/port types. SEACAT’s enforcement of DAC policies is palced
there, which involves finding the security contexts of an IP-port pair from a DAC table
within the kernel.
The object’s context is kept within the MAC policy file seres contexts and the DAC
policy file user seres contexts. To avoid frequently reading from those files during the
system’s runtime, SEACAT uploads their content to a pair of bu↵ers in the memory both
in the framework layer and the kernel. These bu↵ers are organized as hash maps, serving as
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the mapping tables to help a security hook retrieve objects’ security contexts. Specifically,
SEACTA uses a new function for searching the mapping tables within libselinux, and
exposed this interface to the framework so that the security hooks can access it through
Java or native code. Within the kernel, SEACAT employs another mapping table for the
DAC policy8. This table is synchronized automatically with the one for the framework
layer to make sure that the same set of DAC policies are enforced on both layers. The set
of operations SEACAT introduces for manipulation and retrieval of information from the
memory bu↵ers and exposed through libselinux to the rest of the system, are listed within
Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: SEACAT API
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION
loadPDPolicy Loads the MAC (seres res contexts) and
DAC (user seres contexts) policy bases con-
taining the resource with security context
associations, into the SEACAT memory
bu↵ers.
getResourceSecContext Performs a lookup in the SEACAT memory
bu↵ers for a security type assigned to a re-
source.
getResourceChannel Performs a lookup in the SEACAT memory
bu↵ers for the channel that a resource be-
longs to.
isResourceMAC Returns 1 if the resource is present in SEA-
CAT memory bu↵ers and was loaded from
the MAC policy base, 0 if it was loaded from
the DAC policy base, or NULL otherwise.
insertDACRes Stores the security context of a resource in
the appropriate memory bu↵er and the cor-
responding policy base.
getDomain Returns the security context assigned to a
third-party app.
Given the security contexts for a subject (the app) and an object (e.g., an SMS ID), a
security hook is ready to query the AVC and policy engine to find out whether an operation
(i.e., system call) is allowed to proceed. On the framework layer, this policy compliance check
can be done through selinux check access. SEACAT wrapps this SEAndroid function,
adding program logic for retrieving an object’s security context from the mapping table.
8Note that we do not need to build the table for MAC here, since SELinux already has a table
for enforcing MAC policies on IPs. Also, all other channels are enforced on the framework layer.
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The new function seacat check access takes as its input a resource’s identifier (Bluetooth
MAC, SMS ID, etc.), the caller’s security context and the action to be performed, and
further identifies the resource’s security context before running the AVC and the policy
engine on those parameters. Note that for the resource appearing within both MAC and
DAC tables, its security context is only determined by the MAC policy. Also, the resource
not within either table is considered to be public and can be accessed by any app. Again,
this new function is made available to both Java and native code. The same mechanism
was also implemented within the kernel, through wrapping the compliance check function
avc has perm. The AVC and the policy engine are largely intact here, as our system was
carefully designed to make sure that the DAC rules are in the same format as their MAC
counterparts and therefore can be directly processed by SEAndroid.
To be able to enforce these policies SEACAT needs to interject the security hooks in
the appropriate functions of the framework or the kernel. This instrumentation allows the
system to perform policy compliance checks before a requesting app accesses the information
we want to safeguard. Since the external channels we are considering consist of Bluetooth,
NFC, Internet, SMS and Audio, SEACAT has to introduce the hooks at the appropriate
place for each channel such as to minimize both the risk that an adversary can bypass the
protection from a lower level in the software stack and its implementation complexity.
Figure 7.4: SEACAT Policy Compliance Check
To fully control the Bluetooth channel, all its functions need to be instrumented. A promi-
nent example here is Bluetooth Socket.connect within the Bluetooth service, which needs
to be invoked for establishing a connection with an external device. SEACAT requires a
security hook at the beginning of the function to mediate when it can be properly executed.
A problem is how to get the process ID (PID) of the caller process for retrieving its security
context through getPidContext. Certainly we cannot use the PID of the party that directly
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invokes the function, which is actually the Bluetooth service. For this we can turn to Binder,
which proxies the inter-process call (IPC) from the real caller app. Specifically, SEACAT’s
hook calls getCallingPid (provided by Binder) to find out the app’s PID and then its secu-
rity context, and passes the information to the Bluetooth stack. Inside the stack the actual
connection attempt is instrumented to use the app’s security context, the Bluetooth MAC
address to be connected and the “open” operation as inputs to query seacat check access.
What is returned by the function causes the connection attempt to either proceed or imme-
diately stop. The Bluetooth service is notified accordingly regarding the success or failure
of the connection attempt. In the same manner, we can instrument other functions in the
Bluetooth stack.
We also need to e↵ectively control access to the NFC channel. For the broadcomm chip
on Google Nexus 4 devices, the NFC stack has been implemented on the framework/library
layer through libnfc-nci. Thus, all SEACAT security hooks are placed on this layer, within
major NFC functions readNdef,
writeNdef and connect, for mediating a caller process’s operations on an NFC device with
a particular serial number (which is treated as the device’s identifier). A tricky part is that
when a new NFC device is found to be in proximity, NFC runs a dispatcher to identify which
apps have registered for that device through Intent-filters. The dispatcher will deliver an
Intent exposing the content of the device to such an app. In cases where multiple apps
request access to that NFC device, an “Activity Chooser” box will be presented to the user
so she can choose which activity should be launched. Unequivocally, this operation will
cause information leaks if the target app is malicious and therefore needs to be controlled.
SEACAT’s implementation instruments the dispatcher to execute the MAC and DAC policy
compliance check against all such registered apps with regards to a specific device serial
number. For those that fail the check, the dispatcher simply ignores them and therefore the
Intent with the NFC device’s contents will never reach them.
The Internet channel di↵ers from both Bluetooth and NFC. Internet has been controlled
inside the kernel, with security hooks placed within the functions for di↵erent socket op-
erations. As discussed before, SEAndroid has already hooked those functions for enforcing
mandatory policies on IP addresses, port numbers and others. In our research, we ex-
tended those existing hooks to add enforcement mechanisms for DAC policies. Specifically,
we changed selinux inet sys rcv skb and selinux sock rcv skb compat to enable those
wrapper functions to search the DAC mapping table within the kernel for the security con-
texts of IP-port pairs specified by the user and use such information to call avc has perm.
Note that this enforcement happens to the objects (IP and port numbers) that have already
passed the MAC compliance check: that is, those IP and port numbers are considered to be
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public by the administrator, while the user can still add her additional constraints on which
party should be allowed to access them.
The SMS channel turns out to be more intricate. Whenever the Telephony service on
the phone receives a text message from the radio layer, InboundSmsHandler put it in an
Intent, and then calls SMSDispatcher to broadcasts it to all the apps that register with the
event (SMS RECEIVED ACTION or SMS DELIVER ACTION). Also the InboundSmsHandler stores
the message to the content provider of SMS. Such a message is limited to the text content
with up to 160 characters. To overcome this constraint, the message delivered today mainly
goes through Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), which supports larger message length
and non-text content such as pictures. What really happens when sending such a message
(which can include multimedia content) is that a simple text message is first constructed and
transmitted through SMS to the MMS on the phone, which provides a URI for downloading
the actual message. Then, MMS broadcasts the message through the Intent to recipients
and also saves the message locally through its content provider.
To mediate this complicated channel, we instrumented both SMS and MMS to track the
entire work flow and enforce MAC and DAC policies right before a message being handed over
to apps (Figure 7.5 in Appendix). Specifically, we hooked the function processMessagePart
within SMSDispatcher to get the ID of the message sender (i.e., the originating address)
through SmsMessageBase.getOriginatingAddress(). This sender ID serves as an input
for searching the mapping tables. The security context identified this way is then attached
to the Intent delivered to MMS as an extra attribute SEC CON. On the MMS front, a se-
curity hook inspects the attribute and further propagates the security context to another
attribute within a new Intent used to transmit the real message once it is downloaded. We
also modified the function deliverToRegisteredReceiverLocked within BroadcastQueue
to obtain the security context of each app recipient involved in the broadcast and runs
seacat check access to check whether the app should be allowed to get the message be-
fore adding the message to its process message queue.
Besides getting SMS message from Intent receiver for SMS RECEIVED ACTION or SMS DELIVER
ACTION9, an app can also directly read from the SMS or MMS content provider given
the SMS READ permission. To mediate such accesses, we further instrumented the content
provider of SMSProvider and MMSProvider to perform the policy compliance check when-
ever an app attempts to read from its database: based on the app’s security context and
each message’s address, our hooks sanitize the cursor returned to the app, removing the
message it is not allowed to read.



















Figure 7.5: SEACAT ’s enforcement on SMS: SEACAT labels each sms message intent and
checks if an app can access the message before delivering the intent to the app. Also
SEACAT filters the sms content provider query results according to the security context of
the app
Like SMS, the Audio channel is also mediated on the framework layer. Whenever a
device is connected to the Audio jack, WiredAccessory Manager detects the device and
calls setDeviceStateLocked. Within the function, we placed a hook that identifies the
type of the device (input/output
/mixed) and checks the presence of a policy that controls the access to such a device. If so, it
directly calls the SEACAT function SensChannel.assignType to assign the object type in
the policy to the Audio channel (which prevents the channel from being used by unauthorized
third-party apps) when an authorized app is running in the foreground. Otherwise, it pops
up a “dialogue box” to let the user decide whether the device is the object within the policy
and therefore needs to be protected. In either case, as soon as the device is unplugged from
the Audio jack, the hook immediately removes from the DAC mapping table the entry for
the Audio channel, thereby releasing it to other third-party apps.
Policy enforcement happens within the functions for collecting data from the Audio chan-
nel. Particularly, SEACAT has a hook inside the start Recordingmethod of android.media
.AudioRecord. Once the method is invoked, it looks for the security contexts for the calling
process (through getContext) and the Audio channel (using getResourceSecContext) to
check polices and determine whether the call can go through.
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7.4 MITIGATION EVALUATION
As with any security system design we need to evaluate its e↵ectiveness and e ciency.
The e↵ectiveness of SEACAT was evaluated against all existing threats to Android shared
communication channels and the performance overhead it introduces was recorded. The
evaluation was performed on a pair of Nexus 4 phones with Android 4.4 (android-4.4 r12),
kernel KRT16S, with the 3.4 kernel (androidmsmmako3.4kitkatmr0): one installed with an
unmodified OS to serve as a baseline, and the other with the SEACAT-enhanced kernel.
Following I report the evaluation findings. Video demos for this study can be found on-
line [190].
Firstly we want to make sure that SEACAT actually solves the problem and can success-
fully safeguard all known external resources. Table 7.8 presents 5 known threats to external
resources used in our research, which include collection of data from iThermometer through
Bluetooth misbonding (see Section 7.2.1), unauthorized use of an ADB proxy based screen-
shot service through local socket connections [189], as well as attacks on SMS (stealing text
messages from Chase and Facebook), Audio (gathering activity data from the UP wrist-
band) and NFC (reading sensitive information from NFC tags) 7.2.4. In our study, we ran
those attacks on the unprotected Nexus 4, which turned out to be all successful: the mali-
cious app acquired sensitive information from the external resources through the channels
(Bluetooth, SMS, Internet, Audio and NFC), exactly as reported in prior research [189] and
Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.4.
Table 7.8: Threats to Android external resources
No KNOWN THREATS
1 Bluetooth misbonding attack
2 unauthorized adb-based screenshots
3 unauthorized read of an SMS message
4 unauthorized access to audio device
5 unauthorized read of an NFC device’s contents
All such attacks, however, stopped working on the SEACAT-enhanced Nexus 4. Specifi-
cally, after assigning a type to the MAC address of the iThermometer device through SEA-
CAT’s policy management service, only the o cial app of iThermometer, which was assigned
to an authorized domain, was able to get data from the device [190]. The malicious app run-
ning in the untrusted app domain could no longer obtain body temperature readings from
the thermometer. For SMS, once we labeled the Sender IDs of Chase and Facebook with a
type that can only be accessed by the apps within the system domain, the third-party app
could not find out when messages from those services came, nor was it able to read them
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from the SMS content provider content://sms. On the other hand, the user could still
see the messages from com.android.sms [190]. Similarly, the screenshot attack reported in
prior research [189] was completely thwarted when the local IP address and port number
was labeled. Also the security type given to the serial number of an NFC tag successfully
prevented the malicious app from reading its content. In the presence of both authorized
and unauthorized apps, the protected Nexus directly ran the authorized app, without even
asking the user to make a choice, as the unprotected one did. For Audio, after the user
identified the presence of the Jawbone wristband or the o cial app of the device was trig-
gered, the channel could not be accessed by the malicious app. It was released only after
the wristband was unplugged from the Audio jack.
The e↵ectiveness of our protection was evaluated under both MAC and DAC policies for
all those attack cases, except the one on the Audio channel, which we only implemented the
DAC protection (Section 7.3.3). Also, I tried to assign a resource specified by a MAC policy
to a DAC type using our policy manager and found that the attempt could not go through.
Even after I manually injected such a policy into SEACAT’s DAC database and mapping
table (which cannot happen in practice without compromising the policy manager), all the
security hooks ignored the conflicting policy and protected the resources in accordance with
the MAC rules.
After making sure SEACAT is e↵fective, we must study its overhead to determine whether
it can be practically deployed. To evaluate the performance impact of SEACAT, I measured
the execution time for the operations that involve our instrumentations, and compared it
with the delay observed from the baseline (i.e., the unprotected Nexus 4). Table 7.9 shows
examples of the operations used in this research. In the experiments, I conducted 10 trials
for each operation to compute its average duration.








7 Audio device connection
8 AudioRecord.startRecording
Specifically, I recorded the installation time for a new app, which involves assignment of
domains. The time interval measured in our experiment is that between the moment the
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PackageManager identifies the user’s “install” click and when the BackupManagerService
gets the Intent for the completion of installing an app with 3.06 MB. For Bluetooth, both the
pairing and connection operations were timed. Among them, the pairing operation recorded
starts from the moment it was triggered manually and ends when the OnBondStateChanged
callback was invoked by the OS. For connection, I just looked at the execution time of
BluetoothSocket.connect. Regarding SMS, we can measure the time from when a SMS
message is received (processMessagePart) to when the message is delivered to all the inter-
ested receivers and the process of querying the SMS content provider. The Internet-related
overhead was simply found out from the network connection time.
The amount of time it takes to dispatch an NFC message is related to the status of the tar-
get app: when it was in the foreground, we measured the interval between dispatchTag and
the completion of the NfcRootActivity; otherwise, our timer was stopped when setForeground
Dispatch was called. For the Audio channel, we can record the time for the call AudioRecord.
startRecording to go through.
The results of this evaluation are presented in Table 7.10. As we can see from the table,
the delays introduced by SEACAT are mostly negligible. Specifically, the overhead in the
installation process caused by assigning domains to an app was found to be as low as 49.52
ms. Policy enforcement within di↵erent security hooks (with policy checks) happened almost
instantly, with a delay sometimes even indistinguishable from the baseline. In particular,
in the case of NFC, even when the unauthorized app with the NFC permission was running
in the foreground, our implementation almost instantly found out its security context and
denied its access request. The only operation that brings in a relatively high overhead is
labeling an external device. It involves assigning a type to the resource, saving the label
to user seres contexts, updating the DAC mapping table accordingly and even changing
the DAC policy base to enable authorized apps’ access to the resource when necessary. On
average, those operations took 189.44 ms. Note that this is just a one-time cost, as long as
the user does not change the type given to a resource. An exception is Audio, whose type is
assigned whenever the dongle under protection is attached to the Audio jack. Note that the
user only experiences this sub-second delay once per use of the accessory, which we believe
is completely tolerable.
All the results presented here do not include the delay caused by human interventions:
for example, the time the user takes to determine the domain of an app and the type of a
resource. Such a delay depends on human reaction and therefore is hard to measure. Also
they only bring in a one-time cost, as subjects and objects only need to be labeled once.
Actually, for NFC, our implementation could even remove the need for human intervention
during policy enforcement: in the presence of two apps with the NFC permissions, the user
143
Table 7.10: Detailed Performance Measurements in milliseconds (ms)
AOSP (A) SEACAT (S) A-S
Operation mean stdev Operation mean stdev overhead
(ms)
install app 1415.6 40.61 install app (label) 1465.2 76.07 49.52
Bluetooth pairing 1136.5 351.65 Bluetooth pairing (la-
bel)
1434.4 237.60 279.9
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could be asked to choose one of them to handle an NFC event whenever it happens, while
under SEACAT, this interaction is avoided if one of the apps is within the domain authorized
to access the related NFC device and the other is not.
7.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter I presented my study on Android’s shared communication channels with
external resources. This is inceasingly important in the context of IoT where smartphones
connect to smart devices in proximity using Bluetooth and NFS among other protocols.
My analysis revealed that Android’s shared communication channels are coarsely protected,
allowing malicious third-party apps to compromise the confidentiality fo the data transmitted
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Figure 7.6: Hybrid MAC and DAC for enterprise admins and users to dictate access to
personal IoT devices.
advantage of the SELinux infrastructure incorporated to AOSP since version 4.3, to protect
all known channels of communication with external Android resources at the operating
system level. Figure 7.6 visualizes this addition to the smartphone ecosystem.
So far we analyzed adversaries exploiting shared intra-process privileges, shared filesysem
resources, shared system resources and application components, and shared communication
channels with external resources. In response I introduced e↵ective and e cient designs
of strategies for detecting and preventing these problems. However, sometimes external
resources can be hidden behind a mediating point such a router. This is increasingly realistic
with the Internet of Things and the advent of smart-home technologies. Such smart-devices
are increasingly controlled through smartphones and thus shared between smartphone apps.
In the next Chapter I will describe my security analysis on such shared IoT devices.
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CHAPTER 8: SHARING DEVICES IN IoT ENVIRONMENTS
In this Chapter I will describe my analysis on the security of smartphone communications
with shared IoT devices. I will focus on the security of WiFi smart-home IoT devices against
malicious applications running on authorized smarpthones within a home area network. In
particular I will show that WiFi smart-home devices tend to rely on WiFi authentication
for protection which leaves them vulnerable to attacks from compromised local systems.
To prevent such attacks I will illustrate how we can design a practical, fine-grained access
control mechanism within a home area network router endpoint which depends neither on
IoT device manufacturers nor smartphone vendors [15].
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has brought in a new wave of
technological advances in home automation. According to Gartner [193], 6.4 billion IoT
devices will be online in 2016, among which a significant portion are smart-home systems like
smart thermostats [48, 49], fitness trackers, refrigerators, etc., and the number is expected
to go above 20 billion by 2020. Examples of such devices include: the Belkin NetCam [50], a
camera for streaming surveillance video to a mobile phone; the iBaby monitor [51], a device
for remote babysitting; the Family Hub refrigerator [52], which enables online checking of the
fridge’s contents. Increasingly, these devices are designed to communicate not only with their
servers in the cloud but also with other IoT devices and the user’s phone over the Home Area
Network (HAN), which is typically built around a Wi-Fi router. For example, Nest Protect
Fire sensors [194] are capable of propagating an alarm across multiple sensors installed
in di↵erent rooms of a house. For the convenience of management, such interconnected
IoT equipment often relies on the secure connections of HAN (Wi-Fi authentication) for
protection and trusts all the computing systems on the same network. This treatment,
however, completely exposes the device to the attacks from compromised local systems, a
threat becoming increasingly realistic.
Menace of local threats. Indeed, it has been reported that high-profile WiFi-enabled
smart home devices, including the WeMo Switch and motion sensor [195, 196, 197, 198, 199],
Belkin NetCam [200], baby monitoring devices [201, 202, 98] and smart light bulbs [203], are
all vulnerable to a local attack: an adversary within the same HAN is shown to be able to
control those devices or steal sensitive user information, e.g., live video streams [200], from
them. Several other studies further reveal that this is possible since such devices have poor—
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or no–authentication mechanisms [99, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211] and therefore
easily fall prey to a local attacker. This is also validated from the analysis on Chapter 7
where I show that most Bluetooth devices perform no authentication.
Defending against such attacks becomes particularly challenging when the IoT devices are
controlled by smartphones: once the same phone also carries malware (even when the app
has nothing but the network privilege), protecting the device it controls becomes impossible
at the network level, as the phone is completely legitimate to access the device though the
malicious app running on it is not. Given the high smartphone penetration rates [212], the
millions of available mobile applications on both o cial and third-party markets [213], and
the ease of distribution of such applications 1, devices that can be reached through mobile
apps can also become an easy target to adversaries. Unfortunately, such adversaries are
not only realistic; they are on the rise [214, 215, 216]. Because of that they become the
main subject of study of many other academic works [217, 7, 218, 219] while concerns are
also raised on public communication channels [220, 221, 222]. In this study I verify that
IoT vendors tend to trust the local network (Section 7.2). This makes them vulnerable to a
mobile adversary as we illustrate with attacks on real-world IoT devices, including theWeMo
Switch, WeMo Motion, WeMo in.sight.AC1 and My N3rd. The demos of these attacks can
be found on this study’s website [223].
Addressing the issue here cannot solely rely on device manufacturers: business factors such
as time to market and keeping the cost of the device low but also operational factors such as
low power consumption, lead to the production of devices without encryption capabilities [5].
In such cases, response to threats can only be reactive and it would entail manufacturing a
new version of the device which would still leave users with the old version susceptible to
attacks. To make things worse, device manufacturers can be slow in responding [224, 225] to
security and privacy threats. Router vendors have already identified this threat. New hubs
and routers pushed onto the market are increasingly armed with various IoT protections
(e.g. Microsoft Azure IoT hub [226], Google’s OnHub router [227]. Integrating protection
and management capabilities in the router has significant benefits as the infrastructure is
already in place in most households and it enables unified policy management. However,
as mentioned above, security control at the router level cannot succeed without knowledge
of the OS-level situation within an authorized mobile phone, particularly whether a request
to a target device comes from its o cial app or an unauthorized party. Fundamentally, a
practical solution to the problem needs to bridge the gap between the OS-level observation
(apps making network connections on a phone) and the network-layer view (requests from the
1Android applications can be self-signed.
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phone for accessing an IoT device), with minimum modifications on the HAN infrastructure
and all the systems involved.
Situation-aware device access protection. A simple solution to the problem is just
inferring the identity of the app communicating with an IoT device according to its tra c
fingerprint. This approach, however, is unreliable and can be easily defeated by, for exam-
ple, a repackaged app that closely mimics the authorized program’s communication patterns.
Also, individual apps’ fingerprints need to be reliably generated, deployed and continuously
updated, and further to be checked on the router against each communication flow it ob-
serves, which adds cost to both the router developer and the user. In this chapter, I present a
di↵erent approach, a new technique that achieves fine-grained, situation-aware access control
of IoT devices over a home area network. The proposed system, called Hanguard, distributes
its protection logic across smartphones and the Wi-Fi router for jointly constructing the full
picture of an IoT access attempt during runtime, which is then utilized to control the access
on the network layer. More specifically, on the phone side, the information about the app
making network connections is collected and passed to the router; on the router side, security
policies are enforced to ensure that only an authorized app can touch a set of functionalities
the device provides. In this way, malware on network-authenticated phones can no longer
endanger the operations of the IoT devices, even when the IoT devices are not equipped
with proper authentication and encryption protection.
Hanguard is designed to directly work on the existing HAN infrastructure, without mod-
ifying mobile operating systems or IoT devices. To deploy the system, one only needs to
install a Monitor app with non-system privileges on mobile phones and update the firmware
of the Wi-Fi router with a security patch. A key technical challenge here is how to gather sit-
uation information (processes making network connections) on mobile phones, which is not
given to a third-party userspace app on both Android and iOS. Although all these systems
provide VPN support, the app using the service still cannot observe the process generating
tra c and will significantly slow down the network communication of the whole system (Sec-
tion 8.3.2). To address the issue, Hanguard leverages side channel information for lightweight
discovery of runtime situation on Android smartphones and utilizes the VPN to only mark
out authorized apps’ tra c on iOS smartphones (Section 8.3.2). Such information is then
delivered to the router through a separate control channel, which is synchronized with the
tra c generated by the app (over a data channel) and used by the router to determine
whether the communication should be allowed to proceed.
I implemented this design over both Android and iOS which cover more than 95% of
the mobile OS marketshare [228], and a TP-Link WDR4300v1 Wi-Fi router. The system
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evaluation shows that Hanguard identifies and blocks all unauthorized attempts to access
shared IoT devices with negligible overhead in the common case (see Section 6.4).
8.2 ANALYSIS
I performed an analysis on shared WiFi IoT devices and demonstrate the security im-
plications stemming from a mobile adversary. These findings informed Hanguard’s design
decisions.
Methodology. One approach for the analysis in thic case would be to investigate the IoT
devices’ firmware. That would entail—after identifying such devices–finding images of their
firmware or, for each device, buying the device and extracting its firmware. Subsequently,
each firmware needs to be analyzed, which is a non trivial task [229]. However, most of these
devices are now controlled by mobile apps. Thus their control mechanisms can be examined
by analyzing the apps instead of the firmware. Note that, the latter approach has multiple
benefits over analyzing firmware: (1) we can easily acquire Android apps, (2) there is no
monetary cost, (3) it is generally easier and faster to analyze mobile apps than an embedded
device’s firmware.
To discover Android apps for IoT devices, I searched for them at Google Play using
keywords such as “home automation” and “internet of things”. This, turned out to be not
very e↵ective: through manual inspections of search outcomes, we found that many apps
identified this way were not related to any IoT systems and in the meantime, popular IoT
apps fell through cracks. The solution is to crawl iotlist.co, a popular site for discovering
IoT products. From the list, the crawler collected the meta-data of 353 products (all listed
products at the time of the study). The meta-data include “Title”, “Description”, “Product
Url”, “Purchase Url” and others. Such data was further manually checked to identify a
list of package names for the o cial apps of these devices. The crawler then used this list
to download the apps and their meta-data from the Play store. Out of the 353 products,
I found that 63% (223) of them have apps on Google Play, 2% (7) are iOS only and the
rest are mostly unfinished products (listed on kickstarter.com and indiegogo.com) or are
no longer available. This indicates that indeed most IoT devices today are controlled by
smartphones. In this study I have also further used popular reverse engineering tools (e.g.
apktool [164], dex2jar [166]) to facilitate manual inspection of their source code.
Focus on home automation IoT. To better understand the operations of smart home
devices, I manually went through (1) the meta-data of the collected products, (2) their on-
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Figure 8.1: IoT product functionality categorization.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the manual categorization of the IoT products based on their func-
tionality. Note that the Wearables category (31%) embodies mostly fitness and location
trackers, smartwatches and personal medical devices. We call such devices personal devices;
these commonly use Bluetooth to connect to a smartphone app. In the previous chapter
7 I have already presented my studies on the security of such personal devices, where I
revealed problems with encryption and authentication and proposed a systematic solution.
From the figure, we can also see that most of the listed IoT devices (55%) are smart home
automation/entertainment/security/hub systems, which are the focus of this study. I call
these shared devices. Such devices could directly benefit from an access control scheme built
within the HAN. Previous work on shared devices, was focused on a single IoT integration
platform (hub) [101, 111].
Focus on local connections. Prior research already demonstrated that the interaction
between smartphone apps and the cloud is alarmingly unguarded [230, 231]. On the other
hand, the local communication between the apps and the devices is not as well understood.
In fact it is unclear whether app developers and IoT device manufacturers treat the local
network and everybody connected to it as trusted entities and whether such treatments leave
the devices susceptible to attacks from both local adversaries and remote adversaries that
gain access to the HAN. Moreover, even though it has been reported that IoT devices come
with serious problems [204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211], little has been done to
understand the security risks stemming from malicious mobile apps. This is particularly
important since, IoT devices are controlled by apps which send commands either through
the cloud or the local network. Here, we aim to bridge these gaps in knowledge. Our findings
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Table 8.1: Contingency table of HAN IoT apps.
w/ authentication w/o authentication
w/ local WiFi connections 13 9
w/o local WiFi connections 25 0
build on to the existing evidence which collectively support the need for a unified security
and management system built within the HAN to safeguard today’s smart-home devices.
In particular, our IoT application study aims to achieve the following goals: (a) Find
out whether vendors and developers of WiFi smart home devices/apps erroneously treat the
home area network as a trusted environment; (b) Find out whether a mobile adversary can
take advantage of such a problematic trust model to attack local smart home devices in
practice.
(a) HAN Trust Model. I performed a statistical significance test focused on the following
null hypothesis (N0): HAN apps with only remote connections are equally likely to perform
authentication compared to HAN apps with only local connections. To answer this question
I separated our collected IoT apps into two groups. Apps with only remote connections
and apps with only local WiFi connections. I used 55 unique Android applications with
WiFi/Internet only connections to HAN IoT devices.
To separate the apps into the two groups, I manually went through (1) their online doc-
umentations and websites, (2) public forums, and (3) their Java Android code. I found
that 22 (40%) do perform some internet socket connection with local discovered devices or
fixed local IPs. 25 (45%) were found without local WiFi connections, 5 (9%) could not be
determined, for 2(4%) decompilation failed, and 1 (2%) was by that time removed from
Google Play. For each of the 2 sets (local; no local) I analyzed them further for any au-
thentication practices. For the ones that perform only remote connections, I used a parsing
tool that searches for password requests in the layout files of the apps. I then manually
verified the existence/absence of a password request. I found that all these apps do perform
authentication.
For the 22 apps with local WiFi connections I could not simply use the above tool since
it would reveal little to no information on whether a password is used for a connection with
the IoT device or the cloud. Thus I manually went through their code looking for network
API calls responsible for local connections (e.g. creation of sockets connecting to local IPs,
or UPnP discovery). I examined the calls to such APIs and found that 9 of the apps do not
authenticate to the IoT device. The results are summarized in Table 8.1.
To determine whether apps with local connections are less likely to perform authentication
one could perform a  2-test of independence. In our case this is not suitable due to the
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small absolute number of relevant available apps derived from iotlist.co. Instead I used
the Fisher’s exact test [232]—a common approach to derive statistically significant results
when the sample size is small. I performed the test [233] on our null hypothesis (N0). A
2-sided P value less than 0.05 was considered significant. The test yielded a 2-sided P-value
of 0.00036 < 0.05 and thus we can reject N0. Therefore, we can confidently say that HAN
apps with local connections are less likely to get authenticated by IoT devices. This validates
an important intuition that IoT vendors consider the HAN to be a trusted environment.
However, given the fact that smartphones are an integral part of such a network and that
smartphones can carry self-signed apps from third-party markets, this treatment becomes
detrimental to the security of shared HAN IoT devices.
(b) The mobile adversary threat. The previous finding is particularly alarming. Next
I validated that a weak mobile adversary can take advantage of this problematic trust model
and trivially compromise smart home devices. Towards this end, I cherry-picked four devices
with local connections and authentication issues and performed real-world, practical attacks.
The selected devices are listed on Table 8.2. The targets include the WeMo Switch and
WeMo Motion [195], the WeMo in.sight.AC1 [234], and My N3rd [235]. The WeMo devices
are examples of popular plug-and-play devices. Just on Android, the o cial app of the
WeMo devices was downloaded 100,000–500,000 times 2. Note that all the WeMo devices
are manufactured by a single vendor. By focusing on three WeMo devices I want to showcase
how an erroneous trust model by a vendor can spread across various of its devices. This
suggests that trusting the local network was a design decision and not an implementation
issue manifesting in an isolated device. My N3rd, while not yet popular, it is chosen to
showcase a new category of do-it-yourself (DIY) devices. It allows one to connect it to any
other device enabling turning on/o↵ that device from the My N3rd mobile app. Increasingly
more such projects appear on the market with Arduino-based projects taking the lead.
While exciting for users, such devices tend to inherit the problematic trust model and allow
an adversary to take full control of ones devices. In our experiments we consider a mobile
adversary that tries to get unauthorized access to the IoT devices. The mobile adversary
can perform an attack from an unauthorized phone, or from an unauthorized app on an
authorized phone 3. To test the above cases, I used 2 Nexus phones. The first one is
assumed to be untrusted and the second one is assumed to belong to one of the HAN users.
I then tried to access the target IoT devices using both phones. Unfortunately I found that
2This is a conservative number as people can download the app from alternative Android app markets
or from iTunes for iOS devices.
3Note that the case of an unauthorized app on an unauthorized phone trivially reduces to the first case
we consider.
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Table 8.2: Devices used in real-world attack demonstrations.
Target Device Description # App Installations
WeMo Switch Actuator 100K - 500K
WeMo Motion Sensor 100K - 500K
WeMo Insight Switch Actuator 100K - 500K
My N3rd Actuator 100 - 500
the adversary can trivially connect and control all WiFi shared devices. The video demos of
the attacks can be found online [223].
8.3 MITIGATION DESIGN
My previous findings (Section 7.2) highlight the need for an access control system that can
be integrated in home area networks with minimal changes to the existing infrastructure,
that is backward compatible, independent of vendor and developer practices and which
allows the users the flexibility to manage and control who should communicate to which
device. In this section, I elaborate on the design of such a system called Hanguard and its
implementation over the HAN and mobile platforms.
8.3.1 Design Overview
Adversary model. As shown in Section 7.2, IoT devices are controlled through smart-
phone apps. These devices are designed to act blindly on the commands from authorized
phones (based upon their authentication with the HAN router). This treatment becomes
increasingly problematic: while the smartphone may indeed belong to a rightful user, the ap-
plications that it runs can come from less known places (e.g., third-party app stores) and less
trustworthy developers (e.g., malware authors). Given smartphone penetration [212], preva-
lence and ease of distribution of mobile applications [213], adversaries can now find their way
to the HAN through a legitimate phone with minimal e↵ort. Moreover—as demonstrated in
Section 8.2—given the erroneous threat model of today’s IoT devices, which trusts all the
requests issued from a trusted source (a router or phone), such malicious applications can
easily gain unauthorized control of IoT devices (e.g. turning on/o↵ an actuator, or reading
the collected data of a sensor).
Thwarting such attacks is inherently hard. For example, we could employ the solution
(SEACAT) presented in Chapter 7. Smartphones with SEACAT will indeed protect attacks
from malicious applications running on them. Nonetheless, WiFi smart-home devices are
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not only shared between apps on trusted users smartphones but also with any device on
the network. Thus, a more robust solution for smart-home environments, is to implement a
unified security logic in the router, since tra c from applications to IoT devices goes through
it. However, the router alone does not have enough information to make any application
level access control decision. One could resort to tra c fingerprinting techniques to infer
the application generating the tra c. The approach can (1) be easily evaded by a malware
repackaged from an authorized app, (2) bring in false alarms and (3) impacts the performance
of the router.
Hanguard is designed to address this issue through bridging network and application level
semantics, associating an app’s identity to its tra c to enable a fine-grained access control
on IoT devices. In the meantime, it does not modify both software and hardware of these
devices, the operating systems of smartphones, and does not make assumptions about the
router hardware. For this purpose, our adversary model is focused on the situation where a
malicious app is installed on a smartphone device authenticated to the HAN. The adversary
is considered to already know the communication protocol used by the victim IoT device.
We further assume that the smartphone hosting the app has not been compromised at the
OS or hardware level, which limits the adversary to the user land, at the app level. Note that
though outside our adversary model, Hanguard can also provide coarser-grained protection
against guest phones and compromised phones, remote adversaries and more traditional
WiFi attacks. To avoid confusion, I refer an interested reader to our paper [15].
Idea and architecture. Figure 8.2 illustrates the architecture of Hanguard. Hanguard’s
design is partially inspired by software defined networking (SDN) (see [30] for a survey),
which separates the network tra c (data) from its management (control). In the mean-
time, Hanguard is meant to be easily deployed to today’s HAN. Serving this purpose is a
distributed security control architecture that includes a Controller on a HAN router for pol-
icy enforcement and a Monitor on the user’s phone for collecting its runtime situation and
making access decisions (which are enforced by the router). To avoid changing the mobile
OS, the Monitor is in the form of a user-space app. It detects the app making network com-
munication and its compliance with security policies, and then pushes the access permit to
the router’s Controller through a secure control channel (Section 8.3.2). The router utilizes
that information to enforce the policy (Section 8.3.3): only the tra c with a permit from
the Monitor is allowed to reach IoT devices.
In essence, this design preserves the data channel within which unmodified information
from smartphone apps is propagated to the router, and creates an independent control chan-
























Figure 8.2: Hanguard high level architecture.
extra headers to be processed by the router on a per packet basis in the data channel. It can
also guarantee that control information is always transmitted through a secure channel, and
allows the router to further enforce policies and ensure, even in periods of heavy congestion,
that security decisions are delivered in a reliable manner. In addition, our design allows for
a clear separation of tasks: the security policies can be easily managed by the user through
a mobile app interface; the router reduces to simply enforcing the flow decisions. This keeps
the router as simple as possible and allows for readily updating the security logic with a
mere application upgrade.
Policy Model. Hanguard implements an RBAC (role-based access control) policy model
which leverages type-enforcement and multi-category security primitives. It uses them in a
unique way to create SELinux-like policy rules, to protect smart-home devices. However,
Hanguard does not need security experts to create the policies; policies are generated at
runtime and transparently to the user. In particular, the user is only expected to perform
simple mappings between a finite set of IoT apps, IoT devices and HAN users. Default
policies are automatically created during setup to further reduce users’ burden. Hanguard’s
access control model parses such mappings and assigns a category tag to each app and its
respective IoT device. Further, each IoT device is labeled with a type. Types can be organized
in overlapping groups called domains. Each mobile phone is assigned a role and each role
can be configured to access a number of domains. For example, the iBaby camera can be
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labeled with the type “babyMonitor t”. A domain “cameras d” can be created to encompass
the “babyMonitor t” type device among others. Lastly, the role of a HAN user’s phone (e.g.
“Adult”) that is supposed to be able to access the cameras, can be configured as eligible to
access the “camera d” domain and in extend the “babyMonitor t” type device. The relation
between the role and the domain ensures that an untrusted phone (e.g., a visitor’s phone)
cannot touch protected devices and even an authorized phone, once compromised, cannot
communicate with the IoT devices it is not supposed to talk to. At the same time, and
orthogonally to the type-enforcement scheme, the iBaby camera and its o cial app, can be
assigned the category “iBaby”. The category here binds a specific app on a phone to the
device the phone is authorized to access. For example, the role “Adult” can be configured
to access the domain “cameras d”; while that stipulates that the adult’s phone can control
the baby cameras, access is not granted unless the app on her phone and the actual baby
camera that it tries to reach are tagged with the same category. Note that more than one
category tags can be associated with a domain. This enables the generation of a policy rule
which allows an app to access multiple devices of the same type.
By default, a phone registered with the HAN is assigned the role “HAN user”, which is
allowed to access the “Home” domain. The latter encompasses every newly installed IoT
device (which is assigned a unique type). However, the access can only succeed when the
app on the phone is given the same category tag as the device it attempts to reach. Such
an app-device binding is established when the app is used to configure the device, which
is established through a special device, a phone or a PC, that takes the role of an Admin.
This role can configure the router, register other user phones, access all domains and update
security policies. During a policy update, new domains, roles and access relations between
them can be generated. The policy model also handles unregistered phones (e.g., those
belonging to visitors), which connect to the Han as a “Guest”, a role not allowed to interact
with the devices in the “Home” domain. A security policy is shared by the phone side and
the router side. Although its enforcement happens on the router, its compliance check is
performed jointly by the router and the phone. The former ensures that only the authorized
phone, as indicated by its role, can access the domain involving the device. The latter runs
the Monitor to inspect the app and the target device’s category tags and asks the router to
let their communication flows go through only when the category tags are the same. Next,
I describe how individual components of the system work.
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Figure 8.3: Hanguard Control Message delivered over TLS.
8.3.2 Phone-side Situation Monitoring
In this distributed access-control system, the Monitors are deployed as user-space apps.
They are aiming at identifying the subject (app) trying to access an IoT device across the
HAN, and determine whether it is authorized. Such information is delivered through a
control message to the Controller module running on the router, informing it the context of
the access attempt (since the router cannot see the app initiating the communication), which
helps the router enforce appropriate security policies. Note that Hanguard is designed in a
way that the workload on the router is minimized, which is important in maintaining the
performance level needed for serving the whole local network. More specifically, the Monitor
launches at boot time to establish an ongoing secure connection with the Controller module
on the router. Through the channel, the situation on the phone is either pushed to, or pulled
by the router (Section 8.3.3), enabling it to perform a per-flow (instead of per-packet) access
control. Further, the security policies (Section 8.3.1) are broken into two parts: the Monitor
checks whether an app is authorized to access a device and asks the router to enforce its
decision, while the router implements a phone-level policy check as a second line of defense,
which protects the smart-home devices even when a phone is fully compromised.
The communication between the Monitor and the router goes through a TLS control
channel. The control message delivered through the channel is in the format illustrated in
Figure 8.3. For example, it includes a hash of the user credentials (username, password),
the sender phone’s MAC address, an identifier for the detected flow (IP/port), an identifier
for the app making the request, the policy’s version number and a flag indicating whether
this flow should be allowed or not. The negative flag is used to mark suspicious behavior
(detection). Flow termination is handled by the router (Section 8.3.3).
Every registered phone on the HAN, can be assigned roles instantiating an RBAC (Role-
Based Access Control) scheme. Furthermore, the phone used to configure the router is by
default designated as theMaster Controller Node (MCN) and every other phone is designated
as the Slave Controller Node (SCN). A HAN user can update the policy through the Policy
Update Manager running in her phone’s Monitor. A Monitor accepts policy updates only
when it is running on a master node and after verifying its user’s credentials. A distributed
Policy Update Service intermediates policy synchronization and replication in the system.
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Every connected (reachable) node gets the latest policy replica as soon as it connects to the
network or when there is an update. Unregistered devices are automatically assigned the
“Guest” role as soon as they join the network. Each Monitor has a local in-memory replica
of the policy base, that allows it to make decisions for its own tra c e ciently, alleviating
the router from further processing. Having the policy also at the phone side is critical in
SDN-like systems since it allows for e cient decision making by the Monitors, reduces the
bandwidth on the control channel and keeps the routers simple and fast [30]. This way,
Monitors send only their per-flow decision to the router instead of continuously sending all
the mobile OS-situation measurements. In the last case, the number of control messages
in the HAN would exponentially increase while the router would need to process all the
measurements before making a decision, with severe performance degradation.
Situation awareness on iOS. As mentioned earlier, the Monitor is designed to find out
which app is talking to an IoT device under protection. Such information, however, is not
directly given to a non-system app on both iOS and Android. To tackle this Hanguard’s
iOS Monitor utilizes a new iOS capability that allows developers to proxy network tra c.
Once this functionality is enabled by an app and approved by the user, all network packets
from all apps will traverse the network stack and instead of being sent through the physical
interface to the remote destination, they end up in a virtual interface (tunnel). The tunnel
will redirect those packets to the proxy app running the VPN functionality.
iOS o↵ers developers the capability to proxy network tra c with the NEVPNManager APIs).
However, blindly tunneling apps’ tra c through the VPN is very expensive, often slowing
down the mobile system’s network performance by an order of magnitude. This workflow
is illustrated in Figure 8.4: when an app makes a network call this would entail, for every
packet, a userspace-kernel context switch, traversing the network stack, trapping the tra c
through the tunnel interface and context-switching to userspace again to deliver the network
packets to the proxying app. Then the proxying app needs to process the network headers
(essentially performing layer 3-4 translations) and then resending the packet.
The solution is to utilize the VPN in a unique way: instead of running the iOS Monitor to
proxy the tra c of all apps (through the NEVPNManager APIs), which is expensive, requires
a remote VPN server and gives little information about the identity of the app generating
tra c, our iOS Monitor uses the NEPacketTunnel Provider APIs with a per-app VPN
configuration, to tunnel the tra c only from authorized apps (the o cial apps of the IoT
devices), while leaving all other tra c outside the tunnel to avoid unnecessary delays. Fur-
thermore, over the tunnel, our iOS Monitor does not change the data: it merely acquires













Figure 8.4: Tra c monitoring by a Hanguard iOS Monitor.
ticating itself to the Controller module on the router through TLS and its credentials, the
Monitor informs the router that the flow in the tunnel is authorized. Other flows towards
the IoT devices from the phone are by default considered illegitimate and will all be dropped
at the router. In this way, we can strike a balance between the protection of legitimate IoT
management tra c and the performance impact of the security control.
Situation awareness on Android. A straightforward way to capture tra c from other
apps on Android is to follow a similar process with iOS and utilize the closely equivalent
VPNService [236] API, introduced in Android 4.0. However, the implementation of VPN
on Android is similar to the one in iOS and would entail similar overheads. To collect the
situation information in a more lightweight manner, Hanguard leverages side channels on
Android an approach which results in astounding performance benefits.
The Android Monitor continuously looks at the procfs file system (see Figure 8.5).
procfs is a virtual file system which exposes the current status of an Android phone’s kernel
internal data structures. Particularly the files proc/net/tcp, proc/net/tcp6, proc/net/udp
and proc/net/udp6 disclose the ongoing TCP and UDP connections between the phone and
a remote destination, including the source/destination IP addresses of the ongoing connec-
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tion and its port numbers, the status of the connection etc 4. The addresses here can be
either IPv4 and IPv6 (with the su x “6”). These connections are also associated with a spe-
cific UID that the Monitor can map to an installed app. To minimize operation overheads,
the Monitor does not open and parse a file for each access. Instead it just checks the file’s
metadata (i.e. the last modified time or mtime in UNIX terms) to determine whether the file
has been changed since the last visit. A complication here is that Android often fits an IPv4
address into the IPv6 format before reporting it to the user. Such an address is automatically
captured by the Monitor and converted back to the IPv4 form. As an example, consider
an app on a phone with an IPv4 address 192.168.1.189 that connects to an IoT device
with the address 192.168.1.32. During the app’s runtime, the connection may not show up
in proc/net/tcp but appears inside proc/net/tcp6 instead with 0000000000000000FFFF
0000BD01A8C0 for the source IP and 0000000000000000 FFFF0000200 1A8C0 for the desti-
nation. It is clear that the IPv4 address is enclosed in the 32 least significant bits 5 and the
96 remaining bits are fixed. The Monitor detects the address from its fixed part and converts
the rest to an IPv4 format before communicating the app’s identity to the router through
a control message. Note that Android su↵ers from the repackaged apps problem [219]. To
address this the Android Monitor uses a package’s signature to verify apps claiming the
identity of policy-controlled apps.
8.3.3 Router-side Policy Enforcement
The design of the controller module mainly focuses on synchronizing security policies across
all the systems within the HAN and enforcing these policies on the router, as illustrated in
Figure 8.6. More specifically, the module maintains a Master Policy Replica, and runs a
Policy Update Service responsible for updating the policies and distributing them across
registered Monitors. Further, the Controller module introduces a Per-Flow Decision Cache
(PFDC) for keeping the access decisions (on the app level) pushed by (or pulled from) the
Monitors, and a Garbage Collection Service (GCS) for maintaining the cache. It also hooks
on the router’s packet flow for the policy enforcement. Due to space limitations, I omit
discussion of the policy synchronization and focus on the policy enforcement.
Receiving decisions. By default the router blocks all flows to IoT devices. As mentioned
earlier, app-level access control on the router relies on decisions made by the Monitor and
4Note that iOS does not reveal to an app the information about other processes through its procfs file
system. Before iOS 9, one could use the system call sysctl to access such information. This channel has
been closed since then.














Figure 8.5: Tra c monitoring by a Hanguard Android Monitor.
delivered to the router through the control channel. To e↵ectively enforce such decisions on
a tra c flow, the Controller module is designed to e ciently authenticate and process the
control messages to avoid holding up the legitimate interactions with the target IoT device.
Specifically, the Controller module maintains TLS connections with the Monitors through
a userspace program. When a decision from a Monitor arrives, after the successful TLS
Monitor certificate validation, the router checks the policy version and the sender user’s
credentials, and once these are also validated, it passes the decision’s flow ID (source IP and
port, destination IP and port) to the kernel that updates the PFDC using the flow ID as
the key to record the validation/invalidation decision on the flow, which is then enforced by
the router. We highlight that data flows are first checked against a phone-level policy which
ensures that the flow comes from a valid HAN phone.
Supporting this decision-making process requires an e cient userspace to kernel commu-
nication mechanism (for the router). Although this can be achieved through system calls,
ioctl calls or procfs files, these approaches are either complicated to implement or un-
able to handle asynchronous interactions. Our solution employs the netlink socket IPC
mechanism for the user-kernel communication, which can be easily built (without changing
the kernel) and are asynchronous in nature: it queues incoming messages and notifies the
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Figure 8.6: Hanguard Router Controller Module
thread that processes the message and updates the PFDC, either by inserting a valid flow
or removing an invalid flow.
The PFDC is loaded at the router’s boot time from its persistent storage. It holds
the following information per-flow: the flow ID, the flow validation/invalidation flag, the
requesting app and the data last seen time. This cache is used for enforcing app-level policies
(whether a specific app is allowed to access a device), for the purpose of enhancing the
existing flow-control capability of the router, which cannot di↵erentiate two flows from the
same IP and port but produced by di↵erent apps. By searching the cache, the router can
apply the app-level access decision upon the whole flow, instead for every individual packet,
an advantage over deep packet inspection and tra c fingerprinting techniques. To limit the
amount of the resources the cache uses, a Garbage Collector Service (GCS) is run to remove
the obsolete records with the oldest data last seen time. To prevent DoS attacks where a
Monitor attempts to flood the cache, a per-phone limit is applied.
Enforcement. The router enforces phone-level and app-level policies. For the former,
it checks every packet to determine whether it originates from a phone which is allowed
to access a particular IoT device. Phones and IoT devices are identified based on their
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MAC addresses. MAC-IP associations are statically defined during a new device enrollment.
For app-level policies, the router checks the PFDC cache to determine whether the flow is
generated from a valid app. A technical challenge in implementing the protection is where
to place the security control within the existing router infrastructure. On a Linux-enabled
system used by the router, once a packet is received, it is put by the link layer into a backlog
queue from which the IP layer pulls packets for checksum checking and routing decisions.
If the packet is destined for the current machine, it is passed to the transport layer. If not
the packet is forwarded. Apparently, the security control should happen on the IP layer
(e.g. in the ip forward() function). However, a packet might follow a di↵erent path within
the kernel depending on whether the current system is configured to run as a bridge or a
router. For example, in a bridge mode, no layer 3 operation is involved and as a result
the aforementioned function will never operate on the packet. To overcome this, Hanguard
places the Controller hook in dev queue xmit(), a generic driver function, ensuring that no
packet bypasses the check.
To minimize the impact on flows unrelated to the smart-home devices, the Hanguard-
enhanced router quickly inspects each packet it receives to determine whether further at-
tention is needed. Specifically, a TCP flow is considered interesting if its destination MAC
address is associated with an enrolled IoT device. Packets not fitting this description are
forwarded without a delay, and others are first handled according to the phone-level policy
(whether the phone can access the IoT device) stored at the router, and then the app-level
policy (whether the app can do that) which is based upon the validation flag set by the Mon-
itor. For the packet allowed to go through, its flow’s last seen time is updated to the packet’s
arrival time. Hanguard helps its users detect and react to spurious access attempts with its
notification mechanism: Hanguard (1) keeps a log, and (2) sends out-of-band notifications
to the admin user when a violation or tampering of the policy is attempted.
Flow Termination. A determined adversary could attempt to exploit the fact that a flow
from a co-located app is allowed. For example, it could wait for the benign app to release its
port and attempt to send a packet before the Monitor informs the router to invalidate the
flow. For TCP flows, the router prevents such attacks: it proactively invalidates a validated
TCP flow, when it sees its corresponding TCP FIN packet and then handles the session
termination. For UDP, the situation is more complex. UDP is an unreliable protocol with
no clear indications of a session establishment/termination. Hanguard can be configured to
handle UDP flows in two ways: (a) in a STOP-AND-WAIT mode, for every packet, it pulls
a decision from its Monitor. If between the time the packet is received by the router and
the decision request is received by the Monitor, no other app on the same device attempted
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to send a UDP packet to the same target IoT device, then and only then the packet is
allowed. This is a security stringent policy that prevents the attack. However, it comes
with performance penalties since every packet is delayed approximately by one RTT. (b) In
the DETECTION mode, the Monitor pushes a flow invalidation decision when the benign
app releases the port. In this case, a malicious UDP packet from an Android app could
make it through before the decision is enforced. However, the Monitor will (a) detect the
malicious attempt; (b) can determine the o↵ending app and; (c) can determine the a↵ected
device (destination). Once a violation is detected the user is notified to verify the status of
the a↵ected device and uninstall the o↵ending app which is also blacklisted in the policy.
On iOS such race attacks are always prevented: o↵ending tunelled tra c is blocked on the
phone whereas non-tunneled tra c to IoT devices is blocked at the router.
8.4 MITIGATION EVALUATION
I implemented a prototype of Hanguard—in DETECT mode for UDP (Section 8.3.3)—on
top of a TP-Link WDR4300v1 router with a Gb NIC and a wireless network at the 2.4 GHz
band (300Mbps) running OpenWRT Chaos Chalmer with a Linux 4.1.16 kernel, and also
Nexus phones running Android 5 (Lollipop) and an iPhone 4S running iOS 9. The evaluation
answers the following research questions:
• RQ1: Is Hanguard e↵ective in thwarting attacks from malicious applications?
• RQ2: What is the performance impact and resource consumption of the Monitors on the
phone side?
• RQ3: What is the overall overhead of Hanguard?
8.4.1 E↵ectiveness
To answer RQ1 and verify Hanguard’s backward compatibility and practicality, I repeated
the attacks I demonstrated on real world smart-home devices (listed in Table 8.2). I per-
formed the following two experiments: (A) first I set up the target IoT devices over the
“Vanilla” system (without Hanguard’s components), and further installed a repackaged ver-
sion of their legitimate app on the phone to mimic the adversary; (B) next, I updated the
router with Hanguard-enhanced firmware, and also put our Monitor app on the same phone
with a policy that allows the phone and the benign app to access the target IoT device.
Under this protected setting, I repeated experiment (A), using the phone with the Monitor
app to set up the IoT devices. As expected, both the original app and the repackaged one
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Figure 8.7: Android Monitor polling scheduled frequency vs Actual polling frequency.
could access the devices in the Vanilla system. With Hanguard enabled, only the o cial
apps on the phone running the Monitor app could communicate with their respective IoT
devices , which confirms the e↵ectiveness of the access control enforced by Hanguard and its
backward compatibility (see [223] for demos).
8.4.2 Phone-side Performance
Monitoring cost on Android. On Android, the Monitor continuously polls the procfs
file system to detect ongoing network connections. Here I report a study on two monitoring
strategies and their performance impacts. Specifically, I configured the Android Monitor
on a Nexus phone to inspect the procfs file system in di↵erent granularity (every 5ms,
10ms, 20ms, 30ms, 100ms). After running for 30 seconds, the Monitor went through every
single file line to check the presence of interesting network connections, a strategy called
the Naive mode. The approach was compared with another strategy I also introduce, called
the Smarter mode, which first looks at the last modified time of a file before accessing its
content. The outcomes of the study are illustrated in Figure 8.7. Clearly, the Smarter
strategy clearly can poll at a finer granularity (5 ms), given that it reads much fewer file
lines compared with the Naive approach (Figure 8.8), which is translated to less work per
iteration in the common case.
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Figure 8.8: Number of file lines parsed for di↵erent Android Monitor configurations.
I further looked into the resource consumption of the Monitor. For this purpose, I con-
figured the Monitor to poll at 10 ms and recorded its CPU and battery consumption for
both the Naive and Smarter mode. On the same Nexus 5 phone, I also ran Trepn [237] by
Qualcomm to collect the baseline power profile of the phone for 30 seconds before running
our Monitor app for 2 minutes. Figure 8.9 illustrates the average battery consumption that
can be attributed to the Monitor, and Figure 8.10 shows the average CPU usage (first 4
bars). To put things into perspective, I compared the Monitor with a popular Antivirus
app in scanning mode and the de facto mailing app on Android (Gmail). As it is evident
from the figures, the power consumption of the naive approach is comparable to an antivirus
app performing an expensive operation while the smarter mode’s is comparable with Gmail
which is optimized to always run in the background.
Monitoring cost on iOS. To evaluate the iOS Monitor ’s resource consumption, I used
Instruments [238], a performance analysis and testing tool which is part of the o cial Apple
IDE (Xcode [239]). Figure 8.10 depicts the % CPU utilization that can be attributed to a
runtime process, where measurements on iOS are indicated with * (last 3 bars): the Monitor
when proxying a TCP app that sends 500 messages with payload size equal to one character;
the Monitor when proxying an equivalent UDP app; and YouTube while streaming a video















































Figure 8.9: Battery Power on Android.
a lot of work when proxying TCP tra c: this is expected as TCP is a connection oriented
protocol and the Monitor needs to guarantee reliable delivery of the packets. For UDP the
Monitor does very little work. In idle mode (not proxying), the Monitor incurred no CPU
overhead. Instruments can also report the Energy Use Level of an app at runtime as a value
from 0 to 20. In all experiments the reported value was consistently 0/20.
Detection accuracy. The Monitor ’s goal is to detect an interesting flow generated on
the phone. For iOS the detection accuracy is 100% since all packets from interesting apps
are routed through the Monitor ’s VPN. For the Android Monitor though, the situation is
more complicated. For example, an interesting app might quickly set up a socket, send a
packet and then close the connection. The Android Monitor ’s detection accuracy depends
on whether it can catch such events given its polling interval. To answer this question I
created a micro-benchmark that includes a TCP and a UDP app connecting to a TCP
and UDP echo server respectively. They both stop the communication once the server
response is received. Again, we ran the Monitor in the Smarter mode 10 times for each of





























































Figure 8.10: CPU Load on Android and iOS(*).
indicate (see Figure 8.11) that the 10ms configuration could always detect outgoing TCP
and UDP connections.
8.4.3 Communication Overhead
To answer RQ3, I assessed the overall performance overhead of Hanguard, as this can
be observed from a mobile app. I created a baseline by performing the experiments below
on the unmodified system (Vanilla). To evaluate Hanguard communication overheads we
repeated the experiments on Hanguard with the respective benchmark app being either
policy-protected (Managed) or not protected (Unmanaged).
Application latency. I ran the TCP and UDP apps individually, configured to send 100
messages each. Figure 8.12 depicts the mean latency in milliseconds (ms) for a TCP message
and a UDP message for Android. The latency is measured as round trip time (RTT) on
the mobile app. In particular I measured the time interval between the API call to send
the message and the time that the message is returned by the server and delivered to the
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Figure 8.11: TCP and UDP flow detection accuracy for di↵erent Android Monitor
configurations and for the iOS Monitor.
application layer. As we can observe, Hanguard introduces negligible latency for Managed
apps on Android.
In Figure 8.13 we can see that there is a big increase on TCP packet latency for the
Managed apps on iOS. Nevertheless, in practice this is often tolerable, since most devices
are actuators and sensors that create mice flows 6 delivering a small amount of information:
for example, it is completely imperceptible when the delay for switching a light grows from
a few milliseconds to tens of milliseconds. This Figure also reveals an important benefit of
our design: the security controls have negligible impact on Unmanaged apps, on both Android
and iOS devices, for both UDP and TCP.
Application throughput. To measure Hanguard’s throughput overhead, I used the bench-
mark apps to transmit a file of 20MB to their server counterparts. I repeated the experiment
10 times. Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.15 plot the throughput CDF for Android and iOS re-
spectively. Evidently, Hanguard has negligible impact on throughput for all Android apps
and iOS unmanaged apps. Our evaluation also reveals an interesting case: throughput drops
significantly—but only—for the iOS Managed apps 7. This happens because the iOS Mon-
itor implementation uses the built in VPN utility of the OS. Thus, it has to inspect every
6A mouse flow is a flow with a short number of total bytes sent on the network link.
7In practice this will only a↵ect real-time streaming services o↵ered by such app-device connections.











































Figure 8.13: Application-level communication latency for iOS. The x  axis is in log10
scale.
packet for managed apps (see Figure 8.4). This is a security, performance trade-o↵ we had
to address. We opted-in for security.
8.5 DISCUSSION
HAN users smartphones OS integrity. The application-level enforcement assumes that
HAN user phones are not compromised. Preventing phone compromises is out of the scope
of this study since other solutions already exist and even deployed on commodity smart-
phones [240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245]. For example, SELinux for Android [246] uses manda-















































Figure 8.15: Application-level throughput for iOS.
deployed on all Android phones with version 4.4. and higher (more than 60% in 2015 [247]).
Most Android phones are equipped with ARM processors [248] with TrustZone [243] which
can be utilized for solutions stemming from the trusted computing domain. TZ-RKP [244]
is a real-time kernel protection technique deployed on Samsung Galaxy phones that ensures
the kernel integrity using the ARM TrustZone secure world. iOS devices have the Secure
Enclave, a secure co-processor that is used to guarantee secure boot [245]. However, even
if a user device is compromised (and in the case of all guest phones), Hanguard can guar-
antee phone-level protection.Furthermore, Hanguard helps its users detect spurious access
attempts by (1) keeping a log, (2) sending out-of-band notifications to the admin user when
a violation of the policy is attempted.
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Switching Between Information Gathering Approaches. iOS follows a far more strin-
gent approach than Android in isolating processes. In fact our Android solution for tra c
monitoring does not work on iOS. Instead we utilize Apple’s NEPacketTunnel Provider
API with a per-app VPN configuration. The latter requires an MDM (Mobile Device Man-
agement) server: the router vendor will need to enrol their users’ iOS devices and push an
over-the-air (OTA) configuration profile on the phone, just like the cell phone carriers (e.g.
AT&T, T-mobile e.t.c.) do. This process is already mature and streamlined for users who
just need to accept the configuration. Apple does o↵er the non-enterprise NEVPNManager
API but that would entail Hanguard iOS Monitors proxying tra c not only from a selected
set of apps but from all apps, imposing the overheads we demonstrate in Section 6.4 for both
unmanaged and managed apps. In the proposed design we opted for security and runtime
performance in the expense of an initial bootstrapping usability burden, that allows us to
selectively proxy tra c only from a handful of apps when used in the HAN environment.
This work illustrates how such capabilities can facilitate novel solutions on the iOS plat-
form. Also note that any of the two aforementioned techniques can be used in practice
with Hanguard iOS Monitors. Hanguard’s design, allows router vendors to readily switch
between monitoring techniques with a mere application update. Similarly, if access to the
Android procfs as a whole is forbidden in the future (not a straightforward decision since
this would break a lot of legitimate apps), Hanguard can switch to a VPNService-based
Android Monitor by merely pushing an app update.
8.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter I presented my study on the security of smartphone communications with
shared smart-home WiFi IoT devices. My analysis revealed that introducing smartphones
in such environments introduces attack surfaces stemming from the smartphone’s multi-
tenancy. Indeed I showed how a malicious application on an otherwize authorized phone
to the smart-home network, can gain unauthorized access to connected IoT devices on the
same network. To tackle such adversaries I presented an e↵ective, e cient and backward
compatible system solution distributed between trusted phones and the home area network
router. The solution leverages the vantage position of the router to mitigate atacks even
from compromised devices but also collaborates with a userspace applications on trusted
phones to tackle other malicious apps on those phones from compromising the shared IoT
devices. Figure 8.16 visualizes the userspace tra c monitoring addition to the smartphone
operating system.
172
    MIDDLEWARE







































Figure 8.16: Userspace tra c monitors can help network routers enforce fine-grained
policies on network access request to shared IoT devices.
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CHAPTER 9: DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Over the years, stakeholders came up with fundamental design principles for secure sys-
tems. However, none of this would have completely prevented the problems I found in my
work. In this chapter, I will present a set of new security design principles stemming from
my analysis on modern, smartphone operating systems.
Saltzer et al. [249] discusses 8 principles to guide the design of a system which facilitate
reduction in security flaws. These principles are listed below:
• Economy of mechanism: this refers to keeping a design as simple and small as
possible.
• Fail-safe defaults: fail-safe defaults support a design where by default access is
denied, unless there is a condition under which access should be permitted.
• Complete mediation: authorization should be checked on every attempt to access
every object. This is a fundamental principle fo every access control design.
• Open design: the security of a system should not depend on its design secrecy. For
example the Android Open Source Project follows this principle. In contrast iOS is a
closed system. However, we should not assume it is more secure just based on that.
• Separation of privilege: when possible, require two keys to unlock a protection
mechanism.
• Least privilege: every principal should only have the least amount of privileges
possible in order to complete their tasks. Mandatory Access Control mechanisms can
achieve that with an ideal policy.
• Least common mechanism: shared mechanisms should be minimized as they can
be the source of potential information path between isolated principals.
• Psychological acceptability: user interfaces should be simple and protection models
should match the users’ mental models. This is to help user make correct security
decisions.
Similarly, the GenCyber program, targets building a cyber security curriculum based on
10 cyber security first principles. First principles should be the fundamental building blocks
of any security design. GenCyber aims to be more specific since it targets K-12 students
and instructors. According to Payne et al. [250], these principles are:
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• Minimization: aims to reduce the attack surface by disabling unneeded functionality.
This is a corollary from Saltzer et al. Economy of mechanism.
• Simplicity: facilitates clear understanding of a system’s functionality. This is a corol-
lary from Saltzer et al. economy of mechanism.
• Abstraction: remove any distracting details when not needed.
• Information hiding: prevent certain features from being available publicly (users,
other apps etc.).
• Least privilege: same as Saltzer et al.. Any tunning program should have the mini-
mum set of privileges possible to perform its tasks.
• Modularity: break up complex functionality into small components (modules). This
improves manageability, interoperability, security and protection. This is a corollary
from Saltzer et al. economy of mechanism.
• Layering: implement multiple layers of defense. If one layer is defeated, another one
might stop the attack. This is also discussed by Lampson [251] which defines it as
defense in depth.
• Resource encapsulation: all resources should be separated and use as intended.
This is a corollary from Saltzer et al. complete mediation.
• Process isolation: isolate processes sharing a platform so they do not interfere with
each other. Most operating systems implement this. Every program runs in its own
process with its own address space.
• Domain separation: separate areas where resources are located. For example,
SELinux uses assigns principals (subjects) to domains to dictate which resource each
domain can access.
All of these are valuable guidelines for building secure systems. However, during my
studies, I have identified some new valuable principles that could have helped in the design
of modern smartphone operating systems. These are: contextual threat model ; granularity
of mechanism and; layered responsibility.
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9.1 CONTEXTUAL THREAT MODEL
The security of a system is designed with a threat model in mind. However the threat
model itself should be designed taking into account the peculiarities of the context or envi-
ronment in which the system will be deployed.
Consider for example the analysis we performed on shared filesystem resources on smart-
phone operating systems (see Chapter 5). Android is built on top a stripped down version
of a Linux kernel. The Linux kernel does perform process isolation to prevent users from in-
terfereing with each other. It also uses a Discretionary Access Control mechanism to control
access to filesystem resources. By adopting the Linux kernel on Android, Android engineers
also made the decision to adopt its security models. This decision let to a number of prob-
lems where seemingly innocuous information made available on a desktop machine becomes
dangerous when applied on a smartphone operating system. There are two main di↵erences
between traditional Linux-based machines and smartphone operating systems which change
the threat model: (a) the notion of a user; (b) mobility.
In a traditional Linux system, a user ID (UID) is assigned to every user of the system.
A user is typically a human that uses the machine. The DAC mechanism which protects
resources on the device, relies on checks based on that UID and group ID (GID, users can be
grouped). On Android, UIDs are now assigned to applications. That is, every application is
considered as a di↵erent user of the device. Android engineers wrongly assumed that they
could merely reuse the Linux UID and inherit all Linux protection mechanisms. The threat
model though, is not trivially transferable between these environments. For example, reveal-
ing UIDs to users in a traditional Linux environment is of low risk. On smarpthone operating
systems, revealing the UIDs to applications (not users) means that every application can
be made aware of other applications that are installed on the smartphone (from the UID
one can derive the unique package name of an app on Android). This can be problematic
since the mere presence of apps reveals sensitive information: a user might install a dating
app (e.g. Tinder) or lifestyle app (e.g. a gay social network like Hornet), or healthcare apps
(e.g. a diabetes app or a pregnancy app). Other apps might target the user or harvest and
sell this information about the user to third-parties. I further showed in my analysis on
shared process resources (see Chapter 4) that the list of installed apps on a smarpthone can
be highly indicative of its user’s personally identifiable information (PII) such as age range,
gender and, zip code, but also if they su↵er from a medical condition or allergies, salary
range, marital status and more.
Also, other information seemingly harmless on traditional static Linux environment, be-
come dangerous when available on a mobile platform. In Chapter 5 I show how address
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resolution protocol (ARP) information available to a physical user on a traditional Linux
machine, can be leveraged by third-party applications on smarpthones to track the user’s
location. In a published related work[11] we further showed that just by knowing whether
the speaker is on or o↵, can also enable a third-party app to track the smartphone user’s
driving route. These are adversarial capabilities not present on a static machine.
Thus it is very important when designing a new system to re-consider the adversary model
before adopting any security mechanisms or decisions from another system.
Contextual Threat Model: The threat model for a system should be desinged taking into
account the context within which the system will be deployed.
9.2 GRANULARITY OF MECHANISM
Saltzer et al. discusses complete mediation as a fundamental property for access control
design and GenCyber highlights the importance of domain separation and process isolation.
However there is no guideline on the granularity of isolation and mediation. The granularity
of mechanism refers to the importance of selecting principals (or subjects) at the right
granularity for isolation and mediation decisions.
For example, even though Android uses complete mediation this does not stop the attacks
from advertising libraries we discussed on Chapter 4. This is because all mediation mecha-
nisms control access at the process level. Nonetheless, advertising libraries (or in principle
any third-party library) on smartphone applications run within the same process boundaries
as their host apps. Thus any security mechanism enforced at the process level will not be
able to control access to resources by third-party libraries. One could split the libraries from
their host apps such that they run on their own processes something suggested by Shekhar
et al. [17]. In this case, mediation at process boundaries would be enough. Nonetheless,
the security mechanism should be deployed respecting the granularity of principals. This
principle would further help design distributed systems. In Chapter 8 we saw how a router
in a smart home could only enforce device-level policies. When smartphones are introduced
in that environment this mechanism becomes insu cient. An authorized smartphone might
carry unauthorized apps which might try to gain access to smart home devices in the net-
work. The mechanism I introduced is based on the observation that access could happen at
application-level granularity. A corollary derived from the granularity of mechanism princi-
ple is the separation of origin which could further guide the implementation of some security
mechanisms.
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• Separation on origin: Principals or subjects in an access control scheme could be selected
based on their origins. An instantiation of this took place in web security with the same-
origin policy. The same-origin policy tries to tackle untrusted code running on a trusted
web page from accessing data on another web page. More recently Chromium (one of the
most popular open source browsers) introduced out-of-process iframes (OOPIF) which allow
a child frame of a web page to be rendered on a di↵erent process. The important security
decision here was the identification of trusted principals not at the web page level but at the
iframe level. Basically the focus should be to identify the lowest level where an origin can
execute code. Similarly, smartphone operating systems would benefit from security mecha-
nisms designed with principal isolation and mediation at lower than the process levels. For
example, code could be indentified based on the package name of their Java class hierarchy.
This would allow the design of mechanims to protect against third-party libraries who take
advantage of their shared host app’s privileges. Moreover, in Chapter 6 we discussed how
we can utilize the same principle for preventing permission escalation attacks on Android.
For example, custom permissions on Android which are declared by untrusted principals
(identified by their unique app identifiers on Android) should be decoupled from system
permissions which should only be defined by system principals. Even within the realm of
custom permissions, a custom permission should be strictly associated with the principal
that defined it. We have seen how this stops permission hijacking attacks.
• A case study for Android : Lets see how we can re-design security mechanisms given this
principle. Modern processors leverage the notion of protection rings. Protection rings are
basically successively less privileged domains with the data they can access. x86 supports
4 rings ranging from 0 (most privileged) to 3 (least privileged). Linux, only leverages ring
0 for the kernel and ring 3 for userspace apps. The problem with the implementation of
this mechanism on Android, is that third-party libraries run in the same ring as the host
apps. Android also leverages a permission model at its middleware which is essentially a
capability-based access control scheme. Resources are protected by permissions and apps are
granted permissions to access them. A reference monitor checks on such resource requests,
whether the requestor app has the appropriate permission. However, these permissions are
granted at the process granularity which means they can be inherited by an app’s libraries.
Lastly, SELinux on Android further separates apps/processes in domains to enforce a type
enforcement MAC scheme. Even this domain separation does not help when the granularity
of the mechanism is coarse-grained.
Bearing the separation of origin principle in mind, we could identify third-party libraries as
principals. Once we do that, we can revisit the protection mechanism implementations. At
the lowest level, we could utilize an extra protection ring for third-party libraries. Apps could
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run on ring 2, whereas libraries could run in the less privileged ring 3. Of course this would
require certain support from the underlying architecture to utilize more rings. Inside that
ring, principals should not have the ability to directly use system calls, access sensor drivers
etc. At the middleware layer, Android would grant permissions di↵erently to apps and their
libraries. This would allow the system to restrict the permissions that can be granted to
third-party libraries. For example, we could disallow libraries from using middleware APIs
to access sensors, dynamically load code, run background processes etc. Furthermore, we
could easily present the user with clear indications on whether a permission is requested or
used by an app or an advertising library. Lastly at the SELinux type enforcement mechanism
we could also further isolate resources from libraries.
Evidently, the granularity of mechanism is a powerful principle which has a direct im-
pact on systems’ security. The origin of principal can facilitate granularity decisions to set
privilege boundaries.
Granularity of Mechanism: The granularity of a security mechanism (isolation, privilege
assignment) should match the trust model.
9.3 LAYERED RESPONSIBILITY
This principle refers to placement of security mechanisms at the right layers of the system.
Here layers could be layers in the software stack or privileged layers/domains. Lampson [251]
discusses defense in depth and GenCyber uses layering to argue about the placement of
multiple layers of defense. Here I provide arguments to reason about the responsibility
of each layer of defense. Saltzer et al. [252] posed the end-to-end argument which provides
reasoning against low-level function implementation in layered communication protocols. In
a nutshell the paper advocates avoiding mandatory functions in lower layers, if layers above
it have the necessary semantics to decide whether a function should be used. This avoids
unnecessary performance penalties. The paper discusses the subtleties in making those
decisions. Layered responsibility adds to that discourse focusing on security mechanisms.
While it might be tempting to move a security function in a layered system closer to
the application that leverages that function, sometimes relying on higher layers introduces
security problems. Let us consider the Android operating system as a layered architecture
with the following layers from bottom (higher privilege) to top (lower privilege): the kernel;
the middleware including system applications and; third-party applications. Note that the
layers I consider are based on their privileges. You can also think of them as protection rings,
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or isolation domains. In most networking operations, relying only on the OS for security
is insu cient: relying solely on the kernel (with its networking stacks) to authenticate the
external resource (a web domain, a Bluetooth device, an NFC device, a WiFi device) raises
mis-bonding issues (see Chapter 7). In particular, encryption integrated in the protocol
can tackle network adversaries but remains vulnerable to internal adversaries in the form
of third-party apps competing for access to the network channel. These apps have access
to the information after it is being decrypted by the protocol. Moreover, authentication
happens at the device level since the kernel does not have the necessary semantics to enforce
app-level or user-level authentication. On the other hand, solely relying on third-party
applications/developers for security is bad practice. We found that most Android apps
which interact with external sources of information (SMSs, Bluetooth, NFC and Internet
devices) su↵er from lack or weak authentication (see Chapter 7), while others have found
that security is commonly implemented incorrectly by third-party developers [231]. In the
context of a smart home, we can think of an equivalent security architecture with the router
being the most trusted device and third-party IoT devices in the network as untrusted. In
that setting we found that most of the security vulnerabilities manifest again because of lack
or weak authentication, or implementation flaws on third-party IoT devices [29]. In contrast,
not only we should have security in multiple layers, but it is important to think about the
responsibilities of each layer in the overall security of a system.
For example, the networking protocol could ensure device level authentication and encryp-
tion to guarantee secure inter-device communication. Most communication protocols already
do or support that. However, the OS responsibility is to also guarantee secure access to re-
sources, whether these are internal (filesystem resources) or external (devices). Thus the OS
should have mechanisms to make sure that the expected application is utilizing a networking
channel at any given point. Currenty, on Android, this is mediated through permissions and
Linux group IDs (GIDs). Nonetheless, as I showed on Chapter 7, it does not guarantee that
apps will utilize their permissions only to connect to external resources we expect them too;
the permission provides access to the channel irrespective of what is on the other end. The
OS responsibility does not stop at deciding who should access the networking channel as
a whole. This might be true for files, which are mostly static and predictable resources.
In contrast, networking sockets can be used to access any unpredictable external resource.
Since we expect the OS to manage resources, the OS should have mechanisms to guarantee
correct multiplexing of such information to applications. For example, a Bluetooth Fitbit
should interact only with the Fitbit app. We discussed how the OS can leverage user-driven
decision making to support such decisions, or enforce MAC rules in enterprise settings where
admins have knowledge of the enterprise applications and resources. Lastly, authentication
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should be performed by the application, as it is expected to do so in current implementa-
tions. The applications have the necessarry semantics to decide whether the correct user is
logged into the app/service, and also can authenticate the remote resource. For example, an
app developer can decide whether two-factor authentication is mandated or not (a gaming
app might not need it, a banking app will benefit from it); an app developer can decide
whether the remote service is the expected one.
It is also tempting to move security operations in more privileged domains of respon-
sibility. ARMTrustZone and Intel SGX are technologies which support trusted execution
environments (TEE) in systems. Programs and information in TEEs are strongly (harware)
isolated even from the kernel of the OS. Nonetheless, logic in TEEs should remain as simple
and small as possible (economy of mechanism). The security operations in the TEE should
match its responsibility. For example, we could ensure root-of-trust and enable remote at-
testation in the TEE but we should not expect it to perform application access control to
resources.
Layered Responsibility: Respect each layer’s responsibility when placing security mecha-
nisms in a layered system.
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CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
10.1 SUMMARY
In my work, I have performed a holistic security analysis on the security of modern smart-
phone operating systems. My analysis used Android as a usecase which is the most popular
smartphone operating system (> 80% of smartphone OS marketshare). Smartphones, are
equipped with advanced sensors and networking capabilities. Their always-on and always-
with-us nature renders them the de facto devices users utilize to perform a vast array of
daily tasks, from socializing, to performing financial transactions and mangement, medical
condition tracking, navigation etc. To maximize utility, modern smartphone operating sys-
tems rely on a multi-process architecture which supports concurrent execution of userspace
programs from a variety of sources. This allows third-party developers to create mobile
applications which can utilize a number of resources made available to them by the smart-
phone operating system to o↵er creative services. This creates a multi-tenancy issue on
smartphones where third-party applications compete for access to resources. In my work
I analyzed how shared resources in this environments, can be used by third-party tenants
in unexpected ways, to compromise the confidentiality of user and other tenant data on
smartphones. This understanding allows us to develop more accurate adversary models for
smartphone operating systems. I used this understanding to design e↵ective and e cient
mechanisms for information leakage detection and prevention. My solutions are tested on
real smartphone applications, operating systems and devices.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the shared resources studied in my work. The Figure is redrawn here
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I have proven that shared resources can be the source of vulnerabilities on smartphone

































Figure 10.1: Smartphone shared resources.
too coarse-grained or merely flawed, and as such are insu cient to guarantee the confiden-
tiality of user or application data. Unfortunately, current smartphone operating systems
focus mostly on isolating third-party applications as a whole from the system. This is im-
portant for the integrity of the device. However, this treatment overlooks the severe private
information leakage across third-party apps, made possible through shared resources. My
work shows how by including this in our threat models can help us design more e↵ective
systems for detection and prevention of such leakage.
My designs are shown to be e cient and e↵ective. More importantly I took an approach
which retrofits security into existing products. Figure 10.2 illustrates the main security
enhancements my work introduces to smartphone operating systems. For example, in the
case of mobile advertising, it is unclear whether a prevention mechanism would be practical
since the OS vendors have strong business incentives to enable advertising. In this case I
showed how we can develop tools that can help users and app developers to discover how
their information can be accessed by advertising libraries. In sharing filesystem resources I
showed how an abstraction layer can help us release contents of files at di↵erent granularities
as dictated by users through permissions. I also showed how by redesigning the permission
model to separate management of custom and system permissions can prevent privilege
escalation attacks. I have also showed how we can extend the use a hybrid mandatory
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Figure 10.2: Proposed security additions on smartphone operating systems.
and discretionary access control scheme distributed across the middleware and the kernel,
to o↵er fine-grained protection to external to the smarpthone OS resources. Moreover, I
demonstrated how we can build userspace network tra c monitors which can can help IoT
endpoints such as routers enforce fine-grained application level decisions on flows targetting
IoT devices. Lastly, based on my security analysis on shared smartphone operating systems,
I introduced three new needed principles to guide the design of secure systems (see Chapter
9): contextual integrity ; granularity of mechanism and; layered responsibility.
10.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
Next I list the main contributions of this work.
• Provides a systematic analysis of information reach of advertising libraries embedded in
smartphone apps. Previous work has focused on past and current behaviors of advertising
libraries, overlooking the fact that these behaviors can change opportunistically. This thesis
focuses on the fact that such libraries share process space and privileges with their hosts
and as such can eventually take advantage of those privileges. It systematically models all
shared privileges a library has with its hosts which leverages for the design of an automatic
184
open-source tool for estimating the risk of sensitive user information exposure by a host app
to its advertising library.
• Discovers new side-channels hidden in shared filesystem resources and demonstrates new
adversarial inference techniques. An analysis of Android shared filesystem resources led to
the discovery of new side-channels which can be exploited by malicious applications with a
suite of new inference techniques to bypass the process isolation boundaries and infer a user’s
identity, medical condition and financial preferences. This work led to Google introducing
further restrictions on Android filesystem resource access by third-party apps.
• Redesigns the Android Runtime Permission Model to tackle attacks on shared system and
application components. This thesis introduces a redesign of the Android permission model
which (a) separates management of system-defined and third-party-defined permissions and
(b) tracks ownership of custom permissions. This solves a perennial problem on Android
where vulnerabilities kept arising because of this non separation of trust between permissions.
The proposed model is backward compatible and formally verified to be correct with respect
to fundamental security properties.
• Unearths threats on Android’s communication with external resources. This work system-
atically studies Android’s shared channels of communication with external resources such
as Bluetooth and NFC devices, devices that connect through the Audio port, incoming
SMSs and, WiFi smart-home devices. It defines a new threat, called the device mis-bonding
(DMB) problem, to highlight the system’s incapacity to create application-level bonds. It
further demonstrates that Android’s system permissions are too coarse-grained to support
the utility of the apps while guaranteeing the confidentiality and intergrity of the data com-
municated through these channels. Furthermore it measures the prevalence of the problem
in the Android ecosystem.
• Introduces smartphone OS-level enhancements to safeguard the communication with An-
droid external resources, using both MAC and DAC. This is the first mechanism that provides
comprehensive protection of di↵erent kinds of Android external resources over their channels
in a uniform way. The enhancements are built on top of SELinux on Android and achieve
both MAC and DAC in an integrated, highly e cient way, without undermining their se-
curity guarantees. These new techniques help both system administrators and ordinary
Android users to specify their policies and safeguard their accessories and other external
resources.
• Introduces a novel distributed application-level access control system to safeguard vulnera-
ble shared smart-home devices from malicious smartphone apps. It shows how smartphones
can collaborate with enforcing points in smart environments to enable fine-grained access
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control for WiFi smart-home devices. The design focuses on OS-level enahancement at
the enforcing point (the router) which makes device-level decisions and utilizes trusted ap-
plications on smartphones for application-level decisions. The trusted applications utilize
novel tra c monitoring techniques while the overall solution is independent from IoT device
manufacturers.
• Impact on real-world smartphone operating systems. Threats revealed in this work were
acknowledged by Google, who overhauls the development of Android (the most popular
smartphone operating system) which is used by millions of users. Google introduced security
enhancements to Android to address these issues.
• New design principles for the secure systems. Proposed three new principles for the design
of secure systems.
10.3 MOVING FORWARD
Shared resources can be the source of security issues in every multi-tenant environment
(e.g. cloud, smartphones). As devices become more interconnected, this creates a compli-
cated system of systems, where devices compete for and share not only networking, but also
physical, event and other resources.
For example, IoT devices are now increasingly controlled through new user interaction
modalities such as voice and gestures. In those environments, the control signals are com-
municated through the physical channel which is essentially shared between all devices and
humans in proximity. This is problematic since these signals can be spoofed by a proximity
adversary. An interesting direction would be the study of how these physical channels can
be exploited and how we can build better security mechanisms to mitigate such threats.
In addition, a lot of e↵ort is going into enabling smart cities and connected vehicles. The
vision is to enable next generation vehicles to communicate with each other and the infras-
tructure to improve navigation, positioning, awareness and optimize tra c scheduling among
others. In this ecosystem, connected vehicles will share massive amounts of media streams
or outcomes based on those with each other and the infrastructure. Also the infrastructure
would o↵er services to connected vehicles based on crowdsourced and historic data. Shar-
ing these rich sensing streams and historic information, come with grave privacy concerns.
An interesting direction would be to study how an adversary can utilize such shared data
to fingerprint and profile individuals. From the defense perspective we need new technolo-
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